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
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BY GEORGE PLIMPTON ADAMS, Ph.D.


ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA



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PREFACE

HIS essay is intended to offer, in substance, an analysis of an idea which lies at the center of much modern thought and life. In the main, it is only the theoretical aspects of this modern idea which are here examined. The essay began to take definite shape before August, 1914. During recent months the conviction has increasingly been borne in upon the author's mind that it is this same idea on its practical side, in industry and in politics, which lies behind the Great War, now provisionally ended. It is this same idea which also lies behind innumerable sinister forces which are bending every effort to insure that the world shall return as speedily as possible to the status quo ante. "Examining the bonds of sympathy and interest which unite the reactionary forces, we find them centered in the arbitrary 'will to power.' "Thus wrote Mr. John A. Hobson but a few months ago.

It is impossible to be profoundly dissatisfied with much of the main current of modern philosophy and not, at the same time, be radically critical of the eventuation of the modern forces in the established economic and social fabric. Idealism in philosophy should connote a wide understanding of and a generous sympathy for the forces—primarily those of common life and labor—which are rapidly gathering strength to challenge the "arbitrary will to power" lying at the root of so much within the established order. That challenge calls for an articulate philosophy. Many who vigorously repudiate the entire apparatus of idealism have made and are making solid contributions to the formation of such a philosophy. One of them—a leader since the death of William James—it has been the author's privilege to know for the first time during the last few months. Some of his views are criticized in the pages which follow, and there is, quite certainly, nothing here which

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would meet with his approval, should he chance to turn its leaves. Yet, the author likes to think it not wholly impossible to unite in a common undertaking all who see the imperative need for building up a future world order wherein genuine democracy shall be more than a name.

I have to thank the editors of the Harvard Theological Review for their permission to use, in the third chapter, an article on "Mystery God and Olympian God," published in April, 1916.

GEORGE PLIMPTON ADAMS.

Berkeley, February 11, 1919.

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CHAPTER I

THE MODERN PROBLEM

HE world of modern, west European civilization has been fashioned by certain massive energies of life and of thought which, in spite of their complexity and diversity, possess a considerable degree of coherence. The formative forces of any age reveal themselves not only in the more or less formal and explicit utterances of philosophers and moralists, but in social and economic structures, in the settled habits of thought and the latent assumptions which underlie men's judgments, beliefs and ideals. The totality of these structures, constituting the life of an age, may be called the idea system of that age. Every political, economic, and social structure amidst which men live, as a system of human deeds and relationships, is such an idea system. I do not mean that it necessarily originates as the deliberate projection of some conscious idea. Rather does the opposite appear, normally, to be the case. The conscious philosophies and ideals of men seem most often to be the effect of historical facts which are already accomplished. But I do mean that when we seek to study a social structure as something which is significant in human life and human history, we are bound to view it from the side of the ideas and ideals which live within it. Every such social structure and settled institution is the outward and visible form of certain human attitudes, habits of thought, interests, in short, of a certain consolidated idea system. Thus, feudalism is, in the first instance, a political and economic organization of society, defining a certain scheme of land tenure, of mutual obligations, and of the distribution of wealth. But feudalism is also something which has to do with the conscious attitude of man toward his world, with the underlying premises of all his beliefs and value judgments. It is something spiritual as well as economic and political. It is both an

idea system and a structure of society. The same may be said about such things as imperialism, capitalism, and machine industry, nationalism, syndicalism, etc. It is because of this intimate and undeniable continuity between idea system and social forces and processes that history may well be called "the biography of ideals."

We are familiar with the task which physiological psychology has set itself and has carried through, in certain regions at least, with a considerable measure of success. States of consciousness are correlated with bodily and organic processes. Physiological psychology is the study of these correlations. But states of consciousness and idea systems are correlated not only with physiological processes but also with social processes and structures. To study the nature and scope of such correlations would appear to be the task of social psychology, an inquiry still in its infancy. Physiological psychology, as is well known, has been most successful in the study of sensation and perception and the more elementary feelings and emotions. It has, on the whole, comparatively little to say about the higher and more complex mental processes, about judgments, sentiments, and those pervasive attitudes and habits of mind which determine our beliefs and loyalties. May it not be that, in order to understand these regions of the life of the mind, we need a social psychology rather than a physiological psychology? There are many hopeful signs of the solid beginnings of such an undertaking. In any case we know that our thinking does not occur in the void, we know that there are subtle filaments which link together social institutions and conscious attitudes into one single life structure.

If this is at all true, then we may expect to find that most or even all of the formative forces which make an age to be what it is may be interpreted as the expressions of a single idea system. The "unity of consciousness" is not merely an abstract principle which has given to philosophers and psychologists an opportunity for subtlety and dialectic. It is an organizing principle, a spiritual attitude which fashions not only an individual mind, but the life of a community and of an age as well. To understand an age is to understand that idea system, that organizing ideal which lies behind the mind and the deeds of that age and community.

¹ Delisle Burns: "Political Ideals," p. 27.

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Now, I am persuaded that amidst all the manifold traditions which lie embedded within our age, there is, through vast reaches of our life and our thought, a single idea system which is at work. And I cannot escape the conviction that, in a profoundly true sense, "the world war has revealed the meaning of our social system," and that the hope for the future lies, in the first place, in understanding the path along which we have been travelling. That many of the fundamental categories of our thinking and of the basic concepts to which the modern age has become habituated need to be overhauled and reconstructed, is the unescapable lesson of the present world situation, which he who runs may read. This essay is an attempt to understand something of that idea system in the midst of which the present age has been living its life. There is, within the modern world, something distinctive and something new. It may be understood only when we contrast it with those idea systems which lie behind us. To those older structures either of thought or of social life we cannot return even if we would. We must go on into the future. What that future shall be depends in part upon how we estimate and interpret the nature of those energies which have been bearing us along throughout the modern age.

We may profitably dwell for a moment upon this continuity between philosophy and life—for it is just this which we have in mind. Such continuity of life and philosophy has been accepted as a matter of course by those who have contributed most to our human stock of significant ideas. For them, to live has been to think and to know, and to know has been to envisage the meaning of their life and their age. Let us say, if we will, that the instruments and the habits of our thinking acquire all too easily an inertia of their own. They may become severed from the concrete world of actual life. But thus severed, they dry up and they eventually die. This essential continuity between life and thought—when thought is sincere and profound—has certain implications, two of which are worth mentioning in this place. It means that the temper of philosophy, like that of life itself, must be empirical, in the deeper meaning of that term. It is often asserted and more often implied

² Chas. Trevelyan, in a communication to the London Nation, February 2, 1918.

that the process of thinking is one that is essentially different from every process of observing and obtaining insight through first-hand contact with actual facts. This latter is empirical, whereas reflection is somehow removed from all facts and is a mere matter of spinning things out of one's head. That is what philosophy is often thought to be, whereas science looks abroad upon a world of objective facts. But just to the extent to which our thinking is relevant to the process of living, is this contrast inaccurate and superficial. Thinking need not be capricious and uncontrolled by objective data. Indeed we may say, I believe, that all significant thinking is really a kind of insight, and its method is broadly empirical. All thinking is the reporting of some situation which the thinker observes to be whatever it is; it is an exploration of some realm which is as little created by the capricious fancy of the thinker as the configurations of the earth's surface are created by the explorer. Thinking is discovery, exploration, insight into the constitution of some realm which possesses being. What the nature of such a realm may be, and how it differs from the space world of the geographical explorer, need not here concern us. A geometrical or algebraic proof which one "thinks out" is a report of an objective situation, an objective and definite set of entities and relationships. It is at least this, whatever besides this it may be. If mathematical thinking is of this nature, no less so is the thinking of the philosopher. He, too, seeks to report and to interpret an objective situation. To be sure his data, unlike those with which mathematical thinking deals, are not ordinarily as precise; they are not quantitative; not to so great an extent arranged in orders and series so that they may be expressed in compact formulae. The philosopher's data are more elusive and more pervasive; spread out thinly in the various regions of experience, more common and more elemental. In philosophy the area of "facts" over which various men will range in order to gather their data, will not always coincide, and men will not always agree as to what data are most worth while collecting. A region which to one philosopher seems lit up with significance will appear dark or trivial to another. Science, then, differs from philosophy not as observation differs from spinning things out of one's head, but in the sort of facts, i.e., objective situations which each is interested in observing and

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in reporting. Of course, neither science nor philosophy consists merely in reporting facts, as we ordinarily understand that expression. Besides observation, there is explanation and interpretation. But the essential thing to observe is that the process of interpretation itself is a kind of yielding of the mind to an objective situation; it is a species of insight, differing to be sure from the observation of this or the other particular fact, but not differing from it as "mere speculation" differs from "the reporting of facts as they are."

The continuity between life and thought means something further. We find it easy to think of philosophies as necessarily finished structures and closed systems, and we are easily led to contrast such finished systems with the forward-looking and open incompleteness which is characteristic of life. Many writers, feeling themselves to stand in the midst of vigorous currents of life carrying them on into an unknown future, into realms not as yet charted on any philosopher's chart, bid us distrust comprehensive throught structures because of their supposed fixity and finality in contrast with the unfinished flexibility of whatever possesses life. But I think that this is due, not to any inherent defect in thought structures as such, but rather to a certain distortion in our perspective. We look back and call the philosophies of which we read in the histories of philosophy, systems. We approach them from without; it is as if only their bony, skeletal structures were accessible to us through the medium of text books and lectures. The warm blood and the softer tissues which gave these structures life in the minds of their original thinkers are less permanent and all too easily escape us. To reconstruct them in thought requires more than an apprehension of inert dogmas and static systems. It requires that we view such thought structures not so much as systems, implying that they are thereby finished and dead, but rather as living, organizing concepts, both expressions of and guiding the central practical attitudes and interests of life. Such indeed they were. And such must be our philosophy if it shall serve us, as the older philosophies have served earlier generations. It will perhaps help us if we set out, then, not to formulate or to construct any "system" of metaphysics, but simply to gather in such significant, organizing concepts-

whether they be few or many, old or new,—as may best express the nature of our world and the needs of our life. Such an "organizing concept" is a significant idea, which shall mediate between our life and our environment. It shall be both true and pragmatic. It shall be flexible and living, as thinking and philosophy ever have been, and it shall utter the permanent and substantial interests of our life and our experience. It is not possible to say in advance what are the limits of such an undertaking. No doubt, the more we search and reflect, the better fashioned and the more comprehensive will our organizing concepts be, nor is this anything to be afraid of. But even a few, or only a single idea, and one which makes no claim to completeness or to the finished form of any system, may be a precious possession of our minds, giving men something to live by, a token of the reasonableness of our life and the vitality of our philosophy.

We return to the modern age. I propose to stress one single but vastly comprehensive idea system within the modern world and to inquire into its foundations and its consequences. To attempt to bring within the reach of a single attitude and thought structure, however comprehensive, even a few of the varied currents within a complex period is, of course, to invite abstractness and contentment with the obvious and the superficial. Yet, to understand anything which is varied and vital is always to run something of this risk. The worth of the enterprise is to be measured simply by our success in actually seeing what the continuities and analogies are between the various social structures, human attitudes, and reflective theories which radiate outward from one idea system as from a center.

It will serve to start us upon our way as well as to provide us with a rough sketch of our journey, if we state here briefly the problem which is to occupy us. This will be, needless to say, a much oversimplified and a quite abstract statement. Let one, then, survey in a single perspective most of the outstanding things which come to mind when we think of the distinctive traits of modern, west European civilization. There was the Renaissance, with its discovery of nature and of the individual and with its enormous re-

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ease of desires and of interests which seemingly found little outlet that world which witnessed the formation and the fixation of he Christian idea system. There was—and is—nationalism, which s simply the individualism of a continent, and which signifies the onsciousness of definite interests—economic, political, and honoric—which must be maintained, and whose protection and expansion nust be provided for. This individualism and this nationalism, this naintenance and development of interests, covers very much in he modern era. "In fact, the whole political history of the last four enturies," remarks a recent historian, "is in essence a series of ompromises between the conflicting results of the modern exaltation f the state, and the modern exaltation of the individual." There vas, too, the commercial revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth enturies, "starting Europe on her career of world conquest," and eading up to the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century with Il the characteristic features of capitalism following in its train. There was the French Revolution, the first mighty upheaval motived y the conscious conviction that the only social order fit for man o live in is one which he himself has made and can control,—and which he can also unmake if he so desires. This conviction is but emocracy, come to a full consciousness of its meaning and its ower. This conviction, to some degree, is never absent from any f the characteristic achievements and structures of the modern ge. And then there is science, born again with the Renaissance, nd breathing withal a somewhat different spirit from that which aspired it during its brief career in Greece two thousand years arlier. Science, in the modern age, becomes the partner of democacy; it becomes the instrument of knowledge through which man vins such control as he may over the forces of his life and his vorld. Now these mighty energies which have made our present vorld, varied as they are, share in a common trait, and issue from common motive and idea system. What that is will best come to iew if we set it over against the outstanding idea systems of the ncient and the medieval worlds. It is easy no doubt to exaggerate he contrast between modern and medieval. No less an authority

⁸ Hayes: "Political and Social History of Modern Europe," vol. 1, p. xxi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

than Mr. A. J. Carlyle assures us that "it was in the Middle Ages that the foundations were laid upon which the most characteristic institutions of the modern world have grown."

Such continuity in development between medieval and modern there surely is. The transition was a slow and uneven one, but transition there certainly was, and the order of things which emerged, the forces at work, and the human attitudes and interests which came to be uppermost were different. And the Christian tradition and idea system as it took shape in the structures of medieval life and thought were again continuous with those of the ancient world, in their most splendid portrayal in the philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle. Indeed, it may be said with confidence, I believe, that the thought structure and attitude of Christianity has much more in common with the philosophy of Plato than with those idea systems which are most characteristic of the modern era. But I venture upon these large and dubious historical generalizations simply in order to set over against each other two dominant human interests, one of which does belong chiefly to the culture of antiquity and Christianity, and the other to the modern age. Neither to Greek philosophy nor to Christianity did it appear that the vocation of man consisted in the rational and scientific control over life and over nature's energies in order to satisfy human desires. For Aristotle and St. Thomas, speaking respectively for the ancient and the medieval worlds, man's essential vocation was contemplation, the possession, in thought or in feeling, of those eternal and absolute perfections and forms which are both the ultimately real and the ultimately valuable. For both Aristotle and St. Thomas, the center of interest lay not at all in the organization of human life and society in terms of the satisfaction of natural wants; it lay rather in the possession of a Good which was not of this world. In how many ways does this contrast force itself upon our attention. The Stoic moralists condemned slavery, but they saw no way and, one must confess, they had little interest in the task of organizing social life so as to abolish slavery. Their ethics consisted essentially in the acceptance of the human lot and human experience as they found

^{.5 &}quot;Progress in the Middle Ages," in "Progress and History," p. 72.

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it,6 not at all in any zest for the radical control over and reconstruction of human society. Very much the same thing must be said about Christianity in the form which it assumed in the ancient church, and in the medieval world. Both sorrow and surprise are often expressed that this should have been so, that Christianity should not at once have set about the task of the organization of society in the light of those radical moral ideals which, in the primitive gospel, shine with such a simple transparency. Instead, of course, what happened was that the historic church accepted and justified most of those institutions and structures which we think it should have condemned—slavery, private property, political absolutism based upon force, and implicit obedience to the powers that be in all that concerns the body and its life, the inequality and harsh injustice of the entire social and economic order. The church fathers, with a few minor exceptions, acquiesce in these things without the slightest idea that it is either possible or worth while to attempt their control and their organization in the interests of human happiness. The church fathers justified them as both a punishment for man's sin, and a remedy, a means of discipline, necessary to train the will so that it may seek and find the true values of life which have their locus not here but beyond.7

There is here, it will be agreed, nothing of the spirit of democracy, in the modern and the radical meaning of that concept. Men do not seek here to *make* their world; they seek to participate in and to possess (or be possessed by) an ideal and divine order and life which they do not at all construct. That divine order is given to man to know, to contemplate, and to worship. And just this is the attitude which the medieval social order called for, whether it be the universal church or the feudal fabric which men think of not as a structure to be controlled, made and remade, but to be accepted and possessed. And so, too, with the Platonic Idea, and the Aristotelian

⁶ The Stoic, cosmopolitan "ideal was ineffective because it was embodied in a sentiment and not in a programme." Burns: "Political Ideals," p. 88.

⁷ Cf. Troeltsch: "Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen," p. 69. "Immer aber, bleibt bei aller Verständigkeit doch der moderne Gedanke fern, dass gerade der Aufbau einer geistig-sittlichen Welt einen entsprechended Unterbau der Materiellen und sozialen Verhältnisse erfordere. Die Ideologie des guten Willens fühlt sich für mehr als ein Jahrtausend allmächtig, völlig autonom und selbstgenügsam."

Form, and that Unmoved Mover "which produces motion by being loved." Life and thought consist precisely in the knowledge and the possession of these ideal yet most real structures. There are differences enough between the classical and the Christian ideals and attitudes which will interest us in a later place. But obviously they belong together in so far as they are both expressions of the mind's attachment to ideal structures which call for recognition, knowledge, and love, but not for control and mastery, as the modern world understands these terms. When we turn from these older thought structures and life attitudes to that which we sense as distinctively modern, we feel ourselves to be dealing primarily with an alteration in the fundamental bent of the mind's interests. It is no longer the attitude of acceptance, of possession, of knowledge, and of worship which expresses the nature of our world. Our world is one to be controlled, to be made and to be remade, to be exploited and utilized in order that our active human interests and impulses shall find release and satisfaction. And here we have the gist of the contrast between medieval (and ancient) and modern. The historical transition from the older to the newer order, from feudalism to democracy, from the handicraft, precapitalistic scheme of industry to the era of capitalism, from the ascendency of religion to the decay of reli-√gion—these and more may best be conceived as incidents in the transition from a world defined in terms of Possession and Participation to a world defined in terms of Activity and Control. It is philosophies of action, of creative evolution, of the control over nature and experience; philosophies of meliorism and of temporalism which voice the modern dominant temper with least hesitation. But, as we shall later on observe, empiricism and subjectivism are also modern. Not so idealism. That has come to us from Greek life and thought with its ideal of contemplation and possession, its objectivity, and its conviction that the life of the mind participates in objective, significant structures. And into the tradition of idealism there entered, too, something profound from the genius and the temper of Christianity. Nor was this any merely external addition. For idealism, in the historical and proper sense of that term, has proved itself to be the philosophical framework for a certain attitude toward life which may fairly be called religious. How pervasive and

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significant that attitude, with all that it implies, may be for us today is the question which we propose to study in this essay.

We shall be dealing thus with the relation between two comprehensive idea systems. One of these was the informing spirit of the essential contributions made both by the Greek experiment and by the Christian ideal to the venture of western civilization. That idea system is idealism. It is the spokesman for something which can only go by the name of religion. The varied energies of the modern world have exercised a constant pressure upon the idea system of religion and of idealism, and these modern tendencies both of our practical life and of our more formal theories have brought to light a radically different idea system and attitude which is embedded within institutions and habits of thought which may seem to have little in common. But these varied modern structures issue from one fundamental human attitude and idea system. These typically modern structures appeal, more or less consciously, to some interest which lies behind and beneath them, and which exists in order that it may be sustained and provided with material for its growth and its expansion. Life and thought are everywhere a matter of the maintenance and the expansion of such an interest. This is the essence of the modern discovery of nature and of instinct, of the self-consciousness of individuals, of social classes, and of nations. The idea systems of idealism and of religion are different. Here it is not so much a matter-of-fact interest which is thought of as generating the life of the mind, but, rather, certain objective, significant structures which life and mind were to possess and to assimilate. Ideas here look forward to the good, rather than backward to an interest. The vocation of man is to contemplate and to participate in something which is significant in itself, and not simply of value because it is the fruition of a desire or an interest. If life and mind are but the prolongation of certain interests which must expand and exploit their world if they are to exist as interests, then conflict is of the very essence of things, and peace and cooperation, yes, the arts of civilization themselves, are an illusion. Our problem—the common problem of all who may face the future with hope rather than despair—is simply the problem as to whether man's life and his mind may still be thought of as participating in objective,

significant structures, or whether life and mind are but the expression and prolongation of interests. This is the radical question for any theory of value, and for any theory of consciousness. It is the theoretical form of that question which statesmen and public opinion will sometime be called upon resolutely to face. When the time comes to decide what the world order of the future is to be, shall we go back to those structures and habits of thought which rest upon the maintenance and the balance of interests, or shall we go forward to a world in which interests are worth conserving, not because they happen to be our interests, but because they participate in an objective and a sharable good? We know now as never before what the modern world means. Shall we go back to naturalism and conflict, or forward to idealism and cooperation?

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACY AND THE MODERN ECONOMIC ORDER

DEALISM, we have said, may be viewed as the theoretical framework for a certain fundamental attitude and temper in which the mind looks forward to ideal yet objective, significant structures in which human experience may participate. Such an idea system with all of its theoretical and practical implications may be set over against that idea system in which the mind is the spokesman of and the instrument for some vital interest which exists as a fact of nature, and which is bent upon its maintenance, its expansion, and the exploitation and the control of all which its world may offer. That practical attitude and organization of human life which eventuates in the idea system of idealism is, historically, bound up with certain of the more profound traits of religion. Not that religion, as an historical fact and institution, exhibits in unmixed form the substance and the texture of idealism. Yet it has done so sufficiently to warrant our saying that idealism is the theoretical framework for religion. And those energies which have informed the most characteristic structures of the modern age have made of both religion and idealism a problem rather than a premise. Of these powerful undercurrents which have made our modern world to be what it is, there are two which may be observed somewhat more in detail in order to understand the idea system which characterizes our modern age. These two formative agencies are democracy and the energies which have created the modern economic and industrial order. If we should add to these two a third, namely science, I believe we should have before us the three forces which, more than any others, define our spiritual remoteness from the traditions of the past. The ideals of a radical democracy, the method

and temper of science, and the fundamental attitudes and interests correlated with the driving forces of the modern economic era, these sum up that revolution in our habits of thought and our judgments of value which distinguishes our world from that of the past.

These three formative agencies within the modern era are not three isolated forces. There are intimate relations between them. which bind them together, and make them all, in the last analysis, an expression of a fundamental attitude and idea. It is safer for the moment not to say very much about the relation of cause and effect here, not to decide whether this fundamental attitude of the modern man toward his life and his world is the source or the effect of science, of democracy, and of our modern economic order. It is enough for the present to know that all three of these peculiarly modern structures and forces are indissolubly correlated, either as cause or effect, with an inner attitude, a putting forth of mental energy in a highly characteristic and specific way. It is this attitude, and the idea system which it has generated, that has come in conflict with the idea system of religion and of idealism. In this chapter we propose to consider some of the effects of the pressure exerted upon the religious attitude by the modern energies of radical democracy and of machine industry.

However, religion would appear always to have been subject to a process of weathering and of wearing down. The forces which have tended to make of religion a problem rather than a premise are older than the modern age. They appear to be inherent in the nature of religion itself and in the very processes of civilization, as we have come to understand them, at least in the western world. Let us first call to mind two of these more general characteristics of religion which have ever tended to make it appear problematic and of doubtful worth in the enterprise of civilization. There is, first, an inclusiveness about religion where it has flourished with greatest vitality. This inclusiveness of religion is accompanied by a lack of development and differentiation amongst all of the other major human interests. It is frequently observed that all of the specific interests and energies of life were at one time either engendered or nourished by religion. Religion has been well called the "Mother

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of the Arts." But the prestige which thereby falls to religion seems doomed to decay as these specific interests—knowledge, the enjoyment of the beautiful, the arts of politics and war—develop, and come to stand upon their own feet. The process of civilization is marked by a process of differentiation and by the division of labor. As these offspring of religion grow up and attain to maturity, they no longer need the support of religion, and they throw off the restraints of any parental authority. At best will religion awaken a vague feeling of piety for that which lies in the past, but the energies for the active work of the future will be thought to come from elsewhere. Hence, when we say that religion is the mother of the arts, we should add that "the history of civilization is the history of secularization," and that the future appears to belong solely with those interests which have grown to be wholly independent of religion.

There is a second general trait of religion which makes it appear increasingly problematic. It stands out from among the other interests of life with a certain uniqueness. The position which it claims to occupy seems, in one respect, to be utterly peculiar and exclusive. All of the other, the secular interests of civilized man, appear to issue from the responses which he makes to the requirements of his natural environment, both physical and social. His science seems to be a development of what he needs to know in order to secure food and shelter, and to satisfy his basic needs; his morality appears to result from the necessity of meeting the demands of his social world; his art is perhaps an innocent and harmless way of exercising his surplus energy and saves him from more injurious forms of activity. I do not for a moment suppose that this view of the matter would give any fair account of the full nature

¹ "Allow me to assert without detailed evidence that all the arts of common life owe their present status and vitality to some sojourn within the historic body of religion; that there is little in what we call culture which has not at some time been a purely religious function; such as dancing, legislation, ceremony, science, music, philosophy, moral control, . . . Religion, I shall say, according to this vague figure, is the *Mother of the Arts:* this is its pragmatic place in the history of mankind and of culture." Hocking: "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," pp. 13-14.

Cf. also Durkheim: "De la Division du travail social," ch. 5. ² Shotwell: "The Religious Revolution of Today," p. 10.

of these varied interests; it is but a rough way of suggesting that whereas these secular interests constitute man's response to his world, religion appears to be his response to an over-world. Such, certainly, is its historic claim. Small wonder then that it should distrust the finality and the mature independence of all of those secular interests of civilization and culture, and small wonder that these in turn should look askance at the uniqueness and aloofness of religion. Religion can never admit that any one of the dominant cultural interests of civilized man contains its own complete justification or goal, but these, as they develop and absorb the limited energies of men, are impatient of any such judgment. Religion, in some sense standing apart from these cultural interests, is beset with all the disadvantages which the unique and the discontinuous are ever judged to possess. To understand and explain, and hence to justify has come to mean to discover continuities and to banish the unique. We need do no more here than barely mention these two general sources of the distrust of the permanent significance of religion in the work of history. Nor do I think it necessary to cite detailed evidence for the statements that religion is the mother of the arts, and that, unlike her children, she claims to be in some fashion a response neither to nature nor to human society, but to an over-world. We may be reminded, however, that if religion is indeed the mother of the arts and of all secular interests, there can scarcely be any complete gulf between the claims of that over-world and the requirements of man's natural environment. Either the claims of religion are wholly false, in which case something of illusion and falsity will gather around the arts which are the offspring of religion, or else something of that over-world will penetrate the special arts themselves-knowledge, the love of beauty, and all the interests of social experience—and these will not be the complete and independent energies which we so often suppose them to be.

These two general sources of distrust, making of religion something at least problematic, are the concomitants of the entire process of civilization. For all civilization is marked by some increase in the division of labor, and some heightened sense of the claims upon man's life made by specific regions of his natural and social environment. But everyone knows that, since the break-up of the Middle

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Ages, new and mighty energies in the world of thought and of society have been at work exerting a steady pressure upon the idea system which took shape while religion was dominant. These formative agencies we have said to be democracy, the new industrial order together with its concomitants, and science. I propose now to sketch briefly some of the ways in which democracy and machine industry have influenced the older habits of thought. Whether anything of permanent human significance was embedded within those older idea systems which found entrance in religion and in idealism, I do not now inquire. Our first task is to envisage the play of those historical forces which have made both religion and idealism appear

to belong wholly to the past and not at all to the future.

There are ambiguities in the concept of democracy, reflecting cross currents in the elemental forces which enter into its substance. One ambiguity, resulting in two quite divergent ideals of democracy, may here be noted. Does democracy stand essentially for an emphasis and an idealization of the common mass life, or does it stand for the ascendency of the individual? Is the central democratic idea that of the "active and supreme function of the imagined community," of the "beloved community" (Royce), or is it embodied in Bentham's dictum that "each is to count for one and for no more than one"? Common usage will justify either meaning of the concept of democracy, and common usage but reflects the outcome of a complex historical process. The historical roots of the ideal of democracy, at least in one of these two meanings, lie within an idea system and a social structure which was religious and idealistic. Its roots are to be found in those ideals of social solidarity and a community life which found partial expression in Plato's "Republic," in Aristotle's "Politics," and in the Stoic philosophy, but still more in the development of religious thinking and in the formation of the medieval ideal from St. Paul to St. Thomas. In this church idea of a Corpus Mysticum, in this ideal of an "organic Idea" (Gierke), which Royce has set forth as the one distinctively Christian idea, we have an instance, so far as the life of the individual is concerned, of the attitude of Possession and Participation. It is for the individual to appropriate and to possess an objective Grace

³ Gummere: "Democracy and Poetry," p. 17.

which resides in the life of the whole organism. Participation in the living structure of this organism determines for the individual his status, his vocation, his dignity, and his worth. In describing the medieval social structure and the range of ideas to which it gave birth, sufficient emphasis is not always, I believe, given to this "organic" idea. Thus Veblen, in setting forth the ground upon which the rights of an individual were thought to rest in the medieva scheme, concludes that "customary authority was the proximate ground to which rights, powers and privileges were then habit ually referred. It was felt that if a clear case of devolution from a superior could be made out, the right claimed was thereby established. . . . The superior from whom rights, whether of ownership or otherwise, devolved held his powers by a tenur of prowess fortified by usage; the inferior upon whom given rights and powers devolved held what fell to his lot by tenure of service and fealty sanctioned by use and wont. . . . I may be said that God's tenure of office in the medieval conception o things was a tenure by prowess, and men, of high and low degree held their rights and powers of Him by a servile tenure."4 This certainly is not the entire story. There is another aspect to the basis of rights in the medieval theory. Besides the principle of "devolution from a superior," holding his powers by a tenure of prowess, there was the idea of participation in an organic society held together by an autonomous law.5 This organic idea, says Troeltsch, is the "active formative, critical and, at times when occasion demands, revolution ary principle of Christian sociology."6 This idea implies, in principle a respect and love for all individuals and groups who participate in this divine life which pervades and sustains the entire community

⁴ Veblen: "The Theory of Business Enterprise," pp. 74 ff.

⁵ See the summary statement in the essay of A. J. Carlyle, "Progress in the Middl Ages," in Marvin's "History and Progress." See also the account given by Troeltsch "Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen." "Nach innen in ihrem eigenen Wesen wirdie Kultgemeinschaft zu einem verschiedene Stufen und Funktionen umfassenden, abe doch alle am Zweck und Sinn des Ganzen solidarisch betilegenden Organismus. Di Geltung des Individuums, die Verbundenheit zu einen überindividuellen Ganzen und die Einverleibung verschiedener Stufen und Funktionen oder inneren Gliederungen in die Idee des Ganzen sind damit ausgedrückt." p. 296.

⁶ Troeltsch: ibid., p. 304.

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'he individual's worth and his rights derive from what he posesses of the common, objective structure. And since this organic ommunity is defined in religious terms, since it exists, in idea at east, as the embodiment not of any particular political or economic nterest, but as an expression of the religious goal of all human existnce, the individual who participates in that community and who omes to possess its life has a standing and has rights which trancend the actual station to which fortune has allotted him. In the ght of the religious goal which defines the nature of this commuity, the social and economic cleavages between man and man and roup and group are bridged over.7 Here is something independent of he consent and the caprice of men, and independent, as well, of all he circumstances of historical accident and of mere matter of fact. t is through this possession of and this sharing in an objective whole, super-individual life that, as pointed out again by Troeltsch, the dea of subjective individual right first emerges.8 Here then is the rganic, community idea, and here is democracy, in one of its proound meanings. And here is a social realism, the attitude of possesion and participation, the looking forward of the mind to the ossession of an objective structure, rather than its pointing backvard to an interest which is to fashion and to utilize its world.

We feel that something essentially democratic still clings to the dea of group solidarity, to the "feeling that the masses alone make is touch the foundation of humanity, the people have revealed to is the human substance, the sap of the world." But democracy, in the modern world, has acquired a different meaning. It is the consomitant of the modern temper and attitude of activity. In the transition from the older, religious form of the democratic idea to the eighteenth century doctrine of natural rights there steadily falls that way the stress upon the possession, by the individual, of that which the holds from an objective, organic community. The individual's

⁷ Cf. Troeltsch, p. 305. "Auch die sonst so stark betonten ständischen Unterschiede verden in dieser Solidarität und in der Beziehung auf den religiösen Endzweck ausgelöscht. Die Sprache der Gesellschaftslehre kann dann fast demokratisch klingen und en naturrechtlich—christlichen Anspruch des Individuums auf Anteil am Ganzen und einen Gütern Stark betonen."

⁸ Troeltsch: ibid., pp. 305 ff.

⁹ M. Barrès, quoted by Wallace: "Lectures and Addresses," p. 140.

rights are now thought to reside entirely within himself and he is entitled actively to assert them over against every objective situation which confronts him. The individual no longer is what he is because of some system in which he shares, but he is first actively to create his community out of his individual rights. This concept of individual natural rights has both a radical and a conservative aspect. It is radical when compared with the medieval concept of the religious organic community, for it bids the individual not to discover and possess his world, but to make it—and to make it conform to his rights. And yet, as Bentham so vigorously preached, there is a static, unyielding character about the concept of "rights" which renders that concept unfit to be the bearer of a thoroughgoing radicalism. After all, if you talk about natural rights, you are still dealing with something prior to the individual, something which he receives and possesses as a datum, and which is, in just so far, unvielding to his own will. Completely to replace the concepts of possession by those of activity, is to renounce the idea of rights altogether and to substitute for it the idea of desire and its satisfaction, the idea of pleasure. Let nothing stand in the way of the activity of desire, moulding and transforming in the service of its own satisfaction (pleasure or happiness) everything which it finds. The individual is now significant, neither because he participates in and possesses the substance of a genuine organic community life, defined in supernatural and religious terms, nor because he possesses natural rights—nor indeed because he possesses anything which he derives from without, but solely because his own activities meet with response and success. The eighteenth century doctrine of natural rights forms a half-way station between the medieval religious conception, wholly expressing the ideal of possession, and the hedonistic, utilitarian conception, completely justifying the active desires of the individual.

But the full measure of democracy's principle does not altogether fit into the concept of desire and its satisfaction in terms of pleasure. The attitude of thoroughgoing activity means more than this, though modern hedonism and utilitarianism have been important derivatives and expressions of the democratic impulse in one of its forms. And we may say, I think, that the radical and revolutionary

attitude which democracy stands for may be summed up thus; man, either individual man or collective humanity, through an intelligent understanding of the nature of his life and of his world, may hope increasingly to direct and to control his own fortunes, and only that which is fruitful in this enterprise is fitted to endure in a democratic age. The ideal of democracy says to man, "Be not willing to live in any world, in any social order, which is presented to you merely as something to possess, to contemplate, to worship. Make your own world. Live only in the midst of such structures as you yourselves have constructed or have brought under your control."

Democracy, in this its radical meaning, enters but slowly into the current of human attitudes and habits of thought. Nevertheless in some fashion, however halting and obscure, it has ever been at work. For is not the very essence of civilization itself the attempt of man to modify his world, to construct something more congenial to his interests, real or fictitious, out of the raw material which nature offers him? Invention is the gist of civilization. Each successive step in the long history has resulted from man's making over something, transforming that which he but finds, into a form in which it does not exist by nature, but only by art or artifice. Every step, then, is marked by the introduction of something new, which is the outcome of the transforming agency of human activity, and which would never have come into being if man had been content to accept and possess that which he merely finds. Consider briefly the two regions which exhibit such reconstructive activity, the physical things in outer nature, and the elements, instinct and what not, which man finds in human nature. The making of fire, of the bow and arrow, of pottery, the taming of animals, the smelting of iron—these are the epoch-making inventions which raise man through the successive steps of savagery and of barbarism. Each is the discovery of a new art. But the discovery of an art is no mere appropriation or holding fast to some bit of nature; it is a reconstruction of that which nature offers. And in one momentous invention or art, namely that of speech, and still more, in the use of graphic signs, it is the construction and the creation of something which nature of itself does not contain. That is, systems of ideas, embodied in language, made possible by speech and made perma-

nent by writing, depend in some sense upon human activity. Instinctive sounds and meaningless marks are woven together, with the result that something new emerges. Significant ideas and a permanent language are the outcome of working raw materialsounds and marks—into a "finished product." And this process spells activity. It has become an all but universal habit of thought among us to define the progress of civilization in terms of technology and of the increase in man's control over nature. These successive steps by which early man invented something, made over some bit of nature's storehouse of raw material, are no doubt utterly sporadic, accidental, unconscious, compared with the persistent and deliberate adoption of the inventor's mental attitude in modern culture. We expect to make over and to control our world. "The key to modernity is control," says Shotwell. The democratic impulse of self-government, the view of the world as plastic and in flux, waiting to be made over into something which we desire, this attitude is all but lacking in primitive life, in the ancient world, in all cultures permeated by religion. There were practically no inventions in the ancient world; one wonders that an art so simple and elementary in principle as that of printing should not have been discovered by the Greeks. Apart from the absence of any necessity for the widespread diffusion of ideas, the reason lies in the fact that the Greeks did not look upon the objects in their world as raw material for human constructive and transforming activity. Their world was one to appropriate and to possess.

If civilization does however depend upon the inventive and transforming agency of men in respect to physical objects, it depends fully as much upon doing something with, reconstructing and transforming that which man finds within himself. This reconstruction of human nature is of greater significance than is the reconstruction of outer nature. Every law, every social institution, every form of government, every practical idea or ideal, is something made by man, introduced into the world of human instincts and passions and motives, and doing something to these elemental forces which, left to themselves, they would not achieve. Something happens to human nature in the course of civilization just as something happens to trees and animals, grains and metals. We have hardly become

habituated fully to the belief in our own power here; we still think and act as if, however we may succeed in making over physical nature, human nature is something which must be taken as we find it, and left with us as a static possession. These actual transformations and inventions in the arts of social life, the reconstruction and novelties in human nature, have been even more sporadic, more the result of blind necessity and of fortune, than those inventions which put us in partial control over the energies of nature. The democratic attitude and faith have been more slowly maturing here than there. There has hitherto not been as much in our prevailing philosophy and habits of thought to justify the hope of controlling and actively making over human motives and social structures, as there has been in the region of technology, machine industry, and physical processes. Yet, it is inconceivable that the democratic attitude of activity and control should stop short of the world of human nature. It is precisely in this human region that men are sensible, as never before, of the imperious need for some conscious guidance and intelligent reconstruction, if any such thing be at all possible. The belief that it is within the bounds of possibility, and that it is the one supreme task to which enlightened men in all civilized communities should now devote every energy—this belief and the longing which it expresses, will without any doubt be one spiritual deposit left behind by the war. More than ever before shall we need a philosophy which shall envisage this hope and this attitude, interpret it, and relate it to some total view of man's vocation and his enterprise.

Democracy then, as an idea and an attitude, stands for man's interest in mastering and in moulding his world rather than in participating in structures which are already real. It connotes activity, expansion, control, behavior, rather than possession, contemplation and knowledge. Democracy thus interpreted may yield a metaphysic as well. Hobhouse has set forth in impressive words the significance of such a metaphysic. "If, then, the whole course of history, or say, rather, of physical, biological, and social evolution, is to be summed up in this—that it is a process wherein mind grows from the humblest of beginnings to an adult vigor, in which it can—as in the creed of humanity it does—conceive the idea of directing

its own course, mastering the conditions external and internal of its own exercise, if this is a true account of evolution—and it is the account to which positive science points—then we cannot say that this is a mean and unimportant feature of reality which is disclosed to us. . . . It is, at any rate, something to learn—as, if our present conclusion is sound, we do learn—that this slowly wrought out dominance of mind in things is the central fact of evolution. For if this is true it is the germ of religion and an ethics which are as far removed from materialism as from the optimistic teleology of the metaphysician, or the half naïve creed of the churches. It gives a meaning to human effort, as neither the pawn of an overruling Providence nor the sport of blind force. It is a message of hope to the world, of suffering lessened and strife assuaged, not by fleeing from reason to the bosom of faith, but by the increasing rational control of things by that collective wisdom, the els Euros hoyos, which is all that we directly know of the Divine."10

It may not be questioned that there is an apparent conflict and tension between this deeper meaning of democracy and all that comes to us from the idealism and the religion of the past. Are not the two attitudes of possession and activity wholly incompatible? Can it be possible that man's mind should be both the instrument whereby vital interests win control and mastery over the conditions which surround them, and also that it should participate in and possess significant structures which it has not created and does not control? "Idealism, it has been said, is not at heart sympathetic with the modern democratic conception of civilization." Yet, we have observed, democracy, in one of its elemental strands at least, did once have its roots in religion. Something akin to religion and to idealism may again come to be recognized as the soil in the midst of which it can put forth its best efforts.

Let us turn to another of those basic energies which have made the modern age, and which too may be viewed as a concomitant whether cause or effect—of the transition from the older medieval idea system to the modern. One need be no orthodox believer in a materialistic or economic interpretation of history to recognize an

^{10 &}quot;Morals in Evolution," pp. 596, 637.

¹¹ Perry: "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 188.

intimate correlation between our habits of thought and those activities which are spent in furnishing the economic framework for the entire structure of life. Indeed, these industrial activities are for the mass of mankind so engrossing that all other interests must become subordinate and must be dominated by them. Hobson has scarcely overstated the actual situation when he writes: "For the brutal and crushing pressure of the economic problem in its coarsest shape how to secure a material basis of livelihood—has of necessity hitherto absorbed nearly all the energies of man, so that his powers of body, soul and spirit have been mainly spent on an unsatisfactory and precarious solution of this personal economic problem. Religion, politics, the disinterested pursuits of truth and beauty, have had to live upon the leavings of the economic life."12 Those economic structures and processes which have entered into the modern world have fashioned not only the outward circumstances of our lives, but they have inner and spiritual accompaniments as well. A considerable number of students have, in recent years, paid attention to this aspect of the matter. Their studies leave, I believe, a vast and powerful impression upon the mind. Here, one feels, are uncovered some of the deep and darker currents which flow within our modern social structures, fashioning our modern ideals and habits of thought. Certainly the student of philosophy, if he is to settle his accounts with the vital issues and the significant foundations of our thought, may not neglect some study of the economic environment amidst which our thinking and our living proceed.

The essential economic transformation, as one goes from the premodern to the modern era, is correlated with that shifting of attitude and of idea system which we have already roughly outlined. It is the transition from the attitude in which man's life and his activity points ahead to and participates in a preexisting order of things, to that attitude in which his life and his thought are the spokesmen for interests which antecede them, and which are bent upon controlling and constructing the world in order to permit the expansion of these interests. The change from pre-capitalistic to capitalistic industry is the change from the sure possession, the contemplation and enjoyment of objects and of goods, of life and of the world,

¹² J. A. Hobson: "Work and Wealth," p. 299.

to the interest in incessant activity and the expansion of interests for their own sake. In the older order, medieval and pre-capitalistic, man is dependent upon the presence in his world of that which he does not make, of laws, traditions, social structures whose recognition and acceptance have something of the quality of religious awe and worship, giving stability and finality to all of his life.

Speaking broadly, but with more direct reference to the facts of the industrial order, the economic transition from this older world to the modern world has involved the substitution of the interests and the point of view of the producer for those of the consumer. The consumer is the final possessor. When an economic object reaches the consumer, all activity of production is at an end. Economic consumption connotes stability, finality, the present, possession; economic production connotes restlessness, relativity, the future, activity. Now in a "natural" or naïve economic order, the producer exists for the sake of the consumer, the means exist for the sake of the end. In the older order "the naïve conception that all production was in the interests of consumption had not vet disappeared."13 Under the pressure of the modern economic forces, consumption, instead of supplying the goal and the measure for production, comes to exist in order that the activity of production shall go on and shall be profitable. Wealth is produced not because of its utility to the consumer but in order that it may furnish the means for producing more wealth. Newer and wider markets, colonies, and spheres of influence are sought for, not in order that the clamorous demands of waiting consumers may be satisfied, but so that an outlet for the activity of production may be found.

Now the relation between production and consumption furnishes at least an analogy—and a profound one—with the relation between an interest which generates an activity, and the goal in which the activity terminates. Viewed naïvely, the utility which wealth possesses for the consumer is the goal of the economic process. Here is something objective, something which lies ahead of the activity of production and which justifies the economic process. For the economic processes to be set in motion and to be sustained solely, or

¹³ Sombart: "The Jews and Modern Capitalism," p. 125.

at least so far as is humanly possible, by the interest of the producer—the desire for profits—is to withdraw those processes from all contact with and all participation in those objective and terminal structures which alone can justify them. It is to lodge the economic activities of men in the interests which initiate activity rather than in the objective utility and good which lie ahead. And this is the very essence of naturalism and of subjectivism—naturalism, because the activity is but the prolongation of a matter-of-fact interest; subjectivism, because there is no attachment to nor participation in an objective order.

This steady withdrawal of the economic life from its objective goal, the possession of utilities by the consumer, is clearly reflected in the classical and hitherto prevailing economic theory. The arts of consumption, the final destiny and enjoyment of economic goods, have been, in the traditional science, obscured and neglected. "For though, says Hobson, there is everywhere a formal recognition that consumption is the end or goal of industry, there is no admission that the arts of consumption are equally important with the arts of production and are deserving of as much attention by students and reformers of our 'economic system.' On the contrary, so absorbing are the productive processes in their claims upon the physical and mental energies of mankind, that the economic system, alike for practitioners and theorists, has almost come to be identified with these processes. . . . Their (i.e., the classical economists') condemnation of luxurious expenditure and waste, alike in the wealthy and the working-classes, was not primarily directed against the loss of real enjoyment, or human well-being, or the moral degradation involved in such abuse of spending power, but against the damage to the further processes of making wealth by reducing the rate of saving or by impairing the working efficiency of the laborer."14 Practically, this subordination of the consumer to the producer shows itself in countless ways,—in his increasing inability "to protect himself against the depredations of organized groups of producers,"15 in the fact that so much of what and of how we consume is determined by the monetary profit of producers and their skill in adver-

^{14 &}quot;Work and Wealth," pp. 4, 5.

¹⁵ Hobson: ibid., p. 258.

tising, rather than by our organic, genuine needs as consumers. We have learned the arts of stimulating unwholesome and artificial wants better than we have learned how to meet the legitimate and wholesome need of men at large—all consumers. That a large number of many of our most dangerous social ills, gambling, drink, prostitution, arise from such artificial and forced overstimulation of wants rather than from already existing needs seeking satisfac-

tion, is scarcely open to doubt.16

The ascendency of business, pecuniary interests over the consumer's interest in utility and serviceability has many concomitants both of an economic and of a wider cultural order. Impersonal relations and concepts, so far as the bulk of the world's major activities are now concerned, have superseded the directness and intimacy of personal relations. There is nothing accidental about this under the stress of modern conditions. It is not merely that the pressure of the machine process imposes its discipline throughout the whole texture of society, necessitating routine, mechanical standardization of goods, services, and consumption. This lies on the surface, important and portentous as it is. But any act of consumption, the possession and enjoyment of goods on the part of their final owner, is a personal act, inherently measurable in terms of personal values. It inevitably belongs to the conscious experience of a person. The process of economic production, on the other hand, even before the advent of machine technology, is a more objective and impersonal process. And with the rapid extension of the machine process, the arts of production cease almost entirely to be thought of in terms of personal activity and conscious initiative. It was certainly otherwise in the medieval and pre-capitalistic culture. Medieval feudalism was sustained by relations of loyalty, devotion, and allegiance servility if you choose—rather than by impersonal or legal relations of force or of rights. The basis of the medieval social order was not, at least in idea, mere obedience and yielding to a rigid, external authority so much as it was the loose bonds of inter-personal relations. In medieval communities, towns, cloisters, and guilds, there dwelt-as Troeltsch puts it-a "spirit of solidarity and of personal understanding and mutual help which, in spite of a certain depend-

¹⁶ Cf. Veblen: "The Theory of Business Enterprise," ch. 3.

ence upon traditionalism, was utterly removed from all legal (i.e., abstract, impersonal) formalism, and primarily appealed to the affections and dispositions."¹⁷

Now it is scarcely to be questioned that this kind of a world furnishes the soil most favorable for religious ideals and habits of thought. Wherever one looks in such a world as this one does find a neighbor, 18 one confronts persons, and one's life is made up of recognizing, accepting, and responding to the demands which issue from these personal and conscious situations. This environment of persons which bulks so large is not to be used as a means, it exists not to be controlled and reconstructed; it is there to be enjoyed and participated in and, one may even say, worshipped as well. The recognition and contemplation of God, in an order dominated by these habits of thought, does not appear as something irrelevant and out of place. The practice of religion is no such violent setting in motion of unused attitudes and idea systems as it is in a world where everything—our social as well as our physical environment exists only as something to be controlled and made use of by our interests. Not processes awaiting control, but structures awaiting contemplation live in that world—remembering all the while that we are stressing but one aspect of the medieval order, and of that only as it existed in idea.

Our world is indeed of another fabric. In countless places may we discern this displacement of personal by impersonal relations, and its concomitant spiritual effects. Simmel has called attention to certain of the more profound and subtle aspects of this vast transition. There is the fact that, due to the great complexity of the modern economic structure, any individual is now dependent upon the results of the labor of countless other persons, vastly more than contributed to his support under more primitive conditions. This is,

¹⁷ Troeltsch: *ibid.*, p. ²⁴². Cf. also the following statement: "Unter solchen Umständen gibt es überhaupt kein Staatsgefühl, keine gemeinsame und gleichartige Bezogenheit auf die Zentralgewalt, keine alles beherrschende Souveränetät, kein gleichmässiges öffentliches Bürgerrecht, keine abstrakte und formell—rechtliche Bindung." p. ²⁴².

¹⁸ "I might possibly treat my neighbor as myself, but in this vast modern world the greatest problem that confronts me is to find my neighbor and treat him at all." Lippman: "Drift and Mastery," p. 37.

of course, but calling attention to the division of labor. But, along with this dependence upon the labor of an increasing number of persons, we are more and more aloof from the individual beings who stand behind the work.¹⁹ The more specialized any individual's labor becomes, the more does the product issue from but a single and minute function of his nature. It follows that those regions where we meet with other individuals, so far as economic transactions are concerned, are but very partial and superficial surfaces. There is little in our economic intercourse to suggest the wealth of personality and of conscious life, which is really there, concealed behind the products which we buy and sell. At least, there is vastly less than in a social order in which the varied things which a man makes or does have some sort of totality, into which more of himself has entered. The result is that the arteries through which the social life now flows, that network—to change the figure—which touches and encompasses men, is vastly more abstract and formal than was once the case. These actual social relations are related to the real world of persons—to use Simmel's analogy—as a geometrical figure is related to a real, physical object, or as an abstract form or formula is related to some concrete, living entity or process.

The resemblance between the economic structure of modern machine industry and the structure of the modern scientific idea system is more than superficial. The world, as conceived by the exact sciences, is related to the "real" world of our concrete experience just as the social relations created by modern machine industry are related to the "real" relations between conscious individuals. Both the scientific world view and the economic fabric are abstract when compared with what is really there. A similar abstractness occurs elsewhere in concepts and structures which are part and parcel of the modern age. Thus it may fairly be said that "rights" are abstract in that they are indifferent to individual endowments and traits. It is by virtue of his belonging to some more universal genus, because of what he has in common with all other individuals belonging to that genus, that an individual has rights. The concrete, the particular, the contingent, the unsharable does not come within the scope or the protection of such common rights. Thus an age which, like the

¹⁹ Simmel: "Philosophie des Geldes," p. 293.

eighteenth century, did so much of its thinking in terms of universal, abstract rights was relatively blind to that region which is filled with the concrete and the individual. The medieval world, we have observed, was essentially different. There, the individual makes his claims, not because of the rights which he possesses through the universal aspect of his nature, but because other concrete individuals owe him protection or submission. The consciousness of possessing rights can emerge only when this texture of personal qualities and relations is superseded by one of impersonal bonds. This same essential abstractness appears also, of course, in the prevalence of a "money economy" as against a "natural economy." All three of these indeed, as Simmel remarks—"rights, science (*i.e.*, die Intellectualität), money—are characterized by their indifference to individuals."

The term Economic Rationalism has fittingly been used to designate that structure of life and of thought some of whose results we have been surveying. The modern industrial régime had to overcome a certain inertia before it could get under headway; economic traditionalism, the attitude of possession and of acquiescence had first to disintegrate before capitalism could emerge. We have already spoken of the substitution of the producer's world for the consumer's world. But this rejection of tradition, this breaking through of the impulse to activity, this expansion of the economic desire for pecuniary gain, why speak of these as having anything to do with any form of rationalism? Because all of this involves the formation and the carrying through of a plan, rather than the acceptance of a ready-made scheme. It means that men now attempt to organize their world and their activities, instead of accepting the structures which God or nature may vouchsafe them. A new interest, and a new type of person emerges, the maker of "projects." "About the year 1680," writes Daniel Defoe in his "Essay on Projects," "began the art and mystery of projecting to creep into the world."21 A man with a project has a plan. He undertakes something. He sets out to rearrange his world so as to make it conform to his project and realize his plan. A thread of organizing activ-

²⁰ Simmel: *ibid.*, p. 469.

²¹ Quoted by Sombart: "Der Bourgeois," p. 54.

ity binds together and organizes his life. The *entrepreneur* comes into existence. Such organizing, form-giving activity, surely is a kind of rationalism. It connotes a marked contrast with form-receiving traditionalism and empiricism.

As we go forward from the time when the medieval culture was at its height we find increasing indications of this ideal and attitude of thoroughgoing organization and control; one region where this is the case has a special interest for us. Max Weber has pointed out certain striking analogies between the ideals of Protestant ethics, especially in the Calvinistic sects, and the spirit of modern capitalism.²² The similarity lies in their common possession of a zeal for complete organization and discipline. Each involves a break with nature, with tradition, with the spontaneous instincts and proclivities of natural man. There is a sternness about each of them and a ruthless exaction in their demand for discipline and obedience. So severe and heroic, so opposed to the easy acceptance of nature and impulse are both Puritanism and capitalism, that Weber speaks of them under the common rubric of "asceticism." Unlike early Christian and medieval asceticism, however, this modern type is an asceticism within the world (innerweltliche Asceticismus). For the Calvinist, unrelenting devotion to one's calling, one's vocation within the social order, is the one sure sign of election and predestination. Work and labor rather than an unio mistica cum Christo, are the witness to salvation. Not depth of feeling, but active persistence in the pursuit of a plan is the mark of religion and the proof of justification.

That the teachings of Calvin, and the dominant temper of Puritanism should furnish a soil favorable for the newer industrial forces is not then strange. Calvin rejected explicitly for the first time the canonical law against interest and usury; he thereby gave definite recognition to the fact that the consumption point of view of the earlier Christian ethics was now replaced by the interest of production, based upon the economic productivity of money and credit.²³ The newer spirit of Calvinistic puritanism found expression in the unstinted praise of unremitting industry and thrift and the horror of

²² Max Weber: Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft, 1904.

²³ Cf. Troeltsch: ibid., p. 709.

idleness and of luxury. All of which furthered the division of labor, the standardizing and methodizing of life, the limitation of consumption and the encouragement of production. In sum, it seems not too much to say that "Calvinism is the only type of Christian social philosophy which has unreservedly accepted the foundations of modern industry." Thus does it turn out—paradoxical as it may seem—that Puritanism and Rationalism are associated together through an asceticism common to both. Is there not also some truth in the assertion that Puritanism is the father of modern military discipline? At least we shall recognize how deeply the ideal of economic rationalism has entered into the tissue of our modern social structures and idea systems.

Economic rationalism connotes also a certain decay of feeling, and an extraordinary development of intellect. The active, ascetic temper of which we have been speaking is always suspicious of feeling because feelings seem to be either quiet possessions, experiences which call at the moment for enjoyment and which bring calm repose and contentment, or they set in motion inner disturbances which interfere with that mastery and discipline of life which asceticism and activism demand. For such a severe temper, nothing exists to be enjoyed, but everything exists to be mastered. For Puritanism, the goal of life is remote; the utter majesty of God is a symbol for the incessant labor which falls to the share of man, before he be worthy to possess and to participate, through feeling, in the final perfection and treasures which shall be his reward. The thought of these distant possessions may sustain him in his toil, but now, while he labors, there is no present possession, no feeling which may serve as the representative and the pledge of his divine destiny. The whole of modern culture exhibits analogies to religious Puritanism in this absence of enjoyment and of feeling. We have so complicated our entire apparatus and technique, we have become so absorbed in devising means and mechanisms of all kinds, we have been so fashioning our instruments of control, that the ends for which these means are constructed, and which alone justify them, become more remote. Again, the modern economic order gives us our best illustration.

²⁴ Troeltsch: ibid., p. 718.

²⁵ Cf. Weber: *ibid.*, p. 29, note 1.

Industrial processes are so intricately linked together, every economic process responds to changes and fluctuations in all other economic processes the world over, that we have here a practical world of total relatedness and relativity. It is a Spinozistic world so far, at least, as modes and attributes are concerned; nothing is final, and everything points beyond itself. Everything has become a means, a vehicle through which the economic life passes. There are no "end-stations," where the ceaseless flow of economic energy pauses, where possession and enjoyment enter, and activity ceases. At least such terminations are all but accidental, and, like the interests of the consumers, do not count in the life of the whole structure. Compared with the refinements and mechanisms in the arts of production and in the elaboration of means, the enjoyment of values is utterly chaotic and unprovided for. "End-stations," places where we cease to inquire into a thing's use as a means, and enjoy and contemplate it as in itself valuable, tend to disappear from our life. But it is just in these pauses that feeling, rather than idea, comes into play.26 Ideas look beyond; they point to something not themselves. Feeling connotes immediacy, enjoyment, present possession.

And yet, there is another aspect of this whole world of economic rationalism which works out in a different way. It is true that, within this idea system, the individual and the personal, the attitudes of contemplation and possession, and the feeling of immediacy appear to have no foothold. It is also true that this same modern culture has witnessed the release of desire and of feeling, the unchaining of countless forces of impulse and instinct, and this has come about not in spite of, but because of that very impersonal and objective, that intellectual and casually connected world which science and economic rationalism have built up. By the release of desire, I mean something different from, even if it be only a further development of, the will to mastery and control which formed the common element of ascetic rationalism in Calvinism and capitalism. This release of desire is what remains, perhaps, after the religious goal of Puritanism has dropped away, and nothing is left but the will to power. It is

 $^{^{26}}$ Cf. Simmel: ibid.,p. 457. "Je mehr solcher Endstationen unser praktisches Leben enthält, desto stärker wird sich also die Gefühlsfunktion gegenüber der Intellektfunktion bethätigen."

then that the release of desire becomes the point of departure for ethical and economic egoism, and the interest in sheer immediacy is the token of the individual's discovery of himself. It is not strange that this self-discovery and self-consciousness of the individual should have steadily mounted higher as the environment of individuals more and more takes on the form of an impersonal, causal, and mechanical structure. For the mobility and freedom of the individual can be won only as he becomes detached from his world; his world becomes separated from him only when organized and defined in objective and impersonal terms. An individual who is no longer embedded within a network of personal relations is thrown back upon himself just because his world is impersonal and no longer responsive to him alone. The city dweller, unwatched by neighbors, released from petty gossip, and living in a world of routine and mechanism senses a freedom and self-consciousness which the country dweller lacks. The girl who prefers factory work at a relatively low wage to domestic work at a higher wage does so because of a freedom which her impersonal environment gives her. Likewise wherever personal obligations, such as the allegiance of the serf to his lord, is commuted into a money obligation, the consciousness of self and of freedom is enhanced. The possession of self-consciousness, in its more intense forms, depends not only upon the presence of an alter, with whom one may contrast one's own life, but it also depends upon an estrangement from an environment whose very impersonal, neutral and indifferent character makes the person recoil upon himself, seek within for that which he can no longer find in whole regions of his world. The very universality of intelligence and that which it recognizes, creates a common background, a level tableland which permits individuals to emerge and to be distinct. The concept of rights is, as we have observed, a rational concept; it defines something common and universal within human nature. It is thus impersonal, in the sense of neglecting the accidents of individuality, of birth and of status. But just because it is thus common and indifferent to the individual, it permits rather than inhibits a free expansion of the individual.27 Just so does a money economy exert a levelling

²⁷ "Hier wie sonst ist es grade der Boden des gleichen Rechtes für alle, der die individuellen Unterschiede zur vollen Entwicklung und Ausnutzung bringt. . . . Darum

influence. Money as a common measure of all values eradicates in principle all inherent distinction between servile and noble. Every vocation becomes, in theory at least, open to everyone. But just this vast levelling process serves powerfully to stimulate competition and individualism, for the individual now confronts a world where everything is open to him. It is money, a levelling tool, impersonal and intellectual, which accomplishes this. Thus it is that economic rationalism brings about the release of desire and of the individual.

One further fact may be mentioned bearing on the correlation between the modern economic order and individualism. It is an obvious truth that machine industry and the division of labor drive in a wedge between the individual worker and the final and total object which eventually emerges. The individual worker sees as the product of his own labor something utterly fragmentary and partial; he becomes separated from the finished totality.28 But it is only structures and objects, which are in some sense totalities, to which the self can be devoted and in which it may be interested. No longer able, then, to embody one's self in one's work, one must look within, there to uncover whatever dim and hidden resources of feeling, of longing and of desire there may be. It is no historical accident that the whole movement of Romanticism in life and in thought, the release of individual desire and feeling, the expansion and selfconsciousness of individuals and of nations should swell to mighty proportions as the structures of economic rationalism become fastened upon modern industry and life.

Some general reflections such as these, then, may suffice to show why it is that economic rationalism and the intellectualism of science have carried along with them an uncompromising individualism, releasing in greater and greater measure the energies of desire. Otherwise the marriage of rationalism and of individualism might appear to be a strange union. To Plato and to the Stoics it would have been ist die rationalistische Weltauffassung—die, unparteiisch wie das Geld, auch die sozialistische Lebensbild genährt hat—die Schule des neuzeitlichen Egoismus und des rücksichtslosen Durchsetzens der Individualität geworden." Simmel: ibid., p. 465.

²⁸ "The whole wage-earning system is an abomination, not only because of the social injustice which it causes and perpetuates, but also because it separates the man who does the work from the purpose for which the work is done." B. Russell: "Why Men Fight," p. 148.

inconceivable. Their rationalism did not release desire and did not spell individualism. It left the individual still confronted with an objective and divine order which he might appropriate and in which he might participate. That individualism and sense of personal worth which developed rapidly at the close of the ancient world, and which received such marked emphasis within the ethic of Christianity was of a different order from the individualism and the subjectivism of the modern age. There is indeed a motive common to both ages. The individual is thrown back upon himself because some region of his environment which formerly was the home of significant structures inviting the mind's participation, falls to pieces. At the close of the ancient world it was the social and political structures which broke up, and no longer presented themselves as the objective counterpart of human values, as they did in the earlier religious institutions of antiquity, and as they had been reflected and idealized in the teachings of the great philosophers. In the modern age it was physical nature which, with the advance of science, excluded personal values. And the economic forces of modern industry confirmed in practice what science seemed to teach in theory. Man's world becomes impersonal, and, as in the close of the ancient world, the individual is thrown back upon what he may discover within. Esse est percipi is the formula for more than an isolated current of philosophical reflection. But, in the religious thought of late antiquity and within Christianity, the individual, thrown back upon himself, discovered in his inner life the embodiment and the hope of a divine order. That world could still be possessed and appropriated, even if the world of time and of history, of empires and of governments should utterly fall away. In the idea system of modern individualism, that is not the case. The very attitudes which make possible the contemplation and the appropriation of significant structures have been subject to the disintegrating forces which we have sketched. The result is that more and more what the individual finds within himself is simply desire and feeling, impulse and instinct. He no longer finds himself within a significant and objective order which is to be appropriated by him. His world is for him to make, and his life is to be one of outward expansion and achievement, bringing power, satisfaction and pleasure.

We have wished to stress those concomitants of modern economic rationalism which illustrate the characteristic temper and idea system of the modern age. The world is essentially material to be utilized by men's interests in order that such interests may expand and prosper. The mind with all its ideas, points back to these interests which it is to serve. It is such interests which are to control and to master everything which lies ahead of or outside of them. Organization and mastery are here the significant things. Man is to make the structures amidst which he is to live. Such is the radical essence of democracy, and such is the temper of a world fashioned by modern industry. It is clear enough that this is a different world from one in which man's vocation lies in the discovery and the appropriation of structures which are themselves significant, and which are not made by his will to power and mastery. Such structures, if there be any such, exist not for control and exploitation, but for knowledge, contemplation, and worship. Here then are the two idea systems, the two attitudes which we desire to understand and to estimate. The attitude of possession and contemplation connotes religion, and its theoretical framework, idealism. Let us next turn from the modern age to inquire into the elemental nature of the religious tradition in the historical life of humanity.

CHAPTER III

THE RELIGIOUS TRADITION

DEALISM, we have said, is the philosophical framework for that practical concern and attitude of life which men know as religion. In the previous chapter we have been observing the pressure exerted upon this one of life's major interests by two of the great formative forces within the modern world, democracy and economic rationalism. But what is this interest itself and wherein consists the substance of the religious tradition? I am aware of the many pitfalls in any attempt to define some essence of religion. It may reasonably be doubted whether any such definition is possible, or if possible, whether it can be of much service. Those two general characteristics of religion which have already claimed our attention—its undifferentiated quality, whereby it appears historically as the source of many varied interests which grow out of it, acquire definiteness and independence, and its uniqueness in that it responds to an over-world—these two qualities of religion make any definition a doubtful matter.1 There is no thought here of extracting the common element of all religions and reducing it to a ready formula. Any such universal and common feature would be utterly vague and indefinite as well as totally inadequate to express the central content of a single one of the historical religions. Nor shall we revert exclusively to the embryology of religion and look to primitive culture for the clearest disclosure of the essence of religion. The anthropologist who studies the massive, unconscious and primordial attempts of early man to build for himself a religion

¹ Yet those writers who, like C. C. J. Webb and Gilbert Murray, urge that religion cannot be defined, have succeeded in telling some important things about religion. Cf. Webb: "Problems in the Relation of God and Man," pp. 3 ff., and Murray: "Four Stages of Greek Religion," p. 18. Leuba, in the appendix of "A Psychological Study of Religion," has compiled an instructive list of definitions of religion.

may sometimes forget what Aristotle so well knew, that the real nature of anything which lives in time is not at all revealed in the early stages of its growth. It only is that which it has in it to become. In all of our observation and description of historical, anthropological, and archeological material, some idea and some estimate of the true worth and destiny of the forces and facts we are observing is present in our minds. It guides us, however unawares, in the selection of those data and aspects of data which we suppose to be pertinent to the inquiry in hand. To uncover the essence of religion is thus in part a normative task; along with anthropology and psychology, philosophy and metaphysics must contribute to the enterprise. I propose then in this chapter to characterize the substance of the religious tradition. The justification for the interpretation here set forth will lie, not only in whatever historical or anthropological data may be adduced, but in the validity of certain ideas and points of view which will emerge more fully in the further development of the argument.

There are comprised within the religious tradition of humanity two distinguishable elements which are, nevertheless, for the religious tradition itself, intimately and indissolubly related. There are some considerations, familiar to everyone, which may at the outset serve to make clear how these two constituent aspects of the religious tradition may be analyzed. Everyone, I think, would assent to the belief that the historical religions, Christianity for instance, contain certain elements which might remain wholly untouched and unharmed in a world where the prevailing habits of thought were completely naturalistic, atheistic, and seemingly anti-religious. One need by no means imply that these unscathed elements would lose nothing through such a process of attrition, yet however much may drop out, we shall recognize some link, however tenuous, between that which remains, and that which has been lost. There is a quality almost pathetic in man's belief that there is that which would remain after the decay of all positive religion and which itself would be not unworthy of being called a new religion. Guyau, writing of the "nonreligion of the future," bids us see in the worship of the family, in the pure love of the ideal, in the finer feelings of social solidarity, in scientific disinterestedness, and in the creative enjoyment of the

beautiful, a new and "non-mystical," a wholly naturalistic religion.² Dewey has bidden philosophy take notice of "a new individualism in art and letters, with its naturalistic method applied in a religious, almost mystic spirit to what is primitive, obscure, varied, inchoate, and growing in nature and human character." Thus, let God, freedom, and immortality, taken with any literalness, become but the shibboleths of an enfeebled superstition, would not morality and loyalty, imaginative art, human love and sympathy remain, in some measure, and would they not express themselves in sentiments and in words to which something of the quality of religion would still cling? Would not all these, indeed, become more precious, since they alone, and nothing remote and transcendent, would receive undivided and unstinted devotion?

It is such reflections as these which let us see to how great an extent the historic religions have given utterance to that which would still exist and be cherished in a world where human life is thought to be hemmed in everywhere by blind fate, brute fact, or mechanical necessity, or any other non-God which future knowledge may chance to disclose. On this side religion has portrayed and given articulate voice, through imagination, belief, and worship, to those things which man most of all cares for and cherishes, to those values and ideals which his own experience offers him, and which would continue to demand his allegiance whether or no anything in man's environment made answer to them, whether or no they elicited anything from man's world save a bare echo of themselves. On this side religion has been an utterance of man's desires and wishes, his interests and his purposes; religion here is an imaginative portrayal of these very real and very human things. And if this were all, we could indeed ask pertinently with Santayana, "what is this whole phenomenon of religion but human experience interpreted by human imagination?" And if only "the humanistic tendencies of the Renais-

² Guyau: "The Non Religion of the Future," pp. 207 ff. This volume still remains, I believe, the most finely sympathetic and philosophical exposition of the genuine religious possibilities of an imaginative naturalism.

³ J. Dewey: "The Philosophy of Maeterlinck," *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1911. Cf. also Thomas Davidson: "American Democracy as a Religion." *Int. Jour. Ethics*, vol. 10, 1899.

sance could have worked on unimpeded, this interpretation of religion might really have prevailed." The whole function of religion might then have been understood, "simply to lend a warm mystical aureole to human culture and ignorance"; religion would be in substance an "imaginative achievement, a symbolic representation of moral reality." This aspect of religion, then, in which it bodies forth the permanent desires and valuings of human life, thought of in abstraction from the real environment of man—this we shall speak of as the immanent, the empirical, the hither side or content of the religious tradition.

But the religious mind has always concerned itself with something over and above the hither side of experience, with something more than a portrayal, in imagination, of the permanent desires of men. It has, from primitive religion through all of the historical religions, laid claim to possess something of cosmic and universal import; it has supposed itself authorized to make some assertion about the environment of human life and experience, and about some response which reality makes to the energies of our minds. Religion has claimed to be true as well as relevant to the interests which come to light in the life of mind and of reason. It thinks of itself as having not only a function within the domain of experience, of man, and of society, but also as pointing to and disclosing qualities and existences of the real world. Of all life's interests religion has been the most obdurately metaphysical and realistic. Speak as you will of its pragmatic sanction, its utility, its character as symbolic of feeling and emotion, or of its function in man's struggle for existence, if this other side of religion has escaped your analysis, then have you missed the heart of it. So essential in the life of religion has this characteristic been, that I think many misunderstandings and equivocations would be avoided if the word "religion" were not used in speaking of an organization or an idea which recognizes only the first aspect of religion, that which we have spoken of as its immanent aspect and structure. This second function of religion we may describe as its cognitive function. The cognitive side of the religious attitude will denote, then, a reference to some idea or knowledge of a reality or realities which, in some genuine meaning,

⁴ Santayana: "Winds of Doctrine," pp. 39, 46. "Reason in Religion," p. 12.

are other than the immanent strivings and values which are resident within experience.

But we need at once to make a further statement about these two aspects of the religious tradition, or the religious attitude. Not every idea which claims metaphysical or cognitive validity is necessarily religious, any more than every utterance of some felt need or wish, however fundamental, need be religious. It is an essential characteristic of religion that these two elements should be so fused together that there is some mutual relevancy between the system of that which man values and strives for on the one hand, and that which man supposes to be the real environment of his life, on the other hand. This relevancy may take on the form of a direct and affirmative response which reality makes to the engrossing interests of man's life. But the relevancy may be less naïve, more hidden, and more complex. Some interaction and mutual implication there will be between the "internal" and the "external" meaning of the religious idea, between that which is possessed within the area of consciousness and of history, and that which is their background and environment, between the immanent and empirical, and that to which there is some knowledge reference. If, for instance, loyalty be thought of as the most significant and the central moral value or virtue, then loyalty can generate a religious attitude or consciousness only if, in addition to its immanent or moral and, so to speak, pragmatic value, it also possesses a cognitive and metaphysical reference in such wise that it points to and implies the reality of something superhuman, a universal community, or an ideal of transcendent worth. In sum, the religious tradition has to do essentially with, first, the discovery and utterance of man's most permanent desires, hopes, and experiences, the immanent side of the religious attitude; secondly, with some idea which is believed to be genuinely true, and to yield a knowledge of the environment of experience, the cognitive aspect, and thirdly, with the belief in some solidarity and mutual intimacy of these two functions.

It may be urged that so far we have said nothing about religion and the religious interest which might not equally well be said of other interests and attitudes. Can one indeed escape the supposition that, in the final analysis, every idea roots itself in some activity,

some need, some dynamic and instinctive wish, and also that it bodies forth some relation, however concealed and subtle, with some real object? Can we withhold from any idea that doubleness of function, that pointing in two directions which is so apparent and fundamental in the case of sense organs existing, as they do, at the boundary between organism and environment? But it is religion which, from first to last, has borne witness to this fusion and interpenetration of the immediately practical and vital, and the outlying objective Real. The life of religion reaches down into the primitive, the instinctive, into the region of feeling, impulse, and desire; it also seeks to disclose and to make known to man some objective order of things conceived as ultimate and inclusive. The other arts of life show less of this doubleness of function; they show a bias either in one direction or in the other, toward the internal and human, or toward the external and the real. Poetry and music give expression primarily to an idea, a mood, a possession of the mind and this is all we commonly ask of the fine arts. We are content if morality serve to organize the realm of conduct, of desire, and of will. And we have learned to expect science to be impersonal and objective. Thus here is division of labor. Art and morality-in various ways of course—are human, immanent; if we say that they are also "true," it is only that they faithfully embody our meanings and fancies, whereas science is really cognition. Now this is neither very profound nor accurate, though it is no doubt the common sense supposition concerning these matters. And in comparison with these interests religion seems the more primitive; it has yielded less to the process of specialization. For it, "immanent" and "cognitive" are not yet sundered.

But with these two ingredients of the religious consciousness and their solidarity before us, we have now to face an issue which is important not only for the student of anthropology and the history of religion, but which also concerns some fundamental problems of psychology and of metaphysics. Our understanding of the religious tradition will differ widely according as to which of these two aspects we make our point of departure, and according to the direction, so to speak, in which we suppose the current from one to the other to run. And we may pause for a moment merely to indicate

certain of the larger problems of philosophy which hinge upon an issue wholly analogous with the one which meets us here in seeking to understand the origin of religion. Touching the knowledge which we have of nature and of other selves it is to be asked whether we start from that which is immanent within the life of consciousness and then proceed outward through a process of projection, piecing together fragments, always more certain of the internal than of the external, of the parts than of the whole, of the immediate than of the remote. Or may we be said, in any sense, to proceed in the opposite direction, discovering the internal, the human and the subjective within something more total and objective which we already possess and in some fashion know, going then from the whole to the parts, from the knowledge of outer and real structures to the discovery of ourselves? The traditional Cartesian assumption of the immediate certainty of self-consciousness and the doubt of all else besides implies that it is only possible for the mind to move outward to the real from its own near and immediate presentations and perceptions. The current here is entirely in the one direction. This is certainly the traditional manner of thinking. It is in these terms that the problem of knowledge is usually formulated. Indeed, it is because of this assumption that there is a problem of knowledge. How-so the question runs-starting with an unattached, isolated idea, how comes it that such an idea finds its way to a real object, so as to know that object? In psychology there is the question as to the relation between the processes of discrimination and association, between the apprehension of totalities within which parts are distinguished, and the piecing together of fragments to construct some whole. In logic there is the question of the relation between induction and deduction, and in ethics there is the problem as to the relation between felt interest and objective value. The concept of projection is applicable throughout, and it defines a certain type of theory, one in which the real is but a projection of the human; knowledge of totalities and of universals but a projection of what is particular; value and the good but projections of feeling and interest; other minds but projections of our own. These are theories of nominalism and of humanism. They are theories of projection.

Now animism, as an account of the basis and origin of religion,

is such a projection theory. And the problem touching the adequacy of animism to interpret the roots of religion is one with the larger philosophical issue which meets us elsewhere. Let it be agreed that there are the two directions in which the religious consciousness points, within to conscious values and interests, outward to something objective and cosmic. Religion is the spokesman for the mutual intimacy of these two regions. But which of these has the position of priority, logical or temporal? Shall we say that religion arose through an awareness of something which man found first within himself—his soul or his will—and later projected into the world? Or shall we say that religion takes its rise from man's awareness of and participation in something objective and inclusive and that only later does he discover himself, through a process of separation and analysis? This is precisely the issue as to how far the theory of animism will take us in understanding the beginnings of the religious tradition. For animism is a theory of projection from consciousness to nature, from internal to external. Dissatisfaction with the adequacy of animism has its deepest roots in the belief that the current runs in the other direction, from outer to inner, from a whole to the parts, from reality to consciousness. This alternative conception has received no single name. It has been spoken of as totemism. It underlies the "zoism" of Mr. Cook, the "animatism" of Mr. Marett, the "naturism" of Mr. Clodd.5

There are three features of the theory of animism which I shall here comment upon, chiefly in the light of these larger issues which they suggest. I shall then consider some of the more fruitful suggestions which have been offered to supplement the deficiencies of animism. Animism is a theory of projection from inner to outer, it is predominately intellectualistic, and it sees the essence of religion in an illusory anthropomorphism.

It would seem to be in accordance with what we know about self-consciousness and its development to suppose that early man is but slightly introspective, scarcely, if at all, a discoverer and observer of his own will and soul. More specifically would it appear that what he first wakes up to is his group, his living, social environment. I quote Miss Harrison's summary of the matter, which may

⁵ Cf. J. E. Harrison: "Themis," p. 475, note 1.

stand, I think, quite apart from any question concerning the value of many of her specific observations and hypotheses in archeology and anthropology. "First, primitive man, submerged in his own reactions and activities, does not clearly distinguish himself as subject from the objects to which he reacts, and therefore he is but slightly conscious of his own separate soul and hence no power to project it into 'animated nature.' He is conscious of life, of mana, but not of individual spirits; . . . second, man felt himself at first not as a personality separate from other persons, but as the warm excited center of a group; language tells us what we have already learnt from ritual, that the 'soul' of primitive man is 'congregationalized,' the collective daimon is before the individual ghost, and still more he is before the Olympian God." What deserves to be stressed here is the presence in man's consciousness of a massive totality, of a world of life and of force, something utterly objective, before there is any discovery of his own consciousness. His self and the contents of his own mind are discovered, when they are, upon the background of this "other-than-himself" which is there first. This "other-thanhimself" is not, of course, the equivalent of any such objective nature as comes readily to our own minds; it quivers with life, it is that to which his emotions and instinctive desires and activities are attached, rather than the correlate of an intellectual idea. His thought is neither personal nor impersonal, rather is it 'social,' if we may divest this word of some of its acquired connotations. To call attention thus to the centripetal direction of early man's conscious development, to start with his instinctive awareness of that which is objective and outer, and to build upon that rather than upon what is isolated and detached affords concrete verification of Royce's statement that "this whole customary popular and philosophical opposition between a man's self-consciousness, as if it were something primitive and lonely, and his social consciousness, as if that were something acquired, apart from his self-consciousness, through intercourse with his fellows is false to human nature."

Anthropologists and social psychologists, such as Marett, Miss Harrison, Durkheim and his followers have presented this matter

^{6 &}quot;Themis," p. 475.

^{7 &}quot;Studies of Good and Evil," p. 201.

in the light of certain empirical evidence which seems to point in this direction. But the question can hardly be settled wholly by an appeal to anthropological data. Nor is the question solely or chiefly one of time sequence, the question as to whether the awareness of something objective and real precedes or follows the apprehension of ideas as within one's mind and detached both from reality and from one's group. The available data may, perhaps, be interpreted either in terms of animism or of totemism, though the material which is presented by the critics of animism is impressive and convincing. But the issue can, in the end, be met only in the light of larger

philosophical conceptions and analyses.

A second comment upon the theory of animism is that it operates with categories and does its thinking with a certain intellectualistic bias. The theory of animism has supposed that religion could be viewed as essentially the outcome of a belief in ghostlike beings conceived and projected into nature in order to explain the mysteries of sleep and dreams, of life and death. Now among the serious critics of the theory of animism there is, I think, no thought of denying to early man all recognition of mystery and some attempt to render intelligible the strange and persistent phenomena which greeted him on all sides. But to say that this felt need of explaining, this intellectual curiosity is the sole or the chief source of early man's belief in supernatural beings is a different matter. There are some important considerations which are overlooked in such an account, chief of which is the undoubted fact that ideas are, in some manner, correlated with behavior. Practice precedes theory, involuntary and instinctive behavior precedes ideational and voluntary behavior, ritual precedes dogma and intellectual belief. Royce generalizes this situation in saying that "reason, like every state of intelligence, is simply the coming to consciousness of some mode of action."8 We are to look then for something which precedes animism, something which is of the nature of behavior and of instinct. At least we may say that the earliest ideas which are found in man's religion will not be completely intelligible unless they are seen in their relation to these prior activities. Once having emerged these ideas may well take on new functions; they may have a mean-

^{8 &}quot;Studies of Good and Evil," p. 373.

ing which not only points back to the instinctive behavior of which they are the deposit, but which gropes forward as well, seeking some genuine object which is real. But even so, we shall expect them to carry along something of their early inheritance. Sense organs, we have observed, stand at the boundary between the organism and its environment, interpreting the requirements of the world to the life needs of the organism. May it not also be said that ideas stand at the boundary of past and future, pointing both to the behavior which lies behind and the ideal meanings which beckon from ahead? Not everything is told about ideas and beliefs when we conceive them simply as projected forth from instinctive behavior. But we may not forget ritual as perhaps the stuff out of which are made "those faded unaccomplished actions and desires which we call gods." Here is at least a capital truth which leads to some modification of traditional animism and of much else besides.

The intellectualistic bias of animism results in another difficulty which is noticed by Durkheim. Even if we grant that the impulse to explain and to make intelligible the mysterious phenomena of life led early man to the idea of the double, the *anima*, it is not at all evident why this idea should have attaching to it the quality and the feeling tone of sacredness. It is this quality which makes the *anima* an object of fear, awe and worship. An idea which arises solely as the result of an intellectual necessity will not show this quality. Some deeper level of emotion and of desire must be tapped in order that the idea of the sacred, which is the dominant and the organizing concept of religion, shall emerge.

But there is a third implication of the theory of animism, the most serious of all. If we are to see the chief root of religion in the impulse of man's mind to banish mystery through explaining it, and if the explanation in terms of phantoms and doubles be founded on illusion, as it surely is, the inference is obvious. Religion is essentially but false science, and nothing else. But religion is implicated in so very

⁹ Harrison: "Ancient Art and Ritual," p. 54.

¹⁰ "That ritual, or in other words, a routine of external forms, is historically prior to dogma, was proclaimed years ago by Robertson Smith and others. Yet social anthropology is but today beginning to appreciate the psychological implications of this cardinal truth." Marett: "The Birth of Humility," p. 13.

much of the total complex of life's interests that such a judgment must appear so radically over-simple as to be false. Durkheim's judgment is worth recording here, especially when one remembers that he comes to the investigation of religion from the school of French positivism. "It is inadmissible," he says, "that systems of ideas like religions, which have held so considerable a place in history, and to which, in all times, men have come to receive the energy which they must have to live, should be made up of a tissue of illusions. To-day we are beginning to realize that law, morals and even scientific thought itself were born of religion, were for a long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated with its spirit. How could a vain fantasy have been able to fashion the human consciousness so strongly and so durably?"

In these comments upon the concept of animism and its application to the early religion of men, we have had no thought of any wholesale distrust and rejection of reason and intelligence. Nor are we denying the actuality and the importance of the soul idea in primitive habits of thought. We have wished to say that the theory of animism is not able adequately to set forth the relation between the inner and the outer, the immanent and the cognitive aspects of the early stages of the religious tradition, and that much depends on our being able to do this.

And, indeed, recent studies of primitive religion have evidenced an increasing discontent with the traditional view which sees in man's early religion chiefly the product of an illusory anthropomorphism due either to false inductive processes or to what Max Müller called a "disease of language." We may now, I think, say with some measure of confidence that whatever else primitive religion may have been, it was more and other than any simple belief in ghostlike beings conceived in order to explain the mysteries of life and of nature, the phenomena of sleep and dreams and death. Religion preceded such naïve animism, just as it has outlived it. Where then shall we look for the central core of primitive religion? Robertson Smith's "Religion of the Semites" opened the way to a different interpretation. He emphasized as the fundamental conception of ancient religion the "solidarity of the gods and of their wor-

¹¹ Durkheim: ibid., p. 69.

shippers as part of one organic society."12 This vital sense and emotion of social solidarity, which was also cosmic in its scope and intent, received its typical and supreme expression in the common sacrificial meal, where the community, men and gods alike, partook of one food, one life. More recently Durkheim and his school have pointed out that even such a conception as that of Smith is too individualistic and too animistic. There are not at the outset men and gods; there is rather only the social group, and the collective emotions and representations which are generated through membership in the group. Let us expand this main thesis of Durkheim and report its chief constituents. There are two fundamental things to be noted: First, the essential ingredient of all religious ideas and rites is to be found in the distinction which such ideas and rites set forth or imply; the distinction, namely, between the sacred and the profane. "The division of the world into two comprehensive domains, the one comprising all that which is sacred, the other all that is profane—such is the distinctive trait of religious thought; beliefs, myths, dogmas, legends are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are their attributes, their history, their relations with one another and with profane things." "Rites are rules of conduct which prescribe how man ought to behave with respect to sacred objects."13

There is thus an ineradicable dualism at the very birth of religion. Religion is man's expression of the discovery of a cleavage between that which is ordinary and common and that which is charged with mystery and sacredness. But this merely restates the problem. What is it in man's experience which compels him so to split up his universe? What is the source of the concept of the sacred itself? Durkheim's answer is that social experience alone can evoke the sentiment of the sacred. It is as a member of the mass life, when the individual is no longer merely himself, but lives and feels the larger emotions surging around and through him; it is through this social experience that he is transported to a level of existence which is beyond the common and the ordinary, which is divine. That social experience may intensify and transmute individual feeling is of course a famil-

^{12 &}quot;The Religion of the Semites," p. 32.

¹⁸ Durkheim: "Les Formes elementaires," pp. 50, 56.

iar fact. "The laws of the multiplication of human power by association have never been worked out; but no one has failed to measure in frequent experiences what incredible enhancement of the value of any experience may occur in a single touch of endorsement from without," and it is this enhancement of individual feeling through social experience which enabled Carlyle to speak of society as the "standing wonder of our existence, a true region of the supernatural," in which "man has joined himself with man; soul acts and reacts on soul; a mystic unfathomable union establishes itself; Life in all its elements has become intensated, consecrated." 15

Durkheim applies familiar facts of our experience to the question concerning the origin of the idea of the sacred. The life of primitive man seems subject to a rhythm in which there alternate periods of dispersion, when his life is ordinary, monotonous, and common, and periods of concentration, of social excitement, of contact which heightens the intensity and range of feeling and generates that which is inspired and sacred. Here are literally two worlds which the individual experiences—a world of sense experience where economic and physical activities predominate, and a world which makes itself felt during those periods of social "effervescence," when one immediately participates in a larger and different world through his social experiences, his group, or collective consciousness. It is a qualitatively new experience as well as one which is more overwhelming and intense. Here are then two outstanding facts to be kept in mind in interpreting the religion of primitive man. There is first the concept, or better, the emotion, the "collective representation" of something sacred, of something removed from the common, and of supreme importance for human weal and woe. Here is a supernaturalism which is prior to animism, a religion prior to objective or personal gods. And secondly, this representation of the sacred, this theoplasm and matrix of all religion, is the deposit of collective feeling, of social experience. "Not only does the god reflect the thoughts, social conditions, morality, and the like, but in its origin his substance when analyzed turns out to be just nothing but the representation, the utterance, the emphasis

¹⁴ Hocking: "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 222.

¹⁵ "Characteristics," Works, vol. I, p. 340.

of these imaginations, these emotions, arising out of particular social conditions."16

There follow from these two fundamental facts about primitive religion, certain derivative characteristics which must be briefly noticed. Here at its source, religion is the felt participation of the individual in a collective consciousness which is super-individual, yet continuous with the individual consciousness. Here is a "reservoir," to use an expression of Cornford, to which the individual has access through religious rites, which, as we have seen, both utter and in turn intensify the group emotions. The vehicle of group emotion, the source and stuff of that which was sacred and supernatural, was no personal god or spirit, but an impersonal mana, wakonda, which is spoken of variously as a "sympathetic continuum," a "primitive magical complex," a "system of sanctities which knew no Gods," a "social force trembling on the very verge of Godhead." Everything which primitive man does and thinks—the chase and the warpath, the social relationships of marriage and kinship, his practices concerning birth, death, and burial, his magic and his art-are all charged with and rendered potent and awe-inspiring by this one pervasive and continuous Power, this mana. Its influence spreads everywhere, infecting with fear and awe the entire range of his world. If its more positive and wholesome aspect is expressed in his religious rites and feelings-wholesome because under social control-its more negative and fearsome side is found in the darker practices of his magic and his taboos, where the dread power has broken away from the more regular and social control of the group emotions.

But primitive religion is not merely an utterance of man's social experience, as we understand the term "social." This felt continuum of life and force which is the original stuff of all gods and the source of all spiritual substance, is not merely the bond which unites man to man in a common group life; it also unites the entire social group to nature so that both man and nature participate in one common life. It is impossible to say where the social and the human end, and where begins the mere awareness of natural objects. The totemic group includes both man and his natural environment in unbroken unity. Both man and nature participate in one common felt life. Here is a

^{16 &}quot;Themis," p. 28.

whole of life and nature, which as yet is unbroken, which is not yet disturbed by analysis and reflection, self-consciousness and individualism. The collective representation which feels and thinks this entire situation is governed by what M. Levy-Bruhl has designated the "Law of Participation." Because of the pervasive influence of the supernatural Power, the feeling and representation of which generates religion, there is a "mystic identity" between objects. Men actually are animals, the new-born infant actually is both the ancestor of the clan and the totem of the clan. According to this law, "objects can be at once themselves and other than themselves."17 Experience is interpreted in the light of this prepossession; the law itself is "impermeable to experience"—until indeed this prelogical stage of human thinking gives way to the stage of a more logical and analytical thinking. Thus, man's social experience, his collective emotions and representations have at the outset a more than human significance; they are cosmic and metaphysical in their scope and intent.

There is one further fact about early religion which these writers emphasize. It is, they hold, a legitimate inference from the available facts. Religion can now be interpreted as something that in its essence is not illusory, precisely because man's social experience is not an illusion. "We are able to say, in sum, that the religious individual does not deceive himself when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he holds the larger portion of himself. That power exists; it is society. When the Australian is carried in transport beyond himself, when he feels within himself the surging of a life whose intensity surprises him, he is the dupe of no illusion; that exaltation is real, and it is really the product of forces that are external and superior to the individual."

Such is the account of primitive religion and of the origin of the mystery god which Durkheim and his followers give. Miss Harrison summarizes the matter thus:

"Totemism then is not so much a special social structure as a stage in epistemology. It is the reflection of a very primitive fashion in thinking, or rather feeling, the universe, a feeling the realization of

¹⁷ Lévy-Bruhl: "Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures," p. 77.

¹⁸ Durkheim, p. 322.

which is essential to any understanding of primitive religion. It is not a particular blunder and confusion made by certain ignorant savages, but a phase or stage of collective thinking through which the human mind is bound to pass. Its basis is group unity, aggregation, similarity, sympathy, a sense of common group-life, and this sense of common life, this participation, this unity, is extended to the non-human world in a way which our modern, individualistic reason, based on observed distinctions, finds almost unthinkable."¹¹⁹

But, within the religious tradition, there are motives and attitudes which are different from those which find utterance in the religion of participation and of mysticism. The primitive fusion of the human social group with its environment, nature, does not endure. Instead of solidarity and participation in one vital continuum, there is distance and remoteness of man from his gods. The gods emerge as beings who live a life of their own. Man does not share that life in his feelings and his experience of group solidarity; instead of feeling, it is some articulate idea and thought which is uppermost in this other religious attitude. In order to set forth somewhat concretely the contrast between these two motives within the religious tradition, we may refer to Miss Harrison's account of the relation between mystery god and Olympian god. It is as a study of human motives and of their interplay within the life of religion that "Themis" here interests us. If one distrusts the soundness of the author's use of archeological and anthropological material, one may be reminded that her main historical thesis—the development of the Olympians from earlier mystery gods—can always be translated back into the language of psychology. As such the thesis may surely be defended on the basis of the accepted principle that "the further we go back the nearer we approach to a total presentation having the character of one general continuum in which differences are latent."20

We may then pass briefly in review certains respects in which the Olympian gods differ from the mystery gods, viewing the matter simply as an illustration of the relation between the motive of participation and what we may call the motive of contemplation. There is a further advantage in reporting the matter as it is presented in

^{19 &}quot;Themis," p. 122.

²⁰ Ward: Article Psychology in "Encyclopedia Britannica."

Miss Harrison's "Themis." The author holds to the view that the development from mystery god to Olympian god was essentially one of loss, so far as any genuine religious value is concerned. She is a vigorous partisan of "participation" and of mysticism. Certain of the enduring problems touching the interpretation of religion are

brought to our notice as a result of this point of view.

First, the Olympians emerge only when all sacredness and divinity are excluded from nature. The primitive totemic unity, the "sympathetic continuum" between the social group and natural objects, in which, as yet, there is no external god, becomes broken. Divinity is now remote, not near; the immediate natural surroundings of men no longer are pervaded with mystery and life, but become common objects, the domain of scientific analysis and practical utilities. The direct evidence for this, according to Miss Harrison, is that the "Olympian sheds his plant or animal form."21 He gradually shifts from a nature god, instinct with the life and emotions which pulse through nature and the social group continuous with her, to a human-nature god. And this process is essentially one of loss, so far as religious values are concerned. The characteristics of the Olympian human-nature god are mainly negative, the result of stripping off, through analysis and reflection, those vital characteristics which ever made the mystery god so near and so pregnant with meaning and value. The mystery gods, on the other hand, retain a strange beauty and charm and appeal to the very end. They "are never free of totemistic hauntings, never quite shed their plant and animal shapes. That lies in the very nature of their sacramental worship. They are still alive with the life-blood of all living things from which they sprang."22

Second, the Olympians cease to be either the symbols or the projections of a group soul. They no longer have, as an intimate part of their very substance, a community following, a *thiasos;* they are no longer a many-in-one, but solitary individuals. In the "Hymn of the Kouretes," whose elucidation furnishes the theme of Miss Harrison's "Themis," the Kouros, the young Zeus, is hailed as coming at the head of his attendants, his *daimones*. Zeus then once

²¹ "Themis," p. 447.

²² Ibid., p. 450.

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had a thiasos, a following, a social group which attended him. "When he grew up to be the Father, it seems, he lost his thiasos and has gone about unattended ever since. If we can once seize the meaning of this thiasos and its relation to the god, we shall have gone far to understand the making of Greek mythology."23 And the meaning ascribed to the thiasos by the school whose teachings we are now considering is, as we have seen, the fundamental thesis that religion is to be interpreted wholly in terms of man's social experience. The Kouros, the young god, is only the projection of the Kouretes; Dionysos is "but his thiasos incarnate." The Kouretes, a band of youths about to be initiated, dance an excited mimetic dance. They thus utter together their feelings, their delight and terror, their desires. And "being a collective emotion, it is necessarily felt as something more than the experience of the individual, as something dominant and external. . . . They sink their own personality . . . , they become emotionally one, a true congregation, not a collection of individuals. The emotion they feel collectively, the thing that is more than any individual emotion, they externalize, project; it is the raw material of god-head. Primitive gods are to a large extent collective enthusiasms, uttered, formulated."24 And just so long as the bond between the thiasos and the god remains intact, so long as the worshippers feel the intimacy which makes themselves and their god partakers of one Life, participating in a common substance, just so long is the god a genuine god, a true mystery god. But when the thiasos, the social group of worshippers, no longer participates in the life of the god, the god becomes a solitary individual, remote and aloof, majestic it may be, but no longer the incarnation of man's deepest emotions and desires. Such are the Olympians. They are "the last product of rationalism, of individualistic thinking; the thiasos has projected them utterly. Cut off from the very source of their life and being, the emotion of the thiasos, they desiccate and die. Dionysos with his thiasos is still Comus, still trails behind him the glory of the old group ecstasy."25

Third, the Olympians cease to perform the functions of the older

²⁸ "Themis," p. 447.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 48.

divinities, and demand instead that honor and service be rendered to them as superior personalities. The older gods, akin to the mystery gods, were without distinct title, ready to take on plant or animal shape, symbols of functions and activities performed, sharing in the life and labor both of man and of nature. But the Olympian renounces all of this; "instead of being himself a sacrament he demands a sacrifice."26 The inherent democracy of mysticism, of participation on the part of worshipper and god alike, in a common life and in common tasks, is replaced by the aristocratic and dualistic severance between the god who receives and men who give him honor and service. Gift-sacrifice, externality, formalism, are substituted for intimacy and felt unity, remoteness for participation. When the matter is thus presented almost every motive which appeals to us makes us condemn the Olympians as sterile and fruitless. "Sentiment, tradition, may keep up the custom of giftsacrifice for a while, but the gods to whom the worshipper's real heart and life goes out are the gods who work and live, not those who dwell at ease in Olympos."27

Fourth, one function which the mystery god performed for his worshippers was all-important. He not only lived and worked for them; he died for them as well. But the Olympian is immortal; this is his chief claim to distinction and remoteness from man, and also it is "the crowning disability and curse of the new theological

order."28

He gains deathlessness and immutability, and he thinks thereby to gain life; but the life he wins is only a "seeming immortality which is really the denial of life, for life is change." And this is part of a further paradox. The Olympian, we have noted, becomes completely human through ceasing to be a part of nature, through renouncing every plant and animal form, whatever is merely natural and non-human. But in thus being humanized, he loses the one supreme characteristic of human life, its change and mortality. The Olympian ceases to be both human and divine, and becomes

²⁶ "Themis," p. 467.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 468.

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divine alone. Men may now contemplate his beauty and perfection, but he is no longer such as men are; he no longer can sympathize with and participate in the human struggle. Hence the powerful appeal which the later mystery religions made to human need and feeling. It is not "to the bright Olympians who know naught of struggle and pain and death, but to gods who have shared these experiences, who have triumphed over death and risen to new life, that the hope of immortality attaches itself; for in their victory is the evidence that death can be overcome, and their example shows the way."³⁰

In short, we see illustrated throughout the contrast between par-

ticipation and contemplation, feeling and idea, mysticism and rationalism. And yet, in spite of all this seeming diversity and conflict, both the motives of participation and of contemplation must be counted among the energies of religion and within the tradition of religion. This will become clear in the next chapter. It is to be noted here that a third component in the life of religion, in all its higher forms, depends for its emergence and its existence upon this very tension between participation and contemplation, the immediate and the more remote. I mean that which can only be called the knowledge of and devotion to the Good. This is that ethical and moral passion which claims its rightful place alongside of participation and contemplation within the religious tradition. And what we may surely say is that the very absence of the immediacy of participation, the remoteness of man and gods which contemplation signifies, are the necessary accompaniment of the long process whereby man learns to distinguish between what is near, close at hand, immediate, and what is good, what is the ideal and the goal of his destiny. The Olympian remoteness and contemplation are both an accompaniment of this moral process and they aid and

stimulate it as well. And this is *the* moral process. The moral consciousness can emerge and can play its part in human life only as the primitive mysticism of participation breaks up, in order that some quality of contemplation may emerge. Perhaps at some further stage of religion, participation may reappear on a higher level, higher because of what it has learned from contemplation and the

³⁰ Moore: "The History of Religions," p. 444.

moral consciousness. The development of the Olympian tradition was, then, not loss chiefly, not an "intellectual backwater," but a necessary part of religion, contributing something of positive worth to the whole process. The distinction is a real one between the natural and the ethical religions. As long as man's life blends with that of nature in one felt unity, as long as that social and natural mysticism prevails, which characterizes the totemism of early religion, man will not dream of possessing or achieving an ideal good, freed from the irrational limitations of feeling and caprice. Both the social group and the nature continuous with it must cease to satisfy before man can seek or find a God who is also good.

That the Olympians came to represent and sanction moral ideals cannot be doubted. Imaginative playthings, objects of art, abstract intellectual conceptions, they may well have been, but the moral function is there too, and it is sufficient to save the serious and the religious character of the Olympians. The best proof of this is furnished by a study of the cult titles used in prayer and sacrifice. An exhaustive account of these is given by Mr. Farnell, in his "Cults of the Greek State." Social, political, and ethical designations of the functions of the great Olympians are found in abundance; indeed it is not too much to say that they predominate. The Olympians, when worshipped under these ethical cult titles, were no objets d'art, yet they were, to be sure, objects of contemplation. But to contemplate a distant being or object is not of necessity mere idle play of the esthetic imagination, though it may become this. There is a moral vision of some ideal perfection, contemplated from afar, not participated in, and from such contemplation may come added zest and significance.

Moreover, it is contemplation which becomes the spokesman and the vehicle of the cognitive worth and meaning of our deeper human experiences, and which bears witness to the presence of some total environment within which human life is lived. Wholly to exclude contemplation from the religious tradition is to fall back on the assumption that the immediacies of felt experience are self-sufficing, able to sustain and to guarantee all of the values of life; that whatever is not to be thus possessed and participated in, whatever is a distant object of mere knowledge and contemplation, is pale and

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shadowy, inert and fruitless. But that the religious consciousness which has uttered itself in the historical religions fits in with this assumption, whether true or false, cannot be admitted for a moment. Examine the religious consciousness and go back once more to its totemistic origins, as Durkheim and his followers would have us do. Here is, we have seen, the felt unity both of a human group and of some province of nature. Both "pools," as Mr. Cornford calls them, the human pool and the nature pool, are at the outset, continuous with each other, so that there is felt to be, in truth, but one group. Because everything belongs to the one felt group, the one "sympathetic continuum," every region of the group participates in every

other region.

Here, then, is no dualism, no externality, no contemplation. And yet that which is later to become simply the human world even now really has its environment, its background; and this awareness of the environment, of some genuine whole of things, makes this primitive consciousness religious in addition to being social. The religious moment within this primitive feeling relates to the specifically human group. Totemism is, in brief, religious, because the feeling to which the totemic system gives birth is more than mere feeling; it is something cognitive, it bears witness to a background and an environment. Now it is the function of the Olympians, as of all such gods who express the motive of contemplation rather than participation, that they keep alive this knowledge side of religion, this reference to some background of things precisely not here and now experienced and participated in. They are symbols of a distant city of God, a Platonic Realm of Ideas, the thought of which, even if only in sheer imagination, can alone lend stability and significance. Thus can the Olympians be spoken of, in a splendid phrase, as "the symbols of eternity and calm in a transient and troubled world."31

It is this interest in the discovery, the recognition, and the knowledge of that which is both real and also pertinent to the deepest values disclosed within human experience, it is this which constitutes the heart of the religious tradition. A reference to the relation between religion and magic suggests much which confirms this

³¹ J. Adam: "The Religious Teachers of Greece," p. 117.

thesis. Both religion and magic relate to some over-world; both deal with some order of things which is felt to be sacred. But they spring from two different attitudes and interests. Magic grows out of that interest which man has in seeking to control, to manipulate the sacred, and thereby to get something that he wants. The sacred is here an instrument and a means to be used in the fulfilment of desire. But the religious attitude is different. It comes to exist as something other than magic, because man discovers that there are structures in his world whose worth lies not in their being used and controlled, but in their being recognized, possessed in imagination and in idea, and worshipped. Whenever it was, in the development of human life, that these two attitudes began to diverge—the attitudes of pragmatic control and of non-pragmatic contemplation—at that moment religion, as an energy distinct from magic, was born.

Marett has urged, as against Frazer, that the magical act is inter-personal, a transaction between wills. The spell of magic, as against the prayer of religion, is a "spiritual projectile" from one will to another. Frazer, it will be recalled, had argued that magic is allied with science, through the fundamental fact that both of them are concerned with wholly impersonal situations, that "in both of them the succession of events is perfectly regular and certain, being determined by immutable laws, the operation of which can be foreseen and calculated precisely."32 May it not be true that the magical act and the magical relation can occur within either a personal or an impersonal situation, and that it depends primarily upon the human attitude and interest which it serves rather than upon the type of situation within which it moves? No doubt there have been and there still are plenty of occasions in which "religion" attempts to utilize and to control its gods. And these very terms, use, control, instrument, are ambiguous. You may possess a "use" for me when I merely converse with you and seek to share your ideas, perhaps greater than when I try to "use" you as a means for the furtherance of my interests. But it is surely perverse to define religion as Leuba does, as "that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of psychic

³² Cf. the discussion in Marett: "From Spell to Prayer" in "The Threshold of Religion," and in Frazer: "The Golden Bough," ch. 4.

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nature, usually personal powers, and makes use of them." This is not religion but magic because of the pragmatic and utilitarian interest and attitude which are here at work. The attitude of religion is not this. Religion connotes man's interest in participating in, and in possessing, through feeling or through any of the varied energies of his life, structures which he neither makes nor controls, but which he recognizes and enjoys, loves and worships. Are there such structures? Or, is every interest of life a pragmatic interest? The answer of the religious tradition is, in any case, unambiguous. That tradition arises, not primarily through a projection outward of what man finds within himself, solitary and isolated, but through an appropriation of that which he finds surrounding him, of that within which he lives and acts. Religion is, at bottom, simply the spokesman for the interest and the attitude wherein man possesses and participates in objective and significant structures. The manner of such possession as well as the nature of that in which man believes himself to participate is nothing changeless. Yet the attitude and the human interest remain, a permanent manifestation of the life of reason and the vocation of man.

³³ Leuba: "A Psychological Study of Religion," p. 52.



CHAPTER IV

PLATONISM AND CHRISTIANITY

N seeking to lay bare the essential thing in the religious tradition, we have stressed the objective reference of the mind's major interests. Either through contemplation or participation or indeed through his very activity, man is linked to an outer order which is real; the play of his deepest energies is cognitive as well as human. If an insight and conviction of this nature constitute the burden of the religious tradition, and if anything within that tradition has found utterance within the teachings of philosophical idealism, as we have supposed, then we should be able to understand better the way in which man's mind does possess an objective reference, if we examine some accredited exposition of idealism. To this end, I propose in this chapter to make some study of Platonism. Also, we should expect that in the religion best known to us, and which has exercised most influence upon western civilization, this same aspect of objective reference and possession would take on a form peculiarly rich and significant. Such is indeed the case. We shall in this chapter study also, then, some aspects of Christianity, and we shall notice certain comparisons between these two mighty syntheses of life and of ideas. It is just the knowledge side of these two historical forces which will interest us here. We shall ask, what is it that the mind of man is really in possession of, to what objective structures do his conscious energies make reference, and how is this solidarity between the mind and reality set forth in these two cases? Platonism and Christianity are indeed the two chief formative elements of men's thought and life down to the emergence of whatever forces we may choose to regard as distinctively modern. And our situation and our problems are what they are through the interaction of these various energies.

Within the structure of Platonism there is one dominant motive

and idea. It is the conviction that significant forms and structures, appealing to the eye, the imagination, and the reason of man, lie embedded within the world which surrounds him. The vocation of man is to uncover these forms of beauty and of intelligence, and to dwell among them. This constitutes for Plato, and also for Aristotle, a philosophical conviction. But it is to be found as well in the Greek temper itself, in the attitude of the Greek mind to nature and to human life. Spontaneous and plastic throughout, stamping its mould upon all the gifts of Hellas to civilization, this attitude is reflectively voiced in the philosophical imagination of Plato and of Aristotle.

I have used the term "significant structure" to designate those Forms which the mind is to discover and to possess. A significant structure, a Platonic Idea, is both wholly formed and articulate and it is also the embodiment of meaning. It is both a structure, utterly real, and also pertinent to the nature and interests of the mind whose function it is to envisage it in impassioned contemplation. It is these significant structures, real and eternal, which draw the mind to themselves and endow the mind with a divine wonder and love.

Let us view some of the more concrete illustrations of this central Platonic insight. Consider first the literal meaning and the connotation of that term which is perhaps the master term of Greek philosophy and certainly of Plato's thought, the term idea. This word, derived from the root of the verb $i\delta\epsilon i\nu$, to see, cognate with the Latin, video, from which comes our English vision, means literally that which is seen, outward appearance, form, shape. From this primitive and literal sense, its meaning grows in a twofold direction. It comes to designate that which, when seen, is the source of esthetic joy. It thus means not only visible shape, but beauty as well. In Homer, the word is already used to mean simply beauty.1 But it comes to mean not only that which delights the sense of esthetic joy, but whatever possesses order, measure or rhythm, whatever is a genuine structure, of such a nature that the mind bent upon knowledge can delight and terminate in it. Thus, the Pythagoreans apply the term to those geometrical figures which they con-

ceive to be the ultimate elements of reality; the Empedoclean hot and cold, wet and dry are in one treatise at least, spoken of as ideas $(\epsilon i \delta \eta)^2$ and the materialist, Democritus, can apply to his atoms the term ideas. And the Platonic, or shall we say the Socratic, Idea, what is it but a structure possessing the maximum of articulate significance, both utterly real and intelligible, and awaiting to be known and greeted by the mind? Whether we think of the Platonic intelligible Forms as existing by themselves apart, in a world of pure Forms, or whether we suppose them to be articulate structures or laws which the mind can discern within the world of nature's processes, makes, in this regard, little difference. The commanding features of the Platonic Idea are these two: first, the concept stands for realities apprehended and not at all for any way of apprehending or mode of apprehension. And secondly, the Platonic Idea is an object of thought, and not of sense experience, because it possesses true permanence and stability, and is not a process in time. These two more fully developed meanings of the term Idea never, for Plato, completely fall asunder. Any articulate structure is, in so far, a thing of beauty, and that which delights the esthetic vision is also a type of intellectual order. The business of mind it is to unveil these objects of esthetic and intellectual $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho i \alpha$, contemplation, strip them of all that blurs the clarity of their form and outline, of all non-being, and then to possess them in imagination and in thought.

Platonism is, then, the reasoned outcome of a certain objectivity of attitude, a constant reference of the mind to those objective meaningful Forms which constitute the true center of gravity of all that we call conscious, and that we tend to regard as belonging primarily to the inner life. This is the gist of that pervasive characteristic of Platonic philosophy, and of the Greek mind, which we must try in many ways to body forth, if we would apprehend it fairly, because our usual habits of thought about mind and personality are quite different. Zeller, in characterizing this situation as a whole, speaks of a "plastiche Ruhe," a "reine Objektivität,"

² Cf. the note on p. 88, Burnet: "Greek Philosophy," and the article Idea in Hastings' "Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics."

an "ungebrochenen Einheit des Geistigen und des natürlichen." The mind of man is throughout, in his knowledge, his conduct, and his love, a bundle of objective activities; not his inner consciousness, but the beautiful and intelligible Forms, the orderly structures of nature and of the state constitute the true center of reference for all that the mind finds within itself.⁴

This linkage of the mind to outer, significant structures may be thought of in more than one way. Each energy of the mind, knowledge, feeling, love, volition, affirms in its own way its allegiance to the Ideas. Two of these ways may here be especially noted. They center around the concepts of Imitation and Participation. The mind's ideas are to imitate the eternal objective patterns. The language of imitation connotes a dualism, and a copy or correspondence conception of knowledge. Ideas within the mind, if they are to be true, are to portray and to imitate those Forms which are the standards for our knowledge. This concept and vocabulary of imitation is used throughout the dialogues. But there is a more radical way of being in earnest with this entire motive of objectivity. We shall then say, not so much that the mind imitates the objective Forms which remain distant and remote from them, but rather that the mind overcomes that very distance, participates in the very being of that which the mind knows, and even, it may be, becomes identical with the true objects of its knowledge. The more the objective and significant structure is viewed as the real center of reference of the mind's ideas, the less dualistic shall our theory become, and the more will imitation of the real object pass over into assimilation with the object. The language of participation, then, is more faithful to this objectivity of attitude than is the language of imitation. Plato passes freely from the one concept to the other, and he devotes a dialogue, the Parmenides, to a formal study of the logic of imitation and of participation, which becomes there the problem of the

³ Zeller: "Philosophie des Griechen," vol. 1, p. 126.

⁴ It is this objectivity which Santayana has described in these words: "Perhaps the deepest assumption of classic philosophy is that nature and the gods on the one hand and man on the other, both have a fixed character; that there is consequently a necessary piety, a true philosophy, a standard happiness, a normal art." "The New Republic," August 21, 1915.

one and the many. In the eighth book of the "Republic," where Plato eloquently portrays the ideal of the true philosopher, the impassioned outgoing of the mind to those eternal Forms which constitute its true environment is set forth in the language of both these functions, and I quote it in Jowett's translation:

"For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being has no time to look down upon the affairs of men, or to be filled with jealousy and enmity in the struggle against them; his eye is ever directed towards fixed and immutable principles, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he would, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

"Impossible.

"And the philosopher also, conversing with the divine and immutable, becomes a part of that divine and immutable order, as far as nature allows."

Surely the concept of imitation and its accompanying dualism is less radical and profound than the concept of participation and identity. The more the mind participates in the being of these eternal Forms, the more does it reach its goal and fulfill its function. That objective reference is never wholly absent in the life of ideas and of consciousness. To the vision of the philosopher and the lover of beauty, it becomes wholly explicit. Perhaps we may say that there is within any philosophical realism a distinct tendency for a dualistic, representative theory of knowledge to develop into a more monistic realism according to which the idea which knows is, in some fashion, assimilated with the reality which is known. This could, I believe, be shown not only in the case of Plato and of Aristotle, but also in the Scholastics, in Spinoza, and in certain forms of contemporary realism. The language of sheer imitation is less adequate than that of participation again, in that it gives the suggestion of too great a passivity, an inert yielding to the outer Forms and objects. The point to stress is not so much such passivity, but the objectivity of the mind's ideas. There is for Plato and for Aristotle an abundance of impassioned activity on the part of ideas to

^{5 &}quot;Republic," 500 D.

fulfill their destiny, to go out to the Forms of true being, and participate in them. Such a caution is necessary, I think, in reading Windelband's summary of the dominant temper of the Greek attitude. "The limitations of the ancient Greek consciousness," he says, "lay in the fact that it thought of itself only and wholly as receptive, as a mirror before which must be presented both the highest and the lowest objects in the world, ideas as well as sensations."

As a means of understanding better what is involved in this objective reference so essential to the entire life of consciousness, we may look for a moment to Aristotle's conception of mind. For Aristotle, mind is an assimilation and a possession of that which the world holds out to it, and in a twofold sense. Mind looks in two directions, and finds on both sides material for its knowledge and its contemplation. From below, mind expresses but the life of the body; it is continuous with the vegetative and animal functions of the organism. But from above the mind appropriates the pure Forms which for Aristotle no less than for Plato are permanent significant structures constituting the genuine fabric of reality, and furnishing the higher nature of the mind with all its content. It is the first of these two aspects which gives to Aristotle's theory of the soul something more than the semblance of a naturalism which sounds modern and points straight in the direction of behaviorism. Consciousness is, viewed thus from below, but a voice and language in which the life of the body utters itself, bespeaks its own nature and its own interests. The mind echoes the thrills of the living body. The mind is the body's entelechy, a mirror in which are reflected physiological events, mechanisms of brain and of muscle. The mind shall be the spokesman for those organic and external structures which condition it, the screen upon which are projected the interests of just those structures. If, in Aristotle, the naturalistic consequences of this point of view are in abeyance, it is because Aristotle still thinks of the bodily organism in terms of teleology, as the achievement of a significant Form, rather than in terms of a mechanical physiology. But, more important, for Aristotle, the mind is not only the expression of the form of the body; in its rational capacity it appropriates

 $^{^6\,\}mathrm{Windelband}\colon$ "Kulturphilosophie und Transcendentaler Idealismus," Logos, vol. 1, p. 194.

and expresses the intelligible nature of reality itself. The structures which enter into its own being are borrowed from "above" as well as from "below." It is through the contemplation of these Forms which in the end are still the Ideas of Plato, though realized within matter, that the mind is divine and is active. But in this very activity, the mind is still made up wholly of what it has received; the mind is identical with the objects and forms which it possesses so that the activity seems really to belong on the side of the objects apprehended, the significant structures which are real, rather than on the side of any "active" spiritual substance. The result is, then, that both in the case of the mind's utterance of bodily functions from below, and of the Platonic intelligible structures from above, mind tends to become identical with the objects which it expresses. In such a world mind is itself a Form or rather it is potentially all Forms; its life and interests are assimilated to the significant structures which are the true objects of its knowledge. "And thought thinks itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same." In a philosophy such as that of Plato and of Aristotle, thought can afford to be identical with its objects vastly better than in a philosophy of naturalism in which the objects of thought, the entities found by mind as real, are no longer significant structures, forms embodying meaning, but facts drawn from the lower levels of experience, sensation and perception, and held together solely by the play of mechanical forces. There is no occasion to minimize

⁷ Cf. the following passages in Ch. Werner: "Aristote et L'idéalisme Platonicien," p. 165: "On doit reconnaître, tout d'abord, qu'Aristote semble refuser à la pensée le caractère qui est par excellence le caractère distinctif de l'esprit: l'activité. Le pensée, selon lui, exprime l'activité de l'objet, bien plutôt que l'activité du sujet. Ou, du moins—car nous verrons qu'Aristote entend faire une place à l'activité du sujet.—la pensée résulte d'une action exercée par l'objet sur le sujet." Also, p. 190: "Nous savons maintenant dans quel sens il faut entendre la comparison instituée par Aristote entre l'activité de l'esprit et le mouvement. Si l'activité de l'esprit s'oppose au mouvement comme l'énergie achevée s'oppose a l'énergie inachevée; si, d'autre part, le mouvement n'est une énergie inachevée que parce qu'il est une forme inachevée, quelle conclusion tirer, sinon que l'activité de l'esprit est identique avec la forme? Le mouvement est la forme inachevée. L'activité de l'esprit est la forme achevée."

⁸ Aristotle: "Metaphysics," translated by W. D. Ross, Λ 1072 b.

the vast difference between Greek realism and that modern realism which is the outcome of natural science. For both realisms, mind is to be the possessor of that which it finds in its world. But the Greek genius believed itself everywhere to discover significant structures, divine forms; the reason and order which the mind sought were already real, awaiting appropriation and possession by the soul of man.

Here in this objectivity of attitude is the source of that difference between the sense of those earliest of all arguments for theism, in the Philebus, the Phaedo and the tenth book of the Laws, and the sense of such modern arguments as use the same language. To say, as Plato does, that the universe is not left to the guidance of an irrational and random chance, but is "ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom" is, for the Greeks, not so much to emphasize a mind that actively orders, but rather the presence within the world of rhythm and of order instead of caprice and of chance. Mr. Webb has reminded us that among the ancients it was the scientists who were the theists. They are the discoverers and explorers of orderly structures, and the reason and intelligence manifested by nature are identified with objective orderliness and significant structures, rather than with a consciousness which is formative and creative.

This pervasive reference of the mind to objective structures occasions perhaps little surprise in the case of the mind's ideas, and with respect to the function of knowledge. For knowledge, of course, is just that interest in which the mind is, in intention, most completely self-forgetful and assimilated to something not itself. But what of the feelings and emotions, love and goodness? In these regions, too, does the central Platonic insight and conviction obtain, and we may turn briefly to the Platonic doctrine of love, and the Socratic-Platonic thesis concerning the nature of goodness. We may say, I think, that Plato's conception of love is essentially an assimilation of love to knowledge. And this is true not only because love is a passionate movement of the mind in which it is attracted by the perfect Forms, the significant structures, the utterly objective and real Ideas, but also, and chiefly, because of one characteristic of

⁹ C. C. J. Webb: "Studies in the History of Natural Theology."

these outer structures. They are universals and not individuals. So much we may at least say. How much more this involves may be doubtful, but that for Plato and for Aristotle, the true object of all adequate knowledge is a type, a law, an Idea, a universal and nothing individual or particular, admits of no doubt. The mind's interest in genuine knowledge leads it away from the individual, the contingent, the here and now, and compels it to find lodgment elsewhere. The individual is at best an instance and an illustration of something essential and universal. Now this is not only, for Plato, a description of the interest of knowledge, but also of the activity of love, and that in a profound sense. Both the philosopher and the lover of beauty will pierce through the individual and will "hold converse with the true beauty, divine and simple." In that wonderful speech in the "Symposium" which is put into the mouth of Diotima, a discourse at once impassioned and restrained, the love of beauty and its pilgrim's progress is described in language which surely is the language of science, of knowledge, and of philosophy. I think no apology is needed for quoting the passage at some length.

"I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you follow if you can. For he who would proceed rightly in this matter should begin in youth to turn to beautiful forms; and first, if his instructor guide him rightly, he should learn to love one such form only-out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he will himself perceive that the beauty of one form is truly related to the beauty of another; and then if beauty in general is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he perceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover of all beautiful forms; this will lead him on to consider that the beauty of the mind is more honorable than the beauty of the outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him and will search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until his beloved is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty of institutions and laws, and understand that all is of one kindred, and that personal beauty is only a trifle; and after laws

and institutions he will lead him on to the sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, himself a slave mean and calculating, but looking at the abundance of beauty and drawing towards the sea of beauty, and creating and beholding many fair and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom; until at length he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. . . . And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is." 100 to the science of beauty is.

What, we may well ask, is really being set forth here? Whoever reads this must be struck by the vocabulary of knowledge, of science. Is it not with some astonishment that one comes upon the climax, one of the earlier climaxes, "until at length he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, $\epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \eta \mu \eta$, which is the science of beauty everywhere"? Not only is the language here that of the knowledge process and the knowledge interest, but the substance and the thought as well. This is certainly not the same thing as saying that every esthetic interest is here to be dissolved away, and that absolute Beauty is but a transparent cloak for scientific law, for the very concept of scientific law itself, for "die Gesetzesordnung," "das Gesetz der Gesetzlichkeit" as they are spoken of by Natorp, who, I think, falls into this error throughout.¹¹ The "Symposium" is a dialogue which treats really of love and not of the logic of scientific method. But love is a passionate outgoing of the mind, an utter devotion to universal and essential Forms. It is the theme of knowledge set forth in the lan-

¹⁰ "Symposium," p. 210.

¹¹ Natorp: "Platos Ideenlehre," p. 117. Natorp regards Plato merely as a precursor of Kant's critical philosophy, or rather, of certain logical and methodological doctrines of that philosophy.

guage of the emotions, but this is withal a new language and no colorless medium. Here are, then, two interests of the mind in which it confirms the promise of its nature and yields willingly to those universal significant structures which communicate their substance to the mind which knows and loves them.

But there is still a third function and interest which is also assimilated to knowledge. It is virtue, goodness. If Plato describes love in the language of knowledge, he avows openly that goodness is knowledge. We largely miss the purport of this Socratic thesis if we suppose that we have refuted it in pointing to the all too frequent failure of the will to conform to the better insight of our knowledge of good and of evil. To affirm that virtue is knowledge is a striking way of saying that the excellence and vocation of man's mind lies in the mind's appropriation and possession of those Forms, of that order and beauty which constitute the true being of the universe. Not free striving or creative activity but the appropriation of and participation in the eternal significant structures of reality:

There let me gaze, till I become In soul with what I gaze on, wed.

This is the office of the mind. This is what the Socratic-Platonic identification of goodness and knowledge mean. Goodness consists in the fact "that, by a happy infection or infusion, more of the essence of the universe has got into them, *i.e.*, into good men, than into others; that the magnetic wires from the fount of real ideas pass the currents of the fair and good with peculiar intensity through them, and evolve within them the responsive and miniature god. What is praised in them is thus only a margin or local extension of the outer ground of the universe." To use these words, which are Martineau's, ¹² may be to overemphasize somewhat the passivity of the mind in its relations to the objects which it knows. This relation is one of participation on the side of the mind, no less than one of "extension" on the side of its objects. But the important thing is that the energy of will is throughout conceived as linked to and assimilated with objective significant structures.

Before leaving this account of the way in which, for Plato as for

¹² J. Martineau: "Types of Ethical Theory," vol. 1, p. 11.

Greek thought at large, the mind's ideas are linked to an objective order, I would make two remarks. There is, first, an analogy between this objectivity of mind and its ideas, and that stage in the development of the religious tradition which lies behind animism, and which occupied our attention in the last chapter. In that earlier stage, "Totemism" if you will, men's consciousness is conceived as participating in something social and cosmic. It is only subsequently that consciousness finds itself, and withdraws from its world. So that in the development of the religious tradition what comes first is not projection from within outwards, from ideas to spirits and gods, but possession of something objective, and participation in it precedes any isolation of mind and of consciousness. What occurs in the way of anthropomorphic projection can occur only after man has first sundered himself from structures which he originally supposes himself to possess. So it is here with Platonism. Ideas are not yet so sharply separated from objective structures as they are later on to become. They do not as yet live a free life of their own. They are the Forms, the entelechies of objective structures, inseparably linked to the cosmic Forms which serve as their patterns and their objects. This is why, for Plato, every function and interest of the mind must, in the end, be set forth as a cognitive function. For, it is knowledge which affirms most decisively this linkage of ideas to objects. For the knowledge interest, the idea in the mind ought to be quite transparent, so that not it, but the object which it envisages occupies the focus of attention. Platonism, in sum, stands for that stage in the development of reflective thought in which possession and participation, the awareness of totalities and significant structures, are dominant, rather than self-conscious, isolation of ideas from their objects, and projection outwards of what at first belongs only to the inner life. Did it not sound bizarre, and if Durkheim's and Miss Harrison's sense of the word "Totemism" were more prevalent, we could indeed say that Platonism corresponds in philosophy to "Totemism" in religion.

But it is needful to add at once a certain caution, and this is our second remark. From what we have been saying about the Platonic and Greek objectivity of attitude it does not follow that, for Plato, the idea of personality, of conscious individuality was wholly in

abeyance, that "Plato has no concept of Personality, as a subject capable of will."18 It is one thing to say that, for Plato, ideas and self-conscious personality are habitually conceived of as linked to significant structures in which they participate; it is quite another thing to say that such concepts are altogether lacking. Plato surely has heard of the soul; he knows about feelings and volitions and ideas. But this entire life of consciousness has its center of gravity outside itself in those objective significant structures to which is linked every content of consciousness-feelings and volitions no less than ideas. We may say, if we like, that thus to view the matter is of necessity to compromise the autonomy and the integrity of selfconsciousness. It requires effort, indeed, for us to recover in imagination this objectivity of attitude and of reference. But, having done this we may be reminded that something akin to this, rather than any subjectivism is the historical fountain head of idealism in European philosophy.

If now we agree to say that the outstanding philosophical idea in Platonism is the attachment of ideas to, or even their identity with, the significant structures which they know, we may describe the transition from Platonism to Christianity thus. Ideas, and I mean now not Forms, but contents of consciousness, lose that implicit objectivity of reference to significant structures which they know. Ideas begin rather to live a free life of their own. They migrate, so to speak, from the outer structures of the cosmos to the inner life of persons. Instead of being primarily linked to outer objects, they now become attached to selves. They become, or they are on the way of becoming, modes or modifications of the conscious activity of persons. And from now on, as long as religious interests and concepts are dominant, as they are till the close of the Middle Ages, souls or selves are thought of as constituting the inner essence of the whole cosmic drama. They are the stuff of which reality is made, and the inner life of conscious selves is the true home of mind and of ideas.

This transformation, not only of philosophical ideas, but of the entire cultural situation as we go from Plato and Aristotle to Augustine, Anselm, and Descartes is not seldom described as the literal

¹³ Quoted from K. Hildenbrand by Kistiakowski: "Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen," p. 7.

emergence of the sense of personality. It is perhaps safer to speak of a deepening of that idea and a change in the habitual way in which mind was thought of. In the experience and thought of later antiquity and of the early Christian era (I quote from Mr. Webb), "a development had taken place in the sense or consciousness of individual personality, as a result of which individual personality had come to be regarded as a fundamental characteristic of spiritual being in a way in which it had not been so regarded in classical antiquity."14 Many forces contributed to this freeing of ideas from their attachment to objects. The teachings of the sophists, the political fortunes of a world in which traditional structures were going to pieces, and in which the individual was turned back upon the resources of his inner life, and chiefly, the positive influence of the new religious teachings and experience, all of these forces aided in dissolving ideas away from their solidarity with known objects, and in enriching the kingdom of the mind. It was through the reflections and criticisms of the sophists that men began to doubt the indubitable power of ideas to reveal objective realities and values. But these men who surmised the natural forces which could generate ideas from below are, we feel, essentially modern. They sense the naturalistic roots of all ideas, the dependence of all our ideas and valuings upon bodily and social matter-of-fact forces. But their work was essentially critical. Like the social and political forces then in the ascendent, they contributed to the dissolution of those bonds which united ideas to intelligible structures in reality. They had less concern with the discovery or the creation of new structures which might serve as objective points of reference for the mind's interests and ideas. But the most potent of those historical forces which drive ideas, as it

¹⁴ C. C. J. Webb: "Studies in the History of Natural Theology," p. 141. The following may also be quoted from Gierke: "Moreover, a fugitive glance at Medieval doctrine suffices to perceive how throughout it all, in sharp contrast to the theories of antiquity, runs the thought of the absolute and imperishable value of the individual; a thought revealed by Christianity." "Political Theories of the Middle Ages," translated by Maitland, p. 81. Also from Teichmüller: "Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe III," p. 385: "Durch die Anerkennung des Individuellen und der Person hat das Christentum ein der ganzen alten Philosophie fremdes Princip geltend gemacht, und dadurch bekommen alle sonst scheinbar gleichen Ideen eine neue Bedeutung." Cf. also Teichmüller: "Ueber das Wesen der Liebe," p. 78.

were, from outer intelligible structures to the inner life of persons are those religious energies which culminate in Christianity. Here, at any rate, it would seem, is an instance of a religious motive and sentiment effecting a widespread rearrangement of men's habitual ideas. It is this sort of thing which might well make one pause in accepting Professor Dewey's dictum that "there is not an instance of any large idea about the world being independently generated by religion." It is just this deepening appreciation of the kingdom of the mind, so abundantly testified to, and which surely has given birth to certain "large ideas about the world," that is due in great measure to the impact of religious experiences and motives.

I shall mention several aspects of this shifting of emphasis from the significant structures to which, for Plato, ideas were linked, to the activities of conscious beings. In the first place, once this linkage of ideas to outer Forms becomes less secure, the more free ideas become, the less do knowledge and contemplation express the whole nature of man's vocation. The life and thought of men grow now out of attitudes and experiences in which not contemplation, but activity; not intellect, but will and feeling; not esthetic and philosophic theoria, but ethical striving and emotional aspiration express men's dominant interests. This is, of course, a commonplace. We shall presently note an important qualification to which the statement is subject, but I shall here dismiss this transition from the life of knowledge to that of will and feeling with the following quotation from Mr. Percy Gardner: "It may fairly be said that the essentially active nature of man, the place of will in the constitution of the world, is a truth which has gradually been growing upon humanity during all the ages of its thought. Little was made of the will in the philosophy of Greece, though it was better appreciated by Aristotle than by Plato, and better by the Stoics and Neo-Platonists than by Aristotle, and modern philosophy has made far more of the will than ancient."18

16 Percy Gardner: "The Sub-conscious and the Super-conscious." The Hibbert

Journal, April, 1911, p. 490.

¹⁵ Dewey: "The Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy," p. 3. Cf. also the following quotation from Toy: "Introduction to the History of Religion," p. 8. "But, as a matter of fact, the religious sentiment, coexisting with these ideas, has always entered into alliance with them, creating nothing, but appropriating everything."

But in the second place, what we shall need to observe with great care is that although there is this undoubted migration of ideas from outer intelligible Forms to the inner life, and although there is the accompanying emergence of will and of feeling, nevertheless there is still an objective reference which attaches to the life of the mind. The inner life, within the ethos of Christianity as within that of Platonism, is still conceived as participating in an objective, yes, a cosmic order. But this element of objective reference, of possession and of participation has undergone a change. And I propose to describe what that change was by reverting first of all to the different conceptions of love which were provided for by Platonism and Christianity respectively. In the Platonic conception of love, we have said, love is essentially assimilated to knowledge, and that, because the true object of love is universal. In the thought and life of Christianity we must say, I think, that knowledge is essentially assimilated to love. The reasons for saying this strike deep, and will presently appear. But first we may refer to another characteristic of Platonic love which shows its kinship with the life of knowledge. If we think of the knowledge relationship, of any knower and that which is to be known, we may say that the relationship is not, as the logicians put it, symmetrical. The current runs, so to speak, only in one direction. The knower seeks the object to be known, he must conform to it. He is active; it, the object, is fixed and unmoved. It does not go out to meet the knower. Such, in any case, is the prima facie account of the knowledge relationship. And just so does Plato describe the relation between the lover and the object which is or which is to be loved. For Plato and for Aristotle as well, love is the seeking of the lower for the higher, the incomplete for the complete, the empty for the full, appearance for reality. And just as, in the knowledge relation, the object to be known is the standard for and the source of whatever value (truth value, that is,) the knowing idea may possess, so here. The object of love it is which confers value and meaning upon the act of loving. The beloved object is the standard, the norm, and the source both of the activity of loving, and of its significance. Whatever value the act of loving possesses is not

inherent in the act as such, but is derived from the worth which belongs to the object of love.¹⁷

The differences between this conception and the characteristic utterances and attitudes of Christianity are both familiar and important. We may compress the matter into brief compass by saying that for Christianity, the worth of the act of loving does not depend upon the inherent completeness and perfection of the object of love, but is itself and in its own nature, intrinsically worthful. So that it, the loving act and deed, confers value and significance upon its object. For Platonism, the activity of loving is worthful only as its object is antecedently of worth; for Christianity, objects alone possess worth in so far as they are loved. It is the act of loving itself which now becomes of supreme value, and the source of all other value. Hence, no longer is the relationship of love essentially unsymmetrical arising from the desire of the incomplete and the lower for the complete and the higher. Since the act of loving possesses intrinsic worth in itself, and the highest worth, the relationship between the lover and the beloved is reciprocal. The object of love, if it is worthy of love, must be a being capable of the act of love. 18 And thus, whereas a permanent significant structure, the beauty and order of the cosmos, may be the object of our intellectual longing and of our contemplation, only a conscious being, of the order of a self, can be the object of our love. How profoundly this entire change must have affected men's habits of thought, especially their conceptions of human persons and of God, is obvious. God is not now so much the Idea of the Good, as the being who loves and who thereby confers worth upon the objects of love. Our interest here lies in observing two things: First, this change in the conception and status of love is a concomitant of that severance of ideas from the fixed order of objective structures which they know, and in whose substance they participate, and their lodgment instead in the conscious activities of selves. But secondly, and more important,

¹⁷ This account of Platonic love, though I think it to be substantially correct, would need certain qualifications in a more complete analysis. But those qualifications would concern just those elements in which Plato was essentially non-Greek.

 $^{^{18}}$ Cf. the admirable discussion in the essay of Max Scheler, Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der moralen, in "Abhandlungen und Aufsätze," vol. 1, pp. 118 ff.

this inner conscious activity, set free as it is from the intelligible Forms of reality, does not yet exist unattached; it is still linked to and it still participates in something real and objective. But the object of its possession is no longer merely a significant structure, an intelligible Form, it is something concrete, historical, and individual. Esthetic and intellectual theoria, contemplation of universal structures, gives way to passionate loyalty to and love for an individual, either an historical Person, or an historical community, with a concrete life and purpose of its own. It is in that community and in that life that the individual is now to participate, through will and feeling, loyalty and love, rather than in a Platonic Form, through contemplation. Or, in order not to violate too much the real historical continuity here between Plato and Christianity, let us say that the Platonic Idea now becomes an historical life—that of a self and a community, and accordingly the means through which the mind possesses and participates in that Idea undergoes the change which we have indicated.

This is not the place to discuss, or to seek to verify for its own sake the thesis that we discover and respond to universal structures and laws on the one hand, and to genuinely individual beings on the other hand by two essentially different attitudes and interests. We are hardly too venturesome if we speak of this as one of the assured results of philosophical reflection, that whereas universals are the objects of dispassionate contemplation, of science, in order that individuals other than mere passing instances of types shall be disclosed, some activity akin to selective interest, appreciation, feeling, and love must be called into play. It is Royce who, more than others, has brought this home to our convictions and our imagination. Thought, through definition, reaches no true individual being, nor is an individual presentable in some immediate, here-and-now experience. It is "that which has sometimes been called Will and sometimes Love" which individuates our world.¹⁹

We begin now to see something of the interrelations of these various aspects of that vast historical transition from Platonism to Christianity. Ideas which for Plato are linked to Forms, to significant structures, come rather to center in the life of selves. This

¹⁹ See especially Royce's supplementary essay in "The Conception of God."

releases those energies of the mind which are less concerned with sheer participation in or coalescence with objective Forms. But these energies, will and feeling, are the very ones which seek out individuals, and which terminate in them rather than in universal structures and types. And we come upon here something in the light of which many of the central characteristics of the religious tradition, in its higher reaches, may be best understood. There is, namely, a certain sensitiveness and devotion to something local, embodied within a concrete tradition, which is one of the marked traits of the religious attitude. Such possession, in feeling, in love, and in imagination of that which has an individual and historical life, with this we are most familiar in the religious tradition at its best. All that men say of the inherent conservatism of religion, the sensitiveness to the past and to tradition which the very name of piety connotes, is indeed true. Hitherto, in the life of men, this function of appropriating and possessing and carrying on the life of an historical and individual institution, idea, or community, hitherto this function has largely been absorbed by religion. Herein lies, I take it, the profound insight and justice of Royce's interpretation of religion as essentially loyalty, loyalty to a community, which is indeed superhuman, but definitely individual. The sacred is in truth ever enshrined within something which is concrete, unique and which lives throughout time. Such an individual being alone can be the object of love, of piety, and of worship. Any attempt such as that of deism to strip entirely away such devotion to an historical and institutional community in the hope of leaving a "natural" religion shows a failure to sense the very thing which differentiates religion from, say, mathematics or metaphysics. An age such as the eighteenth century which responded with enthusiasm and interest only to the universal and the common, the natural and the rational, and which failed to have sympathy for the historical and the individual must of necessity view religion with distrust, or seek to assimilate it with universal morality or knowledge. Although present within the religious attitude from the start, this sense of possessing and participating in the very life of a being at once individual and historical increases as we follow the long road of religious development. We must surely assent to the statement of Mr. Webb that "a reli-

gion which involves as part of its essence a sacred history is, in this way, at a higher level than one which, while setting forth certain universal principles, moral or metaphysical, is ready to symbolize them by anything that comes to hand as it were, and is comparatively indifferent to the particular symbol chosen. Thus a religion which, having developed a theology, regards the narratives which are associated with it as mere illustrative stories, ranks below one which regards them as the actual form which the universal principles have taken."²⁰

And if the object which the mind appropriates and possesses through love is something which is at least individual, a world in which there is any purposive activity must also be a world which contains individual objects and situations. A realm of universal meanings and timeless Forms is a fit object for contemplation, but only an historical community or life can be a fit object of the will's interest. Interest and devotion are individualizing and exclusive; one master alone can be served, whereas all causes and purposes may be contemplated dispassionately. "Out of time and history is, in the long run, out of meaning and use." This is, no doubt, one reason why mysticism, stressing the inclusive and universal nature of that to which the mind goes out tends to quietism, and has often been instinctively distrusted by the religious mind, devoted to the purpose and the spirit of an individual community. "22"

Any religious life then in which participation and purposive activity have played a decisive part is one in which there is an apprehension and appropriation of genuinely individual and historical structures. It is such structures, possessing individuality, which within the tradition of Christianity play a part analogous to that

²⁰ Webb: op. cit., p. 30. I may quote also the following from an article by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher on French Nationalism in the *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1917, p. 216: "The spirit of Catholicism is a spirit of submission to the local pieties, inherited instincts, and particularizing forces of history. The doctrine of Catholicism has its universal church; but the spirit of Catholicism, so far from being cosmopolitan, is intertwined with an unconscious tangle of exclusion and preferences accumulated in the passage of centuries and transmitted from a distant past."

²¹ Marett: "Anthropology," p. 137.

²² Cf. the statement of Rickert, in "Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung," p. 527: "In einer vollkommen rationalen Welt kann niemand wirken."

played by intelligible Forms, universal and timeless Ideas, in Platonism. Both Platonism and Christianity are the outgrowth of attitudes and interests of appropriation and of possession, the one of universal, the other of individual structures.

In a very stimulating essay on the "Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Modern Mind,"23 Professor Norman K. Smith has made the suggestion that what is inadequately named "the romantic movement" at the close of the eighteenth century is the "channel through which the modern mind resumed contact with its medieval" sources, and that means the tradition of Christianity. And those outstanding characteristics of romanticism—the imaginative appeal made by the life of earlier historical epochs, its "reverence for organic processes which transcend the scope of the designing intelligence" and which must be understood if at all through sympathetic appreciation—through love—its sense for the unique and the individual, and its scorn for what is but universal and rational, all these motives are indeed close to that which is most central in the life of the religious tradition. A study either of Christianity or of romanticism discloses countless instances of what is really an assimilation of knowledge to love, and which may be contrasted with the burden of the classical, or Platonic tradition, the assimilation of love to knowledge.

But after all, we are still in the presence of problems and not of solutions. We might point out the defects of each of these two traditions—the Platonic or classical and the Christian or "romantic," when allowed to go its own way unmodified by the other. The excesses of too exclusive a preoccupation with the unique and the individual lead but too easily to a contempt for every binding and universal law which shall warp and constrain the individual into some organized order and discipline. But who would wish to ignore all the fruits of a discovery and devotion to individual historical structures whose content is wealthier than what might be deduced from any universal rational knowledge, and which give so much the appearance then of being contingent and irrational? Our traditional philosophies are still, in a way, overwhelmingly Platonic. They reflect the attitude of contemplation, and the interest in the dis-

²³ The Hibbert Journal, April, 1914.

covery and possession of universal significant structures. In them only haltingly and half-heartedly, if at all, are the interests which terminate in genuine individual structures reckoned with. This is true both of all forms of naturalism and of very much within idealism. It is true of the new realism, and, contrary to general belief, it is true, I am sure, of some aspects of pragmatic instrumentalism. It is only the philosophies of romanticism which have broken completely with Platonism, and they have done so in ways which challenge doubt and criticism—and so we may say with Professor Smith in the article already referred to, that our task is that of reformulating and fusing together the "two great traditions upon which our civilization historically rests."

But there is, too, another problem, and that a deeper and more perplexing one. After all we must never forget that both of these traditions, Platonism and Christianity, profoundly agree in one important respect. They both give utterance to attitudes of Possession, and the possession of structures which are intrinsically significant and divine. For Platonism and Christianity man's life and vocation are definable only in terms of a recognition of and participation in these significant structures. They differ in the nature of these, their respective objects of appropriation and of possession, and they differ in the attitude and type of mental energy pertinent to these two structures. For both Platonism and Christianity nature and the world of sense constitute a message with a meaning; man's task it is to pierce through to that meaning, to contemplate and to appropriate it, and not to create it through his activity. For Platonism, once more, such meanings are intelligible Forms, things of beauty and of reason, universal and timeless. They are to be participated in and possessed through contemplation, through art and philosophy. For Christianity, these meanings are divine purposes, informing the concrete and individual life of historical processes, selves and communities. They are then to be participated in and to be greeted by love and by loyalty.


But the common heritage of both Platonism and Christianity, their common insistence upon the mind's discovery of something antecedently and inherently good is best seen when we measure them together against those characteristic energies which have fashioned

our modern habits of life and of thought. Democracy, economic rationalism, science have accustomed our minds to distrust anything offered to it for appropriation and possession. They bid us incessantly create, make our world and all the objects of value which it shall contain. They reveal the forces which from below, from nature, and from life, from instinct and impulse generate ideas and activities. Mind becomes the instrument and the fruition of success in maintaining an interest against an indifferent environment, and we are in an altogether different world from that of either Plato or Christianity. So that our deepest concern is hardly that of reconciling the two traditions of Platonism and Christianity, classicism and romanticism with each other, but of deciding what place, if any, either or both of these two systems of ideas may rightfully claim recognition in a world in which not possession, but creative activity, democracy, and the liberation of intelligence in the service of human desires seem to utter our dearest wants. Shall we say with Dewey that "the philosophic tradition that comes to us from classic Greek thought and that was reinforced by Christian philosophy in the middle ages . . . now tends to be an ingenious dialectic exercised in professional corners by a few who have retained ancient premises while rejecting their application to the conduct of life"?24 and shall we say with Santayana that "the shell of Christendom is broken. The unconquerable mind of the East, the pagan past, the industrial socialistic future confront it with their equal authority. Our whole life and mind is saturated with the slow upward filtration of a new spirit—that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy"?25 Surely this last seems to us now26 vastly more remote than it seemed when these lines were written. May it not be that we shall find something continuous with these older traditions, however altered in form and language, which shall contribute to the rebuilding of that civilization whose shattering seems, at least, to coincide with the fullest development of what men had formerly prized as most modern.

²⁴ "Creative Intelligence," p. 53.

^{25 &}quot;Winds of Doctrine," p. 1.

²⁶ Written before the European revolutions.



CHAPTER V

THE ISOLATION OF MIND AND OF SELF

UBSEQUENT to both Platonism and Christianity, there are the forces which have made the modern world. Two of those forces, centering around the changed attitude signified by democracy, and around the fundamental economic and industrial conditions of modern life, have already come to our notice. With these in mind we turned to the religious tradition, its beginnings, and its expression within Platonism and Christianity. What specially concerned us in the study of these two life forces was the way in which, for each of them, the mind of man was believed to be in possession of significant structures, objects either of intellectual contemplation or of ethical loyalty. The life of the mind terminated in and also participated in these significant structures; it believed itself thus to possess a knowledge of them. That knowledge and that sharing, either through contemplation or through love, illumined and organized the entire range of man's interests and his deeds. We are now once more to come back to the modern age, to our world, and observe the nature and the effects of what is essentially a single process, the process, namely, whereby the mind's ideas are conceived far more as the projection of natural forces which lie behind them, than as participating in significant structures which they know. This profound alteration in the status and connotation of mind and the problems which thereby emerge, constitute the abiding center of interest in the whole of modern philosophy.

Before describing this process we may observe one large way of analyzing and formulating the central problem about mind. It consists in noticing the main classes of objects or entities to which our

minds are related. These different regions of objects exist, and these relations there are, no matter what final theory about the mind, its nature and status, one may accept. We have to do here, then, merely with the common data of our problem. There are four such regions of our world to which our minds sustain some definite relation. There is, first, the class of objects which are, or which may be, known by our minds. Such are not only physical objects but, of course, numerous other kinds as well. Past and future events, the minds of our fellow men, the abstract entities and relations of logic and of mathematics, laws of nature, probabilities and assumptions, all belong here within this first region. Even a thoroughgoing intellectual scepticism, if there be any such, will not escape the necessity of recognizing some situation, however poverty-stricken, which is the true and the known object of some idea. For there is existent even in such case, the situation that knowledge is difficult to obtain, is precarious, doubtful, is even impossible, and that situation will sustain just this first relationship to the mind. But, coming to the second class, among the objects which the mind knows, there is one which sustains to it a different relation than that of merely being known. I refer to the body, or if you choose, the brain. The mind may of course know the body, but it is related to its body in a way in which it is not related to any other object. Now obviously, any adequate theory of mind must not only interpret the mind's knowledge of whatever it may know, but it must also meet the facts concerning the mind's relation to the biological organism to which it bears so intimate and unique a relation. No theory of knowledge will, of itself, account for and render intelligible this body-mind situation. The third region with which mind is concerned has a certain analogy with the brain. The actual course of our ideas and our sentiments seems to depend not only upon biological organisms, but upon the social "body" as well, the social environment and the "Folkways" amidst which the mind lives and carries on its thinking. No one now would doubt that here is some actual contact and influence which would need to be reckoned with in any theory of mind. There is at least a place for social psychology alongside of physiological psychology, though it seems to exist as yet chiefly in promise.

THE ISOLATION OF MIND AND OF SELF

The fourth and last region to which in some fashion our minds are related may for the present be spoken of as the class of "practical objects." Instead of speaking of "mind," or of "our minds" let us now use the personal pronoun, and say that besides supposing ourselves to know various things, and besides being bound up with the fortunes of our bodies and of the social tissue which surrounds us. we also seek to act, to fashion, and to control some of the things which our world contains. We are not wholly indifferent spectators of our world; we have interests and preferences and ideals, and we try to fulfill them. Any object involved in these active interests and attitudes, in which our will or our affections thus terminate, we may speak of as a practical object. Our fellow men with whom we cooperate, or against whom we struggle and compete are such "practical objects." They are also, it may be, beings who comprise part of the social environment which is constantly exerting pressure upon us and influencing the content of our minds, just as they are also beings who may be known by us. The traits peculiar to the class of "practical objects" are not adequately dealt with when we consider them only with reference to the fact that they may be known, or the fact that, like the body, they stimulate and mould our minds. There is in each of these regions then a typical relation which the mind sustains to the objects comprising that region. Yet it will be noted that these four regions fall into two groups. My body or brain, and my social environment influence my ideas, determine me to think and feel as I do; they furnish stimuli to the mind. On the other hand, the objects which I know and the practical objects which I choose and which guide my activity provide my mind with "objects" in which ideas and feelings terminate. The first group provides termini a quo; the second group provides termini ad quem. We may think and speak both of the body and of the social tissue of heredity and of environment as exerting pressure from below or from behind, while the objects which we know and desire beckon us on from above or from in front. Now this is for us here nothing but a frankly empirical and descriptive account of certain situations which require explanation and interpretation. We shall later on be interested in the success or failure of certain theories of consciousness to keep in view this entire circle

of regions which sustain these various relationships to the life of mind. At present we wish to call attention to that historical process in which the forces and objects which lie behind the mind, the termini a quo, have come into view so as profoundly to alter and even to make precarious the status of all the objects of our knowledge and our will, the termini ad quem of our ideas. It is a large process coincident with the emergence and the sustained operation of all of those energies which characterize the modern age. It is a process in which ideas retreat from the objective and significant structures which they know and come to be viewed instead as the projection of nature's forces and vital interests. This withdrawal of the mind from Platonic Forms and from changeless objects of contemplation and devotion is, in some measure surely, a process of the increasing isolation of ideas, isolation, that is, from such objects as formerly constituted the true center of reference for all of the mind's interests. The consciousness of this increasing isolation of ideas from outer significant Forms generates the problem of knowledge. That problem persists throughout the entire period of modern thought. Its persistence signifies that the isolation of ideas, their withdrawal from significant structures, their linkage solely to the natural forces and interests which generate them characterizes the whole of the modern age. The preoccupation of modern thinkers with the question concerning the possibility and the validity of knowledge, with the intricacies and subtleties of epistemology, is no accident nor is it due to any perverse fondness of philosophers for problems which are merely verbal and artificial. That pre-occupation reflects one aspect of the entire cultural situation within the modern age. With the withdrawal of ideas from participation in the life of significant structures there results the problem of values, not merely the problem as to the theoretical value of our ideas for the purposes of knowledge, but the question as to the value of every one of our major human interests as well. The problem of knowledge is but one part of the much larger problem of values.

How can ideas genuinely be linked to real objects if they but reveal the particular body and interests which lie behind them? How can they serve two masters, and, Janus-like, face in two oppo-

site directions? This problem becomes more insistent and more imperious as region after region of nature, life, and history are revealed, each disclosing some fresh claim which is made, from below, upon the beliefs and sentiments of men. We have discovered how very much of the idea's function and nature is absorbed in expressing those life interests which push up from below so that we wonder how much, if any, energy in the idea is left over, as it were, to envisage and really to know whatever may lie in front of the mind. Hence even though it is quite true that there is "something preposterous in the notion that one can attain to anything like a complete insight into the nature of reality by a scrutiny of the processes of knowledge, while actual living is such a different affair," yet for us to inquire into the possibility and nature of knowledge is really to examine the status and function of mind in which alone, of course, knowledge exists. And it is just that status which is so perplexing because of the double claim made upon our ideas. Ideas do know something-so we are accustomed to sayand ideas also utter the life and the interests of some particular organism. This is, indeed, our problem not only of the possibility of knowledge itself, but of the relation between knowledge and behavior, possession and activity, the good and desire, theory and practice. It is, we shall also see, the problem of the relation between mind and body. We miss the purport and the insistence of the problem of knowledge unless we recognize that it is an instance of the problem of values at large. A true idea, one which does really convey knowledge, is one which is, in so far, valuable, valuable that is for the purposes of knowledge. To define knowledge and to say something significant about the situation which makes it possible and real, is to throw some light upon all of the other values, ethical, religious, and social, around which so many of our perplexities and problems center.

We are then to describe some aspects of that shifting of emphasis from significant structures awaiting the mind's appropriation and possession, to the matter-of-fact processes of nature and of society, whose forward urge finds a voice in the mind's ideas. And we shall

¹ Woodbridge: "The Problem of Consciousness," in "Amherst Studies in Philosophy and Psychology," p. 146.

direct our attention to that one of the moving and formative forces within the modern world which has had, perhaps, most to do with the direct fashioning of our habits of thought and of our more explicit theories of life and of mind. It is science, its methods and some of its results, which will here interest us. One should not forget that modern science has been a concomitant of the other powerful agencies in fashioning our age of democracy and economic rationalism. Because of this mutual relationship modern science has been something different from Greek science, in its outlook, its methods, and the impact of its influence upon men's minds. We shall, in this chapter, observe first something of the general character of modern science as a whole. We shall then consider certain results of biology with reference to the life and status of ideas. And thirdly, we shall see parallel results in the field of the modern historical and social sciences with reference to the nature and the status of values. Throughout, we shall be observing different aspects of one process, the retreat and the isolation of mind.

There is, now, in the very form of question with which modern science emerges, something more than a suggestion of the shifting of emphasis from significant structures awaiting apprehension to natural processes calling merely for adequate description. It is a commonplace to observe that Galileo's experiments upon moving bodies mark the true beginning of modern science. Science, coming now to its second birth in European civilization, differs in important respects from Greek physical science which had reached its culmination in the work of Democritus, two thousand years before Galileo. Now, in its renaissance, science was to ally itself with those ideals and hopes, those attitudes and forces which were to make the new world, however late it might be that men should become explicitly aware of them. And what we may say is that, whereas Greek science had asked typically the question why, the new science asks everywhere only the question how. Just this is involved in studying motion as a process, instead of regarding it as a quality of a substance. The actual how of the process can be observed and described; even to ask the question why, if it connotes anything other than how, is to impute to the object in question some hidden quality, which shall both explain and justify the process. It is readily

observable how all of the essential qualities of modern science hinge upon this transition from the question why to the question how. Experiment is substituted for definition. For the Greeks, if one knew the definition of a substance, one would also know its behavior, and there is, in principle, no access to its behavior except through a prior knowledge of its nature, its form, its essence. Its behavior is but the subsequent actualization and realization of this, its hidden nature. Knowing the nature of fire, one knew it to be a substance which necessarily moved upward. Since motion is a quality of a substance, the more substance there is, and, accordingly, the heavier a body is, the more motion will there be and the faster will it fall. Now, in setting about merely to observe behavior as a process, Galileo cut loose from prior definitions which of themselves, through implication or deduction, would yield a knowledge of the body's behavior. He sets out to observe the process itself. That process stands upon its own feet, as it were, and is logically independent of all prior definitions. Now,—and this it is which especially concerns us—this procedure is but an illustration of that vanishing of significant structures, viewed realistically, as entities awaiting apprehension and definition, and the discovery of nature's factual processes which furnish the observed basis for whatever hypotheses may tentatively be suggested. For the Aristotelian definition terminates at once in the significant and substantial source of all those characteristics and processes of an object which perception and experience shall reveal. "Substance" and "cause," both of them "significant structures," are on the point of vanishing, or have already done so, in idea, the moment when Galileo's method becomes generalized and accepted as the normal procedure of science. "Matter" which figures in the physical and mathematical equations describing the results of Galileo's observations, is no intelligible and explaining substance; it is the invariant which correlates specific observable moments of time with specific observable points of space. Nothing "inheres" in such a substance; nor does it render intelligible any processes or qualities which flow from it. In the light of this development the verdict seems to be a just one that "since science has made utterly worthless the concept of substance, a period of thought lasting more than a thousand years draws definitely to a close. . . . The history

of philosophy, in the old sense, is at an end, for this is preeminently the history of the idea of substance, the history of metaphysics."²

This older substance concept, and the older "bead theory" of causation which was its concomitant, whose definition 'explained' some process, contains also the ground of a teleological view of science and of nature. Thus, when motion is regarded as the outcome of a definable quality of substance or matter, then, an object, in falling, realizes its nature and its destiny and achieves the purpose of its being. Significant structures not only explain, but they justify as well. The processes of nature are, once more, viewed as realizing and as participating in intelligible forms, significant structures. Nature is the visible domain and the transparent illustration of that whose primary characteristic lies in the fact that it possesses meaning, that it is good, and that it is in its full sense, a significant structure. To discard teleology is to substitute the question how for the question why; it is to describe processes which themselves are, as processes, autonomous, rather than the witness and the actualizing of prior intelligible structures.

These consequences of the new science may be viewed in still another light. Their deeper meaning may perhaps be said to lie in the way in which they utter and in turn stimulate the motive of democracy and of individualism. They typify that vast reorganization in society and in men's outlook which we have expressed in terms of the contrast between Possession and Activity,—the possession of already existing significant structures which but await appropriation, and the consciousness of everything significant as but the fruition of prior, natural processes and desires. The novelty of Galileo's method lies, we may obviously say, in his appeal to immediate experience, rather than to objects already known through definition, and immediate experience belongs to the individual. One discards, thus, all that is authoritative and prior, and one appeals only to that which actual experience shall disclose. The object of knowledge itself must be laboriously and tentatively constructed out of the growing material of the individual's experiences and

² Petzoldt: "Das Weltproblem von positivistischem Standpunkte aus," p. 151.

⁸ Cf. Holt: "The Freudian Wish," p. 157.

experiments. Of course, one may be thinking as yet⁴ of no magical creative power whereby something really new accrues to the texture of reality; it is the *idea* of the object as known, which is to be constructed, and which is accordingly no prior possession. But this is enough. It utters and generates as well the profound difference in idea and in attitude, between possessing your world, and making it, between absolutism and democracy, between feudalism and individualism, between status and contract.

So much for the general background and method of modern science, and the way in which science accords with the other large formative agencies in the modern era. Ours is the question about mind and its ideas. We have noted that shifting of emphasis from the Platonic participation of ideas in real meaningful structures to the later lodgment of ideas in the inner life of conscious selves. Ideas, although they are still thought to be in possession of significant structures, individual and historical rather than universal and timeless, connote now life and activity, purpose and achievement. But this, their status and function within the circle of ideas and motives habitual to Christianity, could not but be profoundly altered by those new questions and discoveries of modern science, which we have just described. That ideas should in some deep sense now come to be viewed as dependent on natural processes rather than as in rightful and inherent possession of significant structures, so much will be clear. But the precise form in which this large conception gradually took shape, will repay our more careful consideration. Any philosophy which, in a large sense, is 'naturalistic' is the outcome of a whole-hearted dependence upon and a preoccupation with some body of natural science. "By naturalism," remarks Perry, "is meant the philosophical generalization of science." But there are differences in outlook and in temper according as to which group of natural sciences it is which furnishes one with his point of departure. Thus it is obvious that physics and mechanics when projected into a philosophical "weltanschauung" become materialism. And such a philosophy, in spite of sharing certain common traits

⁴ I say "as yet," in the light of the later emergence of the more magical sort of creativity—to wit, that of Schiller and of James, and the now popular idea of a world "in the making."

with other species of naturalism, will yet differ notably from an outlook in philosophy which grows out of a devotion to and a preoccupation with the concerns of biology. Pragmatism and instrumentalism are, in this sense, naturalistic, and they are assuredly no mere continuation of historical materialism. Though I think that pragmatism can hardly lay claim to be the sole and exclusive inheritor of the new insight and stimulus which modern biology has furnished, yet, certainly with respect to the problem of mind, materialism and its way of analyzing the problem seems now to most of us old-fashioned and belated. What I mean here is not only to report the judgment of a scientist who knows what the problem of mind really is, that "the fact remains that science, like philosophy, cannot regard thought as the activities of material systems." This may perhaps still be held to be a debatable matter. But the theories of conscious automatism and of parallelism, even the issue between parallelism and interactionism have lost some of their interest, because they result from a way of envisaging the problem of consciousness solely from the point of view of a mechanical system. They are the outcome of asking what place, in a world which is essentially one of physical push and pull and energy transformations, what place in such a world mind can have. This is as true of traditional interactionism and of panpsychism as of epiphenomenalism. Indeed, what J. S. Haldane has said of vitalism in biology may be said of interactionism in philosophy, that it "is nothing but the shadow cast by the mechanistic theory itself—a shadow which has only become and could only become deeper the longer the mechanistic theory has lasted." The universe of discourse within which the philosophical discussion of consciousness now takes place has shifted. And it is the results and the methods of biology which from the side of science are chiefly responsible. It is the discovery of living processes, of incessant adjustment and adaptation, rather than of sequences purely mathematical or mechanical which has, in recent years, been the source of a vigorous philosophical reaction. It is in speaking of this reaction that Professor Woodbridge remarks,

⁵ Lawrence J. Henderson: "The Order of Nature," p. 99.

⁶ J. S. Haldane: "Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of Breathing." Quoted by the Reviewer in the *Nation* for June 28, 1917, p. 764.

"all that is distinctive, valuable and promising in current philosophy is—I think it may justly be said—largely the outcome of this reaction."

But, long prior to nineteenth century biology, there were current certain observations of the body and of its structures which are not without their significance here. Some distrust of all of our natural knowledge and of our metaphysics, some suspicion that our sensations and perceptions cannot yield us trustworthy knowledge was an early result of reflection upon the nature and origin of all sensations. Sense organs were observed to stand between ourselves and the outer world, and sense organs did observably possess a structure. They were not luminous and transparent. We obtained only such reports of real existences as might come to us through our sense organs; we could but conjecture to what extent the true images of objects were distorted before finally reaching us. Now, just as long as it is expected of our sensations and ideas that they shall be adequate representations or copies of external objects, there are only two possible consequences of such biological observation of our sense organs as we have just noted. Scepticism, a thoroughgoing distrust of the value of sensations for all purposes of knowledge, is one result. Or, one might set about to find another vehicle of knowledge not subject to this defect. Such was the course taken by most of the great names in Greek philosophy, Herakleitus and the Eleatics, Democritus and Plato. Reason, nous, is not subject to any such limitation as are sensations. But, one may pertinently ask, what would have resulted if the initial assumption which led to scepticism had been called in question, the assumption, namely, that it is the function of the bearers of knowledge to resemble their objects? What if the proper concern of sensation is some other task which it can well perform without being at all hampered by the structure of sense organs, likely to distort the images entering from without? It might well be the case that our sensations and even our ideas ought not to be judged by their ability to convey unspoiled the exact images of some outer world; their purpose and their function might be to yield power rather than knowledge (in any naïve sense), to maintain the life and interests of the organism rather than to furnish

⁷ Journal of Philosophy, etc., vol. 14, p. 378.

stable and 'true' possessions of the mind. In principle, the entire copy theory of knowledge and all its works is discarded once it is avowed that sensations and ideas are instruments of power and of control, and both scepticism and Platonism are, it would appear, outflanked. It was Francis Bacon who, with more enthusiasm than profundity no doubt, saw clearly and made others see the possibility of a new kind of "knowledge," radically different from the traditional learning of the schools and the church. Knowledge simply is power, and "the relief of man's Estate." This Baconian ideal of knowledge went hand in hand with the struggling forces slowly at work in the economic and social order, the dim discernment of the possibilities of a free development of men's activities, guided by intelligence and knowledge. And, too, this Baconian ideal falls in naturally with the interest of the new science in describing processes, rather than in revealing the rational and teleological "why" of things. For, if you know how a process occurs, you may be able to intercede in that process and divert it to your own aims. "Human knowledge and human power coincide because ignorance of the cause hinders production of the effect," as Bacon phrases it.

But for anything at all like a complete development and verification of this profoundly modern conception of the very nature of knowledge, one must turn to the results of modern biology. There are two theses which, if admitted, lead rapidly and inevitably to certain large philosophical conceptions, which are both relatively novel and stimulating. Indeed it is only fairly recently that the implication of these theses has come home to the philosophical imagination. It is the first thesis that the central nervous system, including of course the brain, is first and last an instrument of behavior and of survival, and not of knowledge, in any traditional sense of that term. The second thesis would maintain that, whatever in the long run you will hold to be true about the nervous system, you must also hold to be true about the mind and its function, so compelling is the intimacy between mind and brain. But since this second assumption is not so clearly a matter of biological concern, since it is a philosophical assumption and hence debatable, we may

⁸ I have used here a few sentences taken from a Phi Beta Kappa address, printed in the *University of California Chronicle*, vol. 16.

for the present neglect it, and turn our attention to the more empirical matter, the view, namely, that the central nervous system is an instrument solely of action and of behavior. This belief itself is the outcome of two large considerations of central biological importance, and of equal interest to philosophy, the "reflex arc" concept, and Darwinian, evolutionary ideas. The reflex arc concept refers to that mechanism which connects sense organs and muscles. The nervous system is a conveyer of impulses from receptors to muscles. It is for the sake of the appropriate muscular response that the systems of reflex arcs exist. The life of any organism simply is its continued adaptation through its behavior to the demands made upon it by its environment. These demands must be recognized; that is, there must be the appropriate sensitiveness and irritability to whatever in the environment is of moment to the interests and fortunes of the organism in question. In the second place, this irritability, this impression, must be transmitted and discharged eventually into the proper motor channel. The apparatus which has thus to do with receiving the stimulus, transmitting it, and converting it into response is the reflex arc. It is the basic functional unit of the life activities of the organism. Now this is utterly commonplace and familiar. Nevertheless it is radical and far-reaching. The full realization of this situation is wholesome for our thinking, not so much because of the inferences most frequently drawn from this situation, inferences leading directly to instrumentalism and behaviorism, but because ultimately it defines for us certain alternatives, the possibility of which is not always kept in mind by those who suppose that all of this has only one possible outcome for our philosophy and for our life.

Now, psychology and physiology have ceased to discuss seriously, I take it, whether the spinal cord, admittedly composed of nothing but the transmitting fibers of reflex arcs, together with certain of their nerve cells, is the seat of consciousness. It transmits stimuli from sense organs to muscles, and that is its entire function. Whatever is present in the way of conscious feelings and sensations over and above behavior, was, some time ago, relegated to the brain, and more particularly to the surface nerve cells of one region of the brain, the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres. It was there that

consciousness, i.e., sensations, perceptions, and feelings were "located." But what earlier was seen to be true of the spinal cord is now recognized to be true of the entire brain structure. It is built on the same plan as the spinal cord. The brain, like the cord, is a complex aggregate of reflex arc structures, of transmitting fibers (together with cell-bodies), of sensory nerves, motor nerves, and transmitting nerve fibers connecting with the reflex arcs lower down in the system. In the words of McDougall, "the incessant labors of a multitude of workers has revealed the fact that not only the spinal cord, but the whole of the brain, also, is built upon the reflex plan, that the whole of the brain may properly be regarded as made up of a multitude of nervous loops, interlacing and communicating with one another, it is true, in wonderfully complex fashion, yet still being essentially loops or long bye-paths; each of these diverges from the afferent limb of some spinal reflex arc to ascend to the brain, and, after traversing the brain, descends to join the efferent or motor limb of some spinal reflex arc. . . . Again, there is good reason to believe, though here we are on less firm ground, that all the processes of the brain, even those that accompany the most abstruse thought, conform to the same fundamental reflex type."9 The evidence of anatomy is supported by the evidence of embryology. The brain is but the anterior region of the cord, which has undergone certain quantitative and spatial changes, an enormous differential thickening of the walls, and a bending back and forth of its main axis. Structurally it is wholly continuous with the cord. What now can it mean to say that consciousness—feelings and sensations—are actually localized within the brain, except to say that there is some correspondence between the transmission of nervous energy in the brain and the presence in consciousness of certain thoughts and feelings? But that the brain literally has some other function than that of guiding, under certain circumstances, the muscular response of the organism to the stimuli of the environment would appear to be incredible in view of the basic structure of the brain. We may, if we like, continue to talk in terms of parallelism. But parallelism adds no other function to the brain than that of guiding behavior; what it does is to accompany that func-

tion of the brain by another function, which either occurs as an unsubstantial process or as the function of a mind. And is it not fair to say that the issue of parallelism and interactionism seems to us now old-fashioned; this issue hardly succeeds in stating for us our problems and our interests. Instead of talking about any mysterious doubling of brain processes, any repetition of cortical occurrences in another radically contrasted dimension, it is vastly simpler to conceive of the mind, of consciousness, as literally identical with certain kinds of bodily behavior, those in which the higher nervous arcs are implicated. Such is a radically motor or behavior theory of mind. It results from the impressive discovery everywhere within the nervous system of nothing but instruments of active response and of behavior. And then, being assured of this biological principle, it is supposed that whatever large assertions you make about the nervous system you will make about the mind. The mind can have no other essential function than that which characterizes the nervous system.

In addition to the reflex-arc concept and all that it connotes, there is the steady impact of Darwinian, evolutionary ideas. These ideas impel us to think of all that any organism has or does as a contribution to the survival of the organism and its kind in the struggle for existence. To be sure we no longer, for the most part, view the conditions and qualities which make for survival with as much simplicity and crudeness as formerly. We are not so likely to set over against each other in such sharp opposition the cosmic process and the moral process as did, for instance, Huxley. Nevertheless, from any biological and evolutionary standpoint, it is not what mind is, but what it does, what results from mind in the form of behavior, that alone counts. Nature can care for nothing else. We may even depart as far from traditional biological naturalism as Hobhouse has done and say that although mind may have come into existence simply as an instrument of biological survival, nevertheless it "ceases to be limited by the conditions of its genesis." Its destiny is to secure mastery and control over all of the conditions of life; it is the means whereby Humanity shall organize its own life and world. Even so, from this larger and far more liberal evolu-

¹⁰ Hobhouse: "Development and Purpose," p. 11.

tionary concept of Hobhouse, the important thing about mindyes, the only thing that counts—is the behavior, the correlations and syntheses which mind is responsible for. One may, of course, still say that in order that the organism may adapt its behavior successfully to the requirements imposed upon it, whether conceived in terms of sheer struggle or in broader terms, the organism must possess some knowledge of the situation and the needs which confront it. Only if the information, the real knowledge conveyed by sensation, for instance, is fairly adequate, can there be any likelihood of effective adaptation and hence survival. Yet it is not difficult to suppose some possibility of divergence between sensations which are adequate to reveal and to know the outer world and those sensations which but serve successfully to initiate the response of the organism. Nor is it difficult to imagine here some real clash of interests and, so to speak, a divided purpose in the life of sensations. Shall sensation set about to reveal the entire situation, or just those elements which are of immediate "practical" import? Shall it survey its world with impartiality, or shall it serve the master who first called it into being, and who, with the increasing complexity of struggle and of life, more and more claims its undivided allegiance? And if it be but the instrument of the organism, whether of the single biological unit or of the social whole of humanity, shall we trust all that it tells us? How early, in the evolutionary series, does special pleading arise? And if such queries as these are pertinent in the case of sensations, they are much more so in the case of ideas. For, ideas lie further along in the process of transition from sensation to response. They arise when overt behavior is delayed, or is only incipient. Ideas are more remote from the environment, and from its literal impressions; they are nearer the vital source of that which calls sensations into being, namely, the necessities of action and the desire for survival. Ideas would, then, be less "true" than sensations in any meaning of the word "true" except the instrumental meaning.

Whatever may be our final reckoning with these motives which originate in the study of modern biology, they inspire us with a cumulative doubt concerning the inherent validity of our mind's ideas. They have operated steadily to convert supposedly stable and

objective possessions of the mind into natural processes, instruments and deposits of vital life histories. They have made us hesitant and sceptical about whatever may lie "in front of" our ideas, possible material for the mind's genuine appropriation and possession. They lead us to stress only those relations in which the mind and all its contents are viewed as the utterance and the instrument of the matter-of-fact energies of nature and of life. And we are led confidently to say of an idea, not that it participates in and embodies a significant structure, resident within reality, but that it is "the projected shadow of an unaccomplished action."

The chapter in Santayana's "Life of Reason" on How Thought is Practical is an eloquent statement and summary of this conception of the life of mind. "Nothing is more natural," so he writes, "or more congruous with all the analogies of experience than that animals should feel and think. The relation of mind to body, of reason to nature, seems to be actually this: when bodies have reached a certain complexity and vital equilibrium, a sense begins to inhabit them which is focussed upon the preservation of that body and on its reproduction. This sense, as it becomes reflective and expressive of physical welfare, points more and more to its own persistence and harmony, and generates the Life of Reason. Nature is reason's basis and theme; reason is nature's consciousness; and, from the point of view of that consciousness when it has arisen, reason is also nature's justification and goal. . . . Now the body is an instrument, the mind its function, the witness and reward of its operation. Mind is the body's entelechy, a value which accrues to the body when it has reached a certain perfection, of which it would be a pity, so to speak, that it should remain unconscious; so that while the body feeds the mind the mind perfects the body, lifting it and all its natural relations and impulses into the moral world, into the sphere of interests and ideas." Shall we wonder that, if men are convinced that this is the whole story about mind, and if they are also sensible of its implications, they should raise the problem of truth and of knowledge? Can an idea which "is a private echo and response to ambient motions," which is but "the voice of

¹¹ Jane Harrison: "Ancient Art and Ritual," p. 53.

^{12 &}quot;Reason in Common Sense," pp. 205-206.

the body's interests," can such an idea possess any outgoing reference, or participate in any structure which it shall really know? And how far such incipient doubt may eat into all our philosophical conceptions and even our scientific theories may be worth inquiring into. Darwin seems to have sensed the situation with his accustomed penetration. Speaking of the gradual decline in his mind of a belief in a First Cause, he remarks upon his doubt, "can the mind of man which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such general conclusions?"13 I cite this, of course, not because of the particular idea to which it makes reference, but because of the larger doubt which is here uttered. Granted,—so may we expand the latent doubt—that mind and ideas originated in the life service of humble organisms. Granted that, throughout their long history, they have always been bound up with the needs, the adaptations of organisms existing always in a local and particular environment. Ideas, then, can be relevant only to the particular organism and the local situation within which they have arisen. They utter the life needs of such struggling organisms. How can they also be expected to "draw general conclusions," to encompass anything of universal import, to participate in anything absolute or eternal? Indeed, how do they know anything whatever?

But besides biology, there are the historical and the social sciences. These have steadily exerted a pressure upon our beliefs and our sentiments, our habits of thought and our judgments of value analogous to that which has been due to biology. Just as the influence of biology has operated to withdraw mind and ideas from participation in or identity with significant structures and to make them a prolongation of organic processes, so the historical and social sciences have likewise contributed to a retreat and an isolation of mind. It is with the status and the meaning of values and what we earlier spoke of as "practical objects," that historical studies have been more particularly concerned. Just as biology leads us to view every idea as a function of an organic brain process, so historical insight and social psychology lead us to regard the 'mores' of a group, their preferences, loyalties, and conscious ideals as functions

¹³ Quoted by Henderson: "The Order of Nature," p. 207.

of specific life conditions. These specific interests lie behind our judgments of value and our loyalties. The apprehension of values ceases to be, then, any possession of or participation in an objective good by the mind; it becomes rather the utterance and projection of the basic exigences of our existence. Values become intelligible only from below. Devotion to an object comes to signify no apprehension of any inherent worth residing in the object, in that which the desire faces and which it may hope to possess. If we still think that our desires, our loyalties, and our devotions look ahead to their objects whose worth shall justify them, we suffer from the old illusion. In truth, we are told, these activities and propensities, the objects of all our strivings are but mirrors in which are reflected the real forces, the brute and basic necessities of our existence which lie behind them. In the words of a recent exponent of such ethical naturalism "of course it is a fact that devotion may breed the illusion that the object of devotion is intrinsically precious; but it is perverse to explain the devotion by the illusion rather than the illusion by the devotion."14 Now it is obvious that in relinquishing the thought of any influence flowing from the intrinsic worth of the object of devotion, that devotion becomes an utterly matter-of-fact and contingent event. It becomes a natural process and, like all natural events, one has said all that is to be said about it, one has explained it, when the causal series of which it forms an element becomes unravelled. And who has not felt some shock when he has first come to realize that all of his own cherished ideals and preferences are the outcome of his own interests, equipment, and traditions, and that every opposing ideal and loyalty has also its generating circumstances which explain and justify it as well? For, having denied any objective worth to the objects of our loyalties (other than that which reflects our matter-of-fact desires) whatever explains our practical ideals will now "justify" them. And how accidental, how capricious and contingent do our loyalties seem when viewed solely from the point of view of the energies which precede them and of which they are but the utterance. Do I express a preference for one cause rather than another, for one nation, one religion,

¹⁴ E. M. M'Gilvary: "The Warfare of Moral Ideals," Hibbert Journal, October, 1915, p. 46.

one philosophy, one race? Do I long for the victory and the dominance of these the objects of my devoted loyalty? Then consider that the real reason for this my preference and my loyalty lies not at all in any inherent superiority which these ideals of mine may possess, but solely in the circumstance that I happened to be born where and when I was, and have been subjected to the pressure of a particular group of "mores" and of local interests and exigencies. It is of this situation and the illusion that it is supposed to breed that Sir Henry Maine writes: "Party has many strong affinities with religion. Its devotees, like those of a religious creed, are apt to substitute the fiction that they have adopted it upon mature deliberation for the fact that they were born into it, or stumbled into it."15 And William James, too, has uttered substantially the same judgment in words which may be placed beside those which we have just quoted. "Everyone," says James, "is prone to claim that his conclusions are the only logical ones, that they are necessities of universal reason, they being all the while, at bottom, accidents more or less of personal vision which had far better be avowed as such."16 In short, under the influence of both biology and of the historical and social sciences, we are led to interpret every value judgment as, in truth, affirming the existence of what, in a large sense, may be called an interest. The judgment X is valuable, i.e., good or right, is but a language form in which an actual interest which desires, wants or requires X, finds utterance. The value which the judgment seemingly ascribes to the object which is declared to be worthful is but the projection of the interest, the conatus, the striving and the activity of some living structure. Sumner compares all of our value judgments to clouds driven here and there by the winds. "So it is," he says, "with the folkways and the attendant philosophy and ethics. They conform to the interests which arise in the existing conjuncture, and that is all the sense they have."17

Now this is the real "ego-centric" perplexity, that our judgments

^{15 &}quot;The Nature of Democracy," p. 100.

¹⁶ "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 10. A. J. Balfour has expressed the essence of all these considerations in the phrase, "Scratch an argument, and you find a cause." Cf. the entire passage in "Humanism and Theism," p. 61.

¹⁷ Quoted by Keller: "Societal Evolution," p. 248.

should seek to envisage some inherent quality or aspect of the real world and yet should but succeed in giving expression to an interest which exclusively belongs to the vital interest whose judgment it is. Such naturalism, which is the generalization of the results of science, turns out to be the real subjectivism. And let us not forget that what is here said about our value judgments must also apply to our theoretical judgments. For they, too, are in essence judgments concerning the knowledge value of our theoretical ideas. If the judgment of value is really the affirmation of an existing interest, the judgment of reality is but the affirmation of an existing belief, or propensity to believe. Just as the actual interest is the foundation and the standard to which the value must conform, so the reality believed in is measured by the belief, and not the belief by the reality. All this is surely far removed from anything at all realistic; it is the confession of remoteness and of isolation. The mind's ideas and judgments really summarize that which lies behind them. What the mind may suppose itself to know, what ideas seem to terminate in as their objects are but the projected shadows of the body and of the life interests of some social group.

That this tendency to view ideas simply as prolongations of prior natural processes does result in subjectivism may be seen in another way. Subjective idealism, of the Berkeleyan type, is the result of a far-reaching confusion between the object of a perception or of an idea, and its stimulus. It is no doubt true that, if we speak of nature at large, we may say that "nature is at once the system of objects that we perceive and the system of stimuli whereby we perceive them." But it does not follow that a particular stimulus and object coincide. In fact, as we shall see in a later place, it is probably never the case that one and the same entity is both stimulus and object at the same time. The author from whom I have just quoted is right when he goes on to say that, "we are always wrong in identifying any object of sensation or perception with the stimulus that produces it."18 The train of ideas which leads to subjective idealism would appear to be essentially as follows. The only access which I have to the objects in my environment is through sense organ, nerve structures, and brain. The avenue from the pencil

¹⁸ Mitchell: "Structure and Growth of the Mind," p. 156.

before me to my perception of the pencil leads from the stimulation of the retina by light waves reflected from the pencil through sensory nerve and optic lobes in the brain. The disturbance in the optic center is then thought of as the "cause" of my perception. But since it and not the pencil is the immediate cause of the perception and since the effect can never exceed the cause or contain more than the cause, what is actually perceived is no real pencil, but only some modification of myself, my brain (or my consciousness). What Professor Kemp Smith has said is literally true and is of the utmost importance. "The belief that sensations are mechanically generated through brain processes is the sole originating cause of subjective idealism."

Now such an approach to the mind and its perceptions may fairly be spoken of as a back-door approach. What seems to be a knowledge of an object which lies in front of the mind is shown to be but the resultant of a brain activity arousing the idea from behind. The significance of ideas comes then to lie in the vital processes which generate them. The meaning of value lies in the existing "interest" of which it is the spokesman and the echo. Every ideal derives its significance from the solid foundation of life's actual processes, the matter-of-fact desires and interests of the organisms, individuals and groups, who live and struggle, compete and conquer. These existing interests and desires, providing only they are victorious and come to prevail, justify the ideals and values which they generate. Might does make right. The Is does determine the Ought. Accepted ideals are always but abstractions from accomplished fact. I quote again from an article which has set forth this in one sense utterly realistic doctrine of ideals and of values in its most plausible form: "The adjustments of sentiments and emotions to what has become the established order is one of the most powerful factors in moral history. Mohammedanism fought its way into Africa by the sword. In a few generations it flourished there by the devoted

¹⁹ Philosophical Review, 1908, p. 144. Note also the following from Sellars: "Critical Realism," p. 9. "We begin with the belief that the physical object seen is outside the body and we end with the proof if not the conviction that what we do actually perceive immediately is the brain as it is affected by the outside world through the sense organs themselves."

acceptance of those who sprang from its deadliest enemies. Tradition as well as trade follows the flag. This is what gives extreme significance to the world's greatest battles. Had the Persians won at Marathon or the Turks at Lepanto and Vienna, and had they followed up their victory, the moral history of Europe, with its accompanying ideals, would have been incalculably different. Might long enough continued wins recognition as right, until overthrown by a greater might meanwhile gathering strength. If we, looking back upon the course of history, decline to acknowledge that in any particular case might was right, it is because another might has meanwhile arisen and brought our sentiments into accord with its sway; and from the point of view of the new ideals that have thus triumphed we condemn what was once victorious. Naturally we use our own ideals in our judgments; but we are likely to forget that these ideals are in great measure the outcome of just the kind of victory which in the case we condemn we deplore as the triumph of might over right. Such a judgment is nothing but the shadow of a new might cast back over what formerly stood bathed in the light of another ideal."20

I do not now raise the large question as to the validity of this interpretation of our ideals and our value judgments. It is certainly not to be dismissed lightly. We shall accord to it a large measure of truth and of significance. What especially deserves notice here is that, however "realistic" this account of our values may appear to be, however much it seeks to base the mind's ideals upon real facts (it is indeed a supreme instance of Real-Politik and Real-Ethik) nevertheless it is in truth a form of subjectivism, precisely upon a par with subjectivism in the theory of knowledge. It places the meaning and the worth of ideas not in objects, but in the stimuli which produce them. Or, perhaps more accurately, it views the object, the terminus ad quem simply as the "shadow" or the mere name of what is in truth the generating stimulus, the real force, the natural process, the Interest which lies behind and which is the terminus a quo. We are dealing throughout with a retreat of mind and of ideas from significant structures which they possess or in

 $^{^{20}}$ E. B. M'Gilvary: "The Warfare of Moral Ideals." $\it Hibbert\ Journal,\ vol.\ 14,\ pp.\ 51-52.$

which they may participate. Ideas become the utterances and the instruments of organic and of social Interests, the symbols of desires and of activities striving for existence and for supremacy. All of the philosophies which view the matter thus—behaviorism and pragmatic instrumentalism—are philosophies of an age which no longer has significant structures to possess, to contemplate and to enjoy, an age which devotes its energies to activity, the release of desire, to struggle and to war. Pragmatism is the intellectual form of modern capitalism.

There is a modern philosopher who lives and writes at a time when these formative forces of the modern age are beginning distinctly to reveal themselves. His philosophy is the first profound formulation of the vast problem which everywhere results from the historical transformation from the idea systems of Platonism and of Christianity to those of modern industry and democracy, issuing in the release of desire and the discovery of nature. That vast problem concerns the status of significant structures. What function they performed in the older world of Platonism and Christianity we have seen. They were simply and utterly real, awaiting the mind's appropriation, and informing the mind with truth. The world which is reflected in the philosophical analysis of Hume is a vastly different world. It is one in which all of the structures which confront the mind, which the mind's ideas may appropriate and possess, are wholly lacking in significance. They are only bare "impressions." They are both incoherent, discontinuous, hence lacking in theoretical meaning, and they are also unfit for any practical activity whatever. The mind can neither know nor act within the world of impressions, yet impressions are all that are given to the mind. Impressions must be transformed and must be added to before they become significant and livable. It is some activity of mind—in the last analysis custom and imagination—which make over impressions into passably significant structures. The permanence in things, the regular sequences and causal relations in nature upon which we depend in our practical dealings with her, the continuity in purposes whereby a relatively stable self and society are built up, all these bearers of significance and meaning are read into impressions by 'custom and imagination.' They are really fictions, existing only through convention and arti-

fice, not in nature. But the central, persistent problem thereby comes into full light. The real world, that which is given to man to possess and to know, is without significance and coherence, and unfit for him to live in. Within the world of impressions, he cannot act because there are no coherent continuities and no significant structures. Man must make his world. He must reconstruct and transform the Given, the world of impressions. But the world which results is unreal and fictitious. In becoming significant it becomes artificial. The disease of subjectivity is the price which we pay for meaning, coherence, and significance. Here, then, is our dilemma: the real world is impossible to live in and the world which alone is livable is a fictitious and unreal one. No wonder does Hume say, "I dine, and play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them farther." This is hardly any ordinary scepticism; it is an honest and penetrating confession of the problem which emerges when ideas no longer participate in significant structures, but are viewed solely as the projections of the matter-of-fact processes of nature.

In the social philosophy of Hume's contemporary, across the channel, we find essentially the same utterance and the same confession, though the inference which is drawn is different. Certainly in his earlier and more radical essays Rousseau regards the structures of civilization as both superficial and artificial, overlaid upon something real and primitive, and alone worthy of man's legitimate possession and devotion. Man has contrived, consciously or otherwise, most of the structures of his political and social life. Just in so far as he has thus made them, do they diverge from that which nature offers man. Just as Hume sees that the world which man actively inhabits is not the world of impressions which he finds, but the world created by custom and imagination, so Rousseau sees the vast difference between these primitive and unspoiled things which man finds in nature, and the elaborate artefacts which he imposes upon nature. Let man strip away these additions due to sheer convention-custom and imagination-and return to nature. But there is

a large difference between Hume and Rousseau. Hume sees that what man literally finds in his world, prior to all which he imputes to it, is no world fit for him to live in. Although all that imagination adds to impressions is fictitious, yet they alone provide us with significance and a basis for all of our undertakings, theoretical and practical. Rousseau, in his more extreme moods surely, thinks it quite possible to content ourselves with what we find, to enjoy that, unspoiled by artifice. Hume is here the more discerning and the more profound. He is the better spokesman of the modern spirit. Platonic and historical significant structures, objects of knowledge and of loyalty have, under the stress of the forces which have made the modern world, tended to be replaced by natural processes and vital activities. These activities fashion and refashion our world. Our world is indeed an age of democracy and of science. What is the status of significant structures in our world? Are they indeed subjective and fictitious, or are there any which await our appropriation and possession, inviting the mind's contemplation and participation? If there are any such they will need to be defined and to be interpreted in the light of all these energies and habits of thought which have made the modern age. What possession of significant structures will make possible the success of the enterprise of modern life—such must be our problem. But not until subjectivism be completely overcome, both in theory and in practice, both in the form of subjective idealism and of naturalism, can we hope really to know any significant structures or to participate in them.

CHAPTER VI

THE MIND'S PARTICIPATION IN REALITY

HE gradual detachment of mind from significant structures which may be appropriated and possessed, the increasing disclosure of the mind's dependence upon matter-of-fact processes of nature which generate, from below, mind and all significant structures,—this has been our theme thus far. This large historical process, this migration of ideas, has sustained an intimate relation, we have seen, with those forces which together have created the civilization, the temper and the problems of our own world, the energies of democracy, of economic rationalism and of science. But this retreat of mind from its participation in objective significant structures, either Platonic or historical, universal or individual, is familiar to us not only in the range of our practical problems and anxieties, but in our thought and our philosophy as well. The resulting situation, the isolation of mind from reality, has strangely enough been called the "cardinal principle of idealism." For we are here dealing with what Caird, and no doubt many others, have called "the disease of subjectivity which has infected the modern world," and it has become very frequent, in England and America at least, to regard subjectivism and idealism as essentially synonymous terms. There is little profit in objecting to a usage of language which has, in some measure, become current. Yet the particular usage here in question may conceal and may foster certain erroneous judgments not only concerning the meaning of historical doctrines and systems, but concerning some important issues of philosophy as well. Thus, idealism is presumably a doctrine of "ideas." But what are "ideas"? Ideas have frequently in modern thought been conceived as essentially and solely, psychical existences, states of consciousness. As such they are not real

and not objective. To make such entities the very stuff and texture of reality is one thing. It is a very different thing to conceive ideas as participating in or as identical with real Forms, permanent, significant structures, as did the father of idealism. Now the Platonic Idea has its legitimate and well-attested descendents throughout the whole development of European philosophy, and perhaps it is still worth while trying to save the name "idealism" for such as these, and to use the perfectly good term "subjectivism" for the other thing. What the relation may be, historically and logically, between these two meanings of idea and of idealism, is, of course, a wholly legitimate and quite important problem. It is with some aspects of this problem that this chapter will be concerned. For, one must definitely settle his accounts with that motive and movement in modern thought which runs from Descartes to Berkeley and beyond, from cogito, ergo sum to esse est percipi. But we shall quite fail to see the problem in anything like its entirety if we limit the field of our inquiry to the definite philosophical movement which receives its final expression in the Berkeleyan formula. That is indeed 'subjectivism,' and it is certainly worthy of careful and sympathetic study and appraisal. But we need also to remember that that other large movement, some of whose aspects we surveyed in the last chapter, is also a kind of subjectivism. It culminates, we have seen, in a withdrawal of ideas from significant structures and in their consequent isolation. It is worth while setting these two historical movements side by side and seeing how they issue in a common situation and a common perplexity. The problem which runs from Descartes through Hume and beyond is of course this: if ideas alone are the vehicles and the objects of knowledge, what of the knowability and the nature of the real world? At the outset of this process ideas are contrasted with real, independent entities. The latter can all be doubted away, but not so ideas. Ideas, which alone are certain and indubitable, lack the objectivity and permanence of real objects, whereas these latter, although possessing much more inherent solidity and worth, are remote and may be possessed by the mind only indirectly and circuitously. Unquestionably, for Descartes, ideas have a certain taint and incapacity. They are not themselves real objects, though they may become the means whereby we know real objects. But with

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Berkeley and Hume, the real world is more and more assimilated and identified with ideas, perceptions, and impressions. It is as if, reconciled to necessity, one renounced the more significant, but inaccessible structures, and contented himself with what he actually did possess, his own ideas, and then renamed these "reality." And this is subjectivism, isolation, renunciation. But while this process has been going on in philosophy, something essentially analogous to it has been going on in the world of life. And that is the impassioned discovery of nature and of life itself, of impulse, instinct, and desire. These are vital energies which spring up from below. Mind, reason, and ideas are the fruition of these activities, perhaps their instrument. Individualism, democracy, the new learning, the new commerce and industry of adventure and of production, all alike spell the liberation of the mind from objective structures which are merely to be apprehended and possessed. The mind with all its deeds and its ideas is intelligible only as the outcome and the expression of some vital interest of the body, or of some social class or group. Only vaguely and imperfectly does this actual modern situation find an articulate voice in philosophy. By and large, no doubt, empiricism has represented something of this sense of freshness, of activity, of contact with the soil of nature. It has been the spokesman for individualism and progress, for the freedom of man's achievement and his control over his world.1 But a problem emerges, not essentially different from the problem as to the status of the real world, if Berkeley's formula be regarded as true. If the entire life of mind depends upon and points back to some particular structure and interest which has engendered it and which nourishes it, how can an idea be "true," i.e., point forward to, and disclose something of universal, independent, and intrinsic worth? Any whole-hearted biological or social theory of mind is really a variety of "subjectivism," as much as is the outcome of the Descartes-to-Berkeley movement. Such a biological theory lodges the significance and the function of mind wholly within the life interests of the here-and-now particular organism or interest which it serves. It interprets the entire life and function of mind—

¹ This larger social and cultural significance of modern empiricism is most clearly brought to light in the article of Dewey: "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge." University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy, No. 3.

including the knowledge function—in terms of the mind's relation to some structure, economic interest, or bodily brain, upon which the mind depends. The result is that we may fittingly survey in one group certain common characteristics of subjectivism (Berkeleyan "idealism") and naturalism. Otherwise expressed, the relation between the subjectivism which is latent in Descartes and explicit in Berkeley, and naturalism would appear to be this. Both are the result of a severance of mind and its ideas from objective structures in which they participate. But where subjectivism represents the stage in which ideas and perceptions live, so to speak, an unattached life of their own, naturalism views ideas as attached to matter-of-fact structures and processes of nature. These structures lie on the opposite side of ideas from that on which the intelligible Platonic Forms were thought to dwell. The mind really knew such Forms, and participated in them; for naturalism the mind depends upon and is the utterance of nature's processes, and that is essentially the whole story. At least, as for instrumentalism, it is the clew to the whole story. We shall keep in mind, then, both forms of subjectivism, the philosophical movement initiated by Descartes, and also the pressure of all those modern energies which have, seemingly, put Platonism and Christianity forever behind us, and which have substituted for them the motives of activity and of experiment, democracy and control.

We shall examine first the more familiar meaning of subjectivism. It has become more or less of a commonplace to view much of the whole philosophical development from Descartes on, till one comes to the recent radical philosophical reforms of pragmatism and of realism, as the outcome of a single controlling conception which functions almost as an axiom and which sets in motion the entire machinery of modern "idealism." This fundamental, organizing idea Professor Woodbridge has fittingly called the "end-term" conception of the mind. The mind, according to this basic assumption, was conceived "as an original capacity or receptacle, endowed with certain constitutional powers, and needing the operation of some alien or resident factor to arouse it to activity. It was the end term of a relation, the other term of which might be the external world, another mind, the divine being, or some unknown source of excitation. The

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important end-term was the mind. . . . This basal conception of the mind as an original end-term was expressed in various forms and different words, but in them all are discoverable the essential originality, isolation, independence, and exclusiveness of that plastic and impressionable thing which through experience of some sort comes to possess consciousness or knowledge, or to be itself the consciousness of the world."²

Now unquestionably something very like this "end-term" conception plays an important rôle throughout the entire development of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, and after Hegel. Our confusions, our difficulties—and our "idealism"—are the consequences of this fruitful concept and motive. It is not strange that reform and revolt should strike first and hardest at this "end-term" conception, and should seek to interpret consciousness in terms of a relation, or a process, a response, an activity. Such concepts strive to connote integrity, a real and total situation, complex indeed because the situation contains two "ends" and a middle, and not merely a single term at the end looking out into a seeming void. We shall find much to welcome and to make our own in the purpose of this criticism of any purely "end-term" situation. Meanwhile a preliminary remark would appear worth making. The "end-term" situation and concept certainly does not furnish an important or an impelling motive within the idea systems of Platonism and of Christianity. Within these, stress is laid upon significant structures or Forms, in which mind and consciousness are to participate, and with which they are even conceived as identical. And this holds true whether the significant structures are universal and intelligible Forms, as in Platonism, or a concrete, historical life and community as in Christianity. So much was the upshot of our earlier discussion of these two syntheses of life and of thought. These are both in so far utterly realistic in at least one proper and important meaning of that term. Within these idea systems there is offered to the mind something to possess, to contemplate, to love, and to worship, and the mind's proper function lies in such possession and such solidarity. Here are then motives and concepts which connote anything but "isolation,

² "The Problem of Consciousness," in "Amherst Studies in Philosophy and Psychology," p. 140.

independence and exclusiveness." And just to the extent to which any of these elements enter into the structures of modern idealism, are the very genuine and serious defects of an "end-term" conception already in some measure provided for. In other words, these short-comings of the "end-term" conception might conceivably be remedied through some return to a philosophy and a culture based upon the mind's solidarity with objective structures such as, in principle, both Platonism and Christianity were. Such might yield a valid program for the "recovery of philosophy." The problem is of course more than any purely theoretical issue. It touches the very roots of the organization of life and of society, of industry, of property and of nations.

Where shall we look for the emergence of the "end-term" concept of consciousness and hence of this so dominant modern idea system? Of course the concept exercises a powerful influence upon the characteristic doctrines of Descartes, and we shall presently examine some of them. But before Descartes there is another thinker and an idea which has been well said to mark the "very turning point of western speculation." It is Anselm and his ontological argument that are here referred to.3 What Anselm's ontological argument really expresses is first, the emergence of mind, of self-consciousness, as something conceivably isolated and non-cognitive, as something which is a potential "end-term," not linked of necessity to a real world in which it participates. But the argument instantly rejects this possibility. It affirms that thought is necessarily linked to real structures, and is not, in its essential capacity, any mere floating image. The argument expresses, as Mr. Webb puts it, both "an incipient doubt" and also the instant settlement of the doubt by adhering faithfully to that "objectivity of attitude inherited by the middle ages from antiquity." Ideas have just begun to slip away from objective significant structures, but only enough, as yet, to formulate with deliberate self-consciousness the argument that thought cannot live a self-centered, free life of its own. Wherever there is a total thought, there is to be found also, the knowledge, and the genuine possession of reality.

³ The expression is used by Mr. C. C. J. Webb in his "Studies in the History of Natural Theology," p. 151.

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With Descartes, as compared with Anselm, the gap between ideas and the objects with which they are linked has widened; doubt and isolation come much more to the front, and endure longer. Indeed, for Descartes, such persistent isolation is itself essential in order to disclose the nature and the foundations of our certain knowledge. We do well frequently to turn back to the Cartesian situation and problem and reflect upon it. Here is to be found the main source of the whole "end-term" conception of mind, of the incessant preoccupation with the problem of knowledge, of subjectivism and of dualism. I turn to some aspects of the Cartesian argument. It is not, I think, the usual reading which shall here be given of the Cogito, ergo sum. We shall see here rather a motive for a very genuine form of realism-if we must use the term-at any rate, for rejecting heartily most of those motives which culminate in the Berkeleyan Esse est percipi. Here is the situation then. We are, at the outset, to banish from our universe of discourse everything which may possibly be doubted. Nothing shall remain except the instrument of doubt itself, which, of course, is an idea. But it is an idea which knows no real object other than itself, for everything other than itself is by hypothesis, not idea, not a literal possession of the mind, and hence subject to doubt and erasure. One says then that no matter what outer, real structures may be doubted away, at least the doubt itself remains, and the doubt is an idea, a conscious act of the self. That idea, yes, the self-doubting, at least is real. But this "at least" betrays us. For it suggests irretrievably that what is still left is not quite as valuable for the purposes of knowledge as that which one would like to possess, and the fable of the fox and the grapes might be cited to advantage. Moreover, in the logical experiment now being carried out, our universe of discourse contains nothing but ideas, nothing but the self-conscious self, aware of its own doubt. But if this is all that exists after doubt has removed, in our experiment, every real object, then it is to be observed that there is simply no point at all in calling that which is left, the doubt itself, an "idea," a "state of consciousness." The concept of an idea has been reached only because we first contrasted idea (which we at least did possess) with real objects which we did not possess. The significance of the adjective "conscious," or of the noun "idea" can remain only as long as

that contrast exists. But in a universe of discourse where doubt has done its work, and which consequently contains no "real" objects. that which remains simply is, and is real, if you choose, but it is no longer "idea" and can no longer be qualified as "conscious." A single fact, alone present to the mind, as sensation, or as idea, could never possibly be the object of doubt. Its reality and objectivity would never be called in question. And so the epithet "conscious," implying that it is at least within my experience even if it isn't a real object, would never come to be applied to it. This, as a theorem in psychology, was clearly seen and stated by James, and earlier by Spinoza from whom James quotes.4 The interest in the question which here occupies James is not quite our interest though it is wholly pertinent. He is discussing the psychology of belief, and what he points out is that "the sense that anything we think of as unreal can only come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think." That is, the whole discussion here refers to the world of beliefs. Within that universe there must be contrast and opposition in order that doubt may emerge. We are here interested in the universe of existences. What we point out is that there is no sense in calling anything within that universe a subjective existence, an idea, unless it is really contrasted with that which is not subjective but which is real. If we turn to an analogous situation, the point may become clearer. Would it be possible, let us ask, for one in a dream to say about his experience that the only thing of which he is certain is that he is dreaming? Obviously not. For, if literally everything which he possesses is a dream consciousness, there is no meaning in degrading it by characterizing it as dreaming. Some other present possession of his mind there must be which he knows and which serves as a standard with reference to which he may judge that all

⁴ "Psychology," vol. 2, p. 288. James refers to the passage of Spinoza in Book 2 of the "Ethics." Cf. also the following sentence from the essay "On the Improvement of the Understanding": "If there were only one idea in the mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no doubt or certainty present, only a certain sensation."

⁵ One of the earlier articles of Perry may be referred to as an interesting elaboration of this thesis, in so far sound, I believe, though we shall not assent to Perry's inferences from this situation. "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness," *Psychological Review*, 1905.

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of his other experiences are but dreams. Again take this case. Suppose, in the light of the instability of our knowledge, of the constant modification of theories and assumptions which the history of science and of philosophy exhibits, suppose one is led to infer that every judgment which claims to be true is only at best probable. The probability may range from a sheer unwarranted guess to the highly probable laws of mechanics. All knowledge is probable then. But if all that we possess is probability, again it must be asked, what could the very concept of probability mean? It acquires a definite meaning only through contrast with certainty. It is because some things are known and are certain, that other judgments and beliefs can be but probable. Now in each of these situations it is to be observed that our universe of discourse is really richer and more complex than it appears at the outset to be. It is a universe of discourse in which doubt has not purged away everything real, leaving only bare ideas, nor one in which only the dream self remains after the real self has utterly vanished, nor can it be a universe in which all truths are but probable.

To say this is not to dispute either the truth or the significance of the initial premise of self-consciousness. It is, rather, to augment that premise by another. It is to insist that consciousness of reality is as much inalienable and elemental as is consciousness of self. Such consciousness of reality is an awareness of an Other, of a background and environment, recognition of which can alone make it logically possible to describe the nearer and more immediate possessions of the self in terms of ideas and states of consciousness. This is our way, then, of accepting so far at least, the soundness of those criticisms of the "end-term" concept of consciousness. Consciousness is not a single end-term, trying in vain to reach out to the other end-term so as to know it. Consciousness originally spreads over both ends; it is not exclusively self-conscious, nor is it essentially isolated and remote.

We may turn immediately to that motive and doctrine in which the Cartesian impulse terminates, the thesis of Berkeley. We have to settle our accounts with Berkeleyan "idealism," and to dwell for a moment upon the situation which generates the Berkeleyan thesis. We are, in order to understand and accept that thesis, asked to

reflect upon the meaning of our natural belief that we immediately know and experience real objects. We see, touch, and hear directly the things of our world. Berkeley merely asks that we be in earnest with this conviction, that we be willing resolutely to identify in all literalness the real objects of our environment, with that which we do immediately experience. That which each one of us has in his experience, what is it but sensations, perceptions, feelings, contents of consciousness, subject-matter of psychology, throughout ideal and mental? To experience, to think of, to know anything whatever, is inevitably to bring the object known or thought of into the texture of my experience, my ideas, and it thereby becomes something utterly mental. This, in principle, is the substance of that radical insight which Berkeley in such eloquent and earnest language gave to the world, and which by so many inspiring and earnest teachers has been set forth as at least the beginning and the sure foundation of a worthy idealism. Once assent to the cogency of this insight, and at a stroke, it would seem, is the entire position of idealism achieved. At once it follows that all experience, all knowledge, all science and philosophy can only disclose to us that which is really a part of ourselves, our ideas, our minds;—if not belonging to our momentary selves, it is at least the possession of that complete and total self which is continuous with our partial selves. Are not all of man's moral and spiritual interests vindicated beyond all possible doubt and once for all, merely by this overwhelming insight that nothing about my world which I can ever discover and know will be revealed as foreign to my mind, independent of my conscious life, hostile or indifferent to my real self? But must we not say that even were we content with the theoretical soundness of this Berkelevan thesis, which a constantly increasing number of us are not, we might well hesitate over the manner in which this insight is to furnish us with the guiding principle of idealism. The insight is won far too easily, one feels; it is obtained not through patient search for the specific values and purposes which men have at heart, and for the conditions which shall attend their fruition and their enjoyment. It is so utterly sweeping in its scope that it often seems to be only a re-naming of the total universe of knowable objects, considered wholesale and en bloc, and a relabelling which tells us

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nothing further about any of the specific items or relations which characterize the particular things within our world. However this may be, and we shall return to some consideration of this matter later, we may now deal with certain aspects of the Berkeleyan doctrine which call for comment and for criticism. The criticism may be prefaced by the remark that we believe Berkeley's statement to imply certain truths which are genuinely idealistic and important, but that until we have first seen some of the errors to which his thesis easily gives rise we are not in a position properly to understand either idealism, or the deeper elements of truth within the theses of Berkeley.

There are two respects in which we shall at this place examine the assumptions and the implications of Berkeley's argument. For, be it noted, there is an assumption here, of a very far-reaching nature, but one which is certainly problematic to say the least. We may speak of it as the axiom or assumption of sheer immediacy. It coincides with the belief that knowledge must mean simply reading off the immediately given possessions and experiences of the mind. To know anything is, in the last analysis, to tell what is literally present to or within the mind. There is, for such an assumption, nothing whatever akin to venture, nothing distant and outlying, nothing implicit and deep-lying, about the knowledge situation. To know an object is to have and to be aware of actual sensations and perceptions. So that there is complete coalescence of the object and the knowledge of it. All distance is overcome, and presence, immediacy, literalness, characterize the basis of the knowledge situation. One might fairly call it the 'swallowing' or 'digestive' concept of knowledge. That is to say, the process and achievement of knowledge are conceived as essentially akin to the process and achievement of digestion. Just as the stomach can digest only such objects as come to reside within it, so the mind can know only such entities as literally dwell within the mind, and are thus through and through of mental stuff and texture. And this preconception as to the nature of our knowledge has its roots in something deeper. It springs from a blindness, natural yet utterly confusing, to certain fundamental characteristics of the entire life of consciousness. I shall touch upon

these here briefly and only in so far as their neglect is one capital source of subjectivism.

In the study of psychology, as traditionally understood, there are certain motives which lead us to view all contents of consciousness, all of the immediate experiences of the self, as spread out upon one plane of being. There are, of course, feelings, sensations, ideas, perceptions, and the various other states of consciousness; and in so far as these constitute the proper objects of psychological study, they are all comprised within the same area. Now this inclusion of all states of consciousness within a single field has led to the neglect of a capital distinction within that field, the insistence upon which constitutes one of the solid achievements of recent psychology. Let us first take a concrete instance. Consider side by side a feeling of pain and an intention to start for Paris on the following day. Both the feeling and the intention are states of consciousness. They are both immediately experienced. They are items in the inner life of their owner. Psychology tries to analyze and to describe them. Yet there is one contrast between them which deserves to be stressed. We speak, of course, of the feeling of pain, and of the intention to go to Paris. But while the pain is an actual and literal possession of the person, the going to Paris is not his present possession. That is in the future and the intention but refers to it, and means it. There is, in the case of the intention to go to Paris, a certain distance between the idea and that of which it is an idea, whereas the pain and the feeling coalesce together. The intention means something it does not possess; the feeling means the pain which it does possess, and with which it is substantially identical. There is a tension and a duality in the one case which is virtually lacking in the other case. The result is that if you set about to describe the intention in the same fashion, and with the same preconceptions as those with which you describe the feeling, you will miss just that characteristic of the intention whereby it differs from the feeling. You will be likely to notice only the literally present possessions, the immediate experiences which constitute the pain in the one case, but which are not identical with the object of the intention in the other case. Generalizing from this illustration, what we may say is that there are moments of consciousness which are only experienced items and

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events immediately present, and that there are also "intentional acts"-to use the expression of Husserl-acts which mean and intend something not now literally experienced or possessed. Now something of this same fundamental difference which exists between a feeling of pain and an intention to go to Paris is to be found in the distinction between sensation and thought. Yet, it by no means follows that sensations, or feelings either, are entirely lacking in the "act" character, in the intention to refer to something other than themselves. It is quite possible, and I believe it to be true that something of the nature and function of thought permeates every state of consciousness, though in varying degree. We had perhaps best keep the term "thought" to designate those states or acts of consciousness which mean or think objects wholly other than those present modifications of consciousness which constitute the mind's literal possessions. Thought is the bearer and vehicle of those conscious acts whereby that which is not experienced and possessed, and which constitutes no literal modification of the stream of consciousness can nevertheless be intended. The thought or intended object is always other than and different from a content of consciousness.

I may briefly refer to certain writers and doctrines in recent psychology which support the validity of this contention. It has many implications and it is worth being clear about. It cuts at the roots of Berkeleyan subjectivism and "idealism"; yet it does not, as we shall see later on, play into the hands of either naïve realism or of neo-realism. Among English psychologists, Stout deserves especial mention for his clear emphasis upon this matter. We may quote him at some length. Let us consider, he says, the case in which we think of a sensation as such. "If it is under any conditions possible for the object of thought to be present in the consciousness of the thinker when he thinks of it, it ought to be possible in this case. If it is not possible in this case, it is difficult to see how it can be possible at all. If introspective knowledge is not immediate, then no knowledge is immediate. Now it will be found on examination that whenever we try to think of an immediate experience of our own, we can do so only by investing it with attributes and relations which are not themselves immediately experienced at the moment.

For example, I may think of a momentary appearance in consciousness as an occurrence in my mental history, an incident in my experience. But neither my experience as a whole, nor the position and relations of any part within that whole, can be given as the content of momentary consciousness. The momentary consciousness is only one link in the series which constitutes my experience. We are able to 'look before and after, and sigh for what is not,' only because thought can refer to an object which is not present in consciousness. Again I may think of the content present in consciousness, abstracted from the fact of its presentation. In this case also I am obviously not thinking of the momentary experience as such at the moment at which it is experienced. The presented content is regarded as something which remains identical through the fleeting moments of its appearance." And again, Stout asks us to consider the case in which we refer to the non-existence of an object. There is here an added argument. "If an object is to be identified with the special modification of consciousness whereby we think it, we could never think of what does not actually exist; for the specific modification of our consciousness, whereby we think of the non-existent, as such, must always itself have existence. Similarly with objects which are recognised, not merely as fictitious, but as absurd; I can think of a round square, and in so doing recognise that I am thinking of an absurdity. But what is it that is absurd? Not the thought itself, as a modification of my consciousness: for this actually exists, and cannot therefore possess the internal absurdity which excludes existence. What is regarded as absurd and nonexistent is the object. The felt failure to combine round and square in one image is itself part of that content of consciousness through which the absurdity of the object is presented."7

Now all of this has a very definite bearing upon the situation which has been so well characterized by Perry as the "ego-centric" situation. Any object or meaning whatever, it is implied, which is thought of, intended, referred to by any 'intentional act' of the mind with its characteristic tension, thereby becomes inevitably a part of the mind which knows it. It is swept into the area of the mind's

⁶ G. F. Stout: "Analytic Psychology," vol. 1, p. 44.

⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

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contents and actual possessions through the very fact that it is known. But the distinction which we have been describing becomes here of the first importance. An object which is intended, meant, aimed at, by an intentional act is not a modification of the stream of consciousness as is a feeling which the mind has. To say that both the feeling and the intended object are experienced or are present to the mind, is at once to run the risk of using the word "experience" ambiguously, and to blur the distinction here in question. Thus, to take a typical instance, Rashdall remarks that "when we are clear that by 'object' or 'thing' we only mean that which the mind thinks or feels, and that no independence or self-existence can be attributed to the thing, the distinction between 'mind' and 'thing' becomes merely a distinction within the mind."8 What the mind "thinks" is here viewed as belonging to the same class and as having the same characteristics as that which the mind "feels." Yet is it not clear that what the mind feels is a modification of the mind, an event within the stream of consciousness, in a sense in which that which the mind thinks is not a mode of consciousness, and consequently is not a part of the mind? The ego-centric dilemma applies to feelings in a literal sense; it does not apply to the objects of our 'intentional acts' in any so literal and factual a manner. In what sense it does apply to objects of thought we shall have later to consider.

This distinction holds not only between feeling and thought, but between feeling and sensation. This latter distinction has much to do with the way in which the difference between self and not-self grows up in our experience. Certainly feelings attach to the self more intimately than do sensations. As Oesterreich, who has dwelt at length upon this contrast, has it, I will readily say, when a feeling of joy is present to my mind, that I feel myself to be joyful. But I do not say, when a sensation of red is present to my mind, that I feel myself to be red.⁹

A surer and more adequate psychological analysis has had to emancipate itself from the psychological tradition which puts sensations, feelings, thoughts, and conations into the one class of ideas,

⁸ In The Ultimate Basis of Theism, "Contentio Veritatis," p. 15.

⁹ K. Oesterreich: "Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen," p. 34.

perceptions, or presentations within the mind, items within the stream of consciousness, literal and almost spatial portions of immediate experience. Within that tradition, which coincides with the "end-term" conception of mind, there is the reduction of all of the mind's presentations to one common level, and the all but total failure to discover that unique quality of tension, of meaning an object, which is the essential characteristic of thought. Hume has set forth the outcome of this utterly democratic and levelling impulse in a classical passage as follows: "It has been observed that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination. The mind can never exert itself in any action, which we may not comprehend under the term of perception; and consequently that term is no less applicable to those judgments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than to every other operation of the mind. To approve of one character, to condemn another, are only so many different perceptions."10 This emancipation has been due to the labor of a large group of psychologists who, in one form or another, recognize the unique and autonomous nature of thought, of "intentional acts," of Gegenstandsbewusstsein, of attitudes and of meaning. 11 It is this autonomy of reason which is lost sight of when such terms as idea, perception,

Special reference should also be made to the short essay by Pfänder: Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen, in Husserl's "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung," vol. I, part 1, 1913.

^{10 &}quot;Treatise of Human Nature," Book 3, of Morals, Part 1, Section 1.

¹¹ Oesterreich, ch. 5, gives a summary of this most significant chapter in recent psychology, citing the important names among German writers. I quote here a statement of the contrast between sheer factual contents of consciousness and intentional acts from one of the clearest of these recent German writers: "Wir haben nunmehr an dem Ausdruck 'Empfindung' eine zusammenfassende Bezeichnung für Erlebnisse und Erlebnisbestandteile nicht-intentionaler Art, also für sämtliche Inhalte, sofern sie als ein qualitativ und intensiv bestimmbares Etwas einfach im Bewusstsein da sind, während wir alle diejenigen Momente vermöge deren diese Elemente eine Gegenständliche Deutung erhalten—sei es, das sie auf physische Dinge bezogen oder selbst als psychische Gegenstände gefasst werden—zu einer anderen Klasse von Bewusstseinselementen, eben den 'Akten' oder 'Intentionen' rechnen, die gerade das Eigentümliche haben, das sie nicht einfach im Bewusstsein da sind, sodern das wir in ihnen etwas 'meinen,' auf etwas 'gerichtet' sind." Messer: "Empfindung und Denken," p. 42.

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or presentation are applied indiscriminately to all of the mind's immediate data. And Berkeley's *esse est percipi* is one expression of this inclusion of all data of experience within the class 'idea' and then viewing all ideas merely as factual biographical items in some center of consciousness.¹² If this were a valid procedure every science would reduce to psychology, and introspection would be the sole avenue of knowledge about everything of which the mind may

have a perception or idea.

We have been observing the error in psychology which results from viewing all contents of consciousness merely as presentations, ideas, in one dimension and upon one level. Let us turn next to a difficulty of another sort which inheres in such a procedure. Such a radically levelling process brings us face to face with what is really the problem of truth and error, and the larger problem of values. Here we are concerned with that problem in so far as it is involved in a critique of subjectivism, whether the subjectivism of Berkeley's esse est percipi, or of naturalism. Let us first recall the way in which each of these doctrines does exercise a levelling influence upon a wide area of facts. This is obvious in the case of the Esse est percipi thesis. Here, whatever is real is made an item, a content of consciousness. And it is upon the common characteristics of all possessions of consciousness, upon their existence as "ideas," that attention is now concentrated. It is implied that the most important feature of any object or idea is just this universal characteristic which all contents of consciousness share in common. It is tempting to speculate on the possible relation between this philosophy of Ideas which, clearly formulated by Locke, persists throughout all subsequent English thought, and that Individualism which in England more than elsewhere in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was influenced by the economic and industrial régime of handicraft. Certainly the prevailing state of the indus-

12 Cf. the following from Webb: "Studies in the History of Natural Theology," p. 152: "Now a tendency towards subjectivism is always apt to connect itself with a tendency to lose sight of such essential differences as that between knowledge and opinion which is so prominent in Plato; or that between 'think' or 'reasoning' on the one hand and 'imagining' on the other. The objective reference which distinguishes Reason from other mental processes is blurred when attention is concentrated on the common character of mental process which it shares with them."

trial arts did induce in the English people "an animus of democratic equity and non-interference, self-help and local autonomy."13 Now any such Individualism brings it about that the individual thinks of all his possessions, his circumstances, his ideas no less than his real property as his own and as all of it belonging within a single universe of discourse. This quality of belonging to himself may become then the most important characteristic of everything which the individual has. It may become so pervasive and dominant as to obliterate or at least render innocuous any cleavages within this class of what belongs to him. At least the distinctions and discriminations within this class are insignificant in the light of the one common characteristic of everything within the class, the characteristic, namely, that they all belong to him. Is this mention of the motives and idea systems of individualism, economic self-reliance and self-consciousness irrelevant in observing the psychological doctrine that everything before the mind is just a perception, an idea? I think not. Bergson has made the observation, both acute and profound, that the "germ of English idealism (by which he means subjectivism) lies in its inability to see any difference, other than that of mere degree of intensity, between the reality of a perceived object and the ideality of a conceived object. And the theory that we somehow erect our interior states of consciousness into matter, that perception is only a true hallucination, arises from the same source."14 It is through breaking with this tradition, by calling our attention to the utterly qualitative distinction between perception and memory that Bergson has made, I believe, his most distinct contribution to philosophy.

But if the psychological tradition of English philosophy is associated with the tendency to sweep all objects and ideas into the one large class of "things immediately experienced," and if, in consequence, certain important distinctions within that class were blurred or ignored, precisely the same is true of naturalism. We need but recall the way in which, for naturalism, every idea, every value

¹⁸ Veblen: "Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution," p. 96.

¹⁴ "Matière et Mémoire," p. 267. Taine also had called perception an "halluzination vraie." Cf. the penetrating comments of Scheler: Die Idole der Selbsterkenntniss, in "Abhandlungen und Aufsätze," vol. 2, pp. 78 ff.

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judgment, every devotion and loyalty is viewed as the outcome and the utterance of some quite matter-of-fact process. These prior factual conditions of all ideas and judgments are brain processes, or the behavior of the organism whatever it is, or some actual desire and interest. And what is here to be observed is that since this pointing back to prior conditions and interests characterizes every idea, true or false, and every value judgment, good or evil, all theoretical ideas and all practical loyalties are at once placed upon a single level, brought within a single comprehensive class, in respect to the most important characteristic of ideas and loyalties. For, as we have seen, the very essence of naturalism lies in withdrawing ideas and loyalties from objective significant structures in which they may participate, and in viewing them as the fruition of natural life processes and interests. There was, in the earlier idea systems, always the possibility of discrimination, of making a distinction between true ideas and false, good and evil loyalties. Either some ideas might not reach their goal and consequently might fail to possess and to participate in the objective structures embodying meaning and goodness. Or it might be that there were cleavages and conflicts between the objective structures themselves, some being good and others evil. The former was, on the whole, the solution of Platonism; the latter was that of Christianity. But when we leave all of this behind, when we cease to regard ideas as pointing forward to significant structures in which they may participate, and when we view them simply as pointing back to the interest which they utter and of which they are the deposit, then all possibility of making any radical discrimination has left us. We are in the world of facts, of causes, the world of democracy and science. Is not something of all this present to the mind of that thinker who early in modern philosophy saw most deeply into this consequence of science and of such large naturalism? There is, of course, very much else which shapes the structure of Spinoza's philosophy, but his uncompromising rejection of teleology, his insistence that all value judgments and discriminations are left far behind when one attains to an adequate knowledge of the true cause of things, this is a profound reading and anticipation of many of the forces definitely setting in to fashion the modern world. For Spinoza, indeed,

such relativism is, in the end, held in check. Something absolute and objective, if ineffable, is accessible to the mind, when purged of its emotions. For full-fledged relativism, i.e., refusal to acknowledge any distinction between the objective and intrinsic value of our ideas, one turns to later thinkers who come more directly and more pervasively under the influence of biology and of history. Renan is one such. Renan fails to discover any possibility of uniting together an undivided allegiance to a single cause, and a comprehensive understanding of all causes and ideals. Really to understand any ideal and any loyalty is to see that it, like every other ideal, does spring from some actual interest and desire which sustains it. Any ideal is thus completely understood and justified when viewed from the interest which has engendered it. One may, to be sure, be blind and not see the dependence of loyalties and preferences, other than one's own, upon interests and desires equally real with his own. But history and psychology correct such blindness. And with the insight which results from our knowledge there is, it would seem, a decreasing confidence in the inherent and absolute worth of one's own preferences and ideals. "On the whole," says Veblen, "the number and variety of things that are fundamentally and eternally true and good increases as one goes outward from the modern west-European cultural centers into the earlier barbarian past or into the remoter barbarian present."15 And might it not seem as if there were some deep-seated antagonism between the life of knowledge, of insight, and of whole-hearted devotion? Is the universality of the knowledge interest incompatible with the discriminating choice and exclusiveness of practical loyalty and of social action? Not infrequently has voluntarism and irrationalism supposed this to be the case, and, with James, has disclaimed against intellectualism, because it leads so inevitably and quickly to inaction and quietism, justifying everything, and paralyzing the will. "Formerly," says Renan—a noble example of such relativism—"every man had a system; he lived and died by it; now we pass successively through all systems, or better still, understand them all at once." I may cite again, too, from the thinker who has done so much to let us

^{15 &}quot;The Theory of Business Enterprise," p. 321, note.

¹⁶ Quoted by Babbitt: "The Masters of Modern French Criticism," p. 258.

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see the intimate relation between democracy and modern science. Professor Dewey, speaking of Maeterlinck's philosophy of life, has written as follows: "It has long been said that all men are equal in the presence of death; it was perhaps reserved for Emerson and for Maeterlinck to perceive that all men and all experiences are equal in the presence of life, and because of the presence in that life of nature that is uniform and equable in all its diversities. When one has transmuted the abstract ideas of science into working sentiments, the distinctions of higher and lower, of transcendental and empirical, of the great and the little, the heroic and the ordinary remain, as Maeterlinck has said, the only extraordinary and miraculous things—that is, the only infantile and foolish things."17 This must meet with sympathetic response on the part of everyone who is in any touch whatever with the enthusiasm of modern democracy. And yet, too, even the lover of democracy must ask whether the distinction between the true and the false, extraordinary and miraculous as it no doubt is, is also "infantile and foolish." Let him be single-mindedly devoted to the ideal of democracy itself and he will not regard the distinction between democracy and aristocracy, between what is true and significant and what is false and outworn as a trivial and meaningless distinction. Wherein the meaning of this contrast between the true and the false does really lie, I do not now ask. I urge merely that if the distinction is to remain, we cannot pursue the levelling process to its ultimate limit. We cannot remain content with a subjectivism which tends to sweep all mental contents and processes into the one class of things immediately experienced, nor can we remain content with a naturalism which regards all ideas and all judgments equally as the outcome of brain processes or of life interests. If the whole story about the life of mind is thought to be told, in principle, when one observes that mind is the fruition and the expression of the living body, that "the soul is the voice of the body's interests," if every idea is what it is wholly because of what the body or the brain is doing, then indeed does the distinction between true and false ideas simply cease to exist. For in that case, a "false" idea is just as much the function of a brain process as is a "true" idea.

¹⁷ "Maeterlinck's Philosophy of Life," Hibbert Journal, vol. 9, p. 777.

We are in a position here, I believe, to see something of the real meaning of an argument which is likely either to escape us or to irritate us unless it can be set forth as the discovery of a very concrete situation which characterizes the life of the mind. The argument is the familiar one that there are some truths which may not be doubted or denied, for the doubt or the denial simply reaffirms those very truths. Professor Royce has urged that this is the only type of truth upon which we may safely build in our philosophical reflection. We know that there is absolute truth, for you cannot deny it without implying that your denial itself really conveys truth, and so on. But this argument seems to us, I think, empty and formal until we see that it, indeed, touches closely upon the relation between the mind's ideas and prior natural process on the one hand, and the mind's relation to objective significant structures, on the other hand. The argument does in truth point out that ideas, however related they may be to the brain, and to social, economic interests, are also linked indissolubly to objective significant structures which they know and in which they literally participate. The argument in question, seemingly so barren and formal, is really an insight into the real situation in which ideas exist. It yields as it were a picture of the solidarity between the mind and those objective Forms and structures which are not the brain and are not the desires and interests which enter into the manifold folkways of men. The argument is really an observation of one highly significant aspect of the relation between the mind and the body. For, whoever says that the mind is the utterance of the body's interests and behavior says then that this theory itself is not true, but is only the utterance of some particular, contingent brain process or behavior. But whoever says this intends to impart at least to just this idea some universal meaning and validity. Such universality of meaning looks far beyond and it points in a different direction from the here-and-now, local and particular organic structure and behavior from which the idea is thought to emerge. Consider, as a concrete illustration of this whole situation, the "economic interpretation of history." This is the theory that all the ideas and ideals of any age do but reflect the prevailing economic and industrial processes of that period. Now, unquestionably, this theory does reflect the economic life and

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interests of a particular age. It could hardly have arisen in the medieval world. It is itself the spokesman of an era in which men's lives and habits of thought are, more than ever before, determined directly or indirectly by the routine of machine industry and the economic structure of capitalism. But, if what the theory asserts be really true, then that which is revealed by the theory is just the state of the industrial arts in the second third of the nineteenth century in western Europe. Yet the theory intends to reveal a universal situation, a truth valid for the entire life of mind at all times and in all places. And herein lies the contradiction. We would by no means deny that intimate bonds of some sort there are between mind and body, ideas and bodily behavior, values and matter-of-fact interests. We shall later on ask how that intimate relationship had best be formulated.

Consider, again, the most elementary features of the situation in which an instrumental theory of knowledge is set forth. Such a theory stresses not only the way in which ideas and thoughts emerge from the life activities and needs of organisms but also the way in which they reenter the life processes as instruments in the furtherance of those activities. The successful functioning of ideas in this manner constitutes their truth. Ideas point backward to needs and problems, forward to satisfactions and to solutions. This scheme is to supplant any reference whatever of ideas to "reality," in, let us say, the traditional and the Platonic sense. When, however, we inquire into the assumptions and the foundations of instrumentalism we shall discover, I believe, that it rests primarily upon accepting as true-in the traditional and Platonic sense-certain premises and results of modern biology. Instrumentalism is true, in other words, because really and "absolutely" the nervous system is, like any other organ, an engine of behavior and of adaptation. There really exist, then, reflex arc systems whose functioning enables the organism to meet the requirements of its life and of its environment. And ideas, mind, and consciousness are just the fruition, or perhaps the instrument of such functioning. It is only because some ideas, those which set forth this biological situation, are true in the literal and Platonic sense that all ideas can be true in the pragmatic and

instrumental sense. The pragmatic theory of truth is a true theory only if certain biological ideas are true in a non-pragmatic sense.

What results from our analysis thus far is this: the dependence of the mind upon the body cannot be thought of as excluding the participation of the mind in universal significant structures. Ideas stand indeed in this double relationship. They point to the natural and vital forces which seem to engender them, and also to significant structures which they know. Ideas stand in a "between" relationship with reference to two orders or dimensions of being, matter-of-fact processes, and Platonic meanings, particulars and universals. Ideas, we may say, interpret the one order of existence to the other. We may in the existing state of our knowledge, I think, be even more confident of the mind's knowledge of reality, in the idea's participation in universal significant structures and meanings than we are of the supposed commonplaces of physiological psychology and of the economic interpretation of history. Whatever else we may be in ignorance of, we may know that ideas are not completely isolated from reality, they are not ego-centric. They are, by rights, in possession of reality, and they possess and participate in a real Other, in something universal and utterly objective. Neither subjectivism, nor naturalism, nor behaviorism can possibly be the last word, if it is intended that they shall be true theories.

Four grounds for rejecting the isolation of mind and of ideas from objective significant structures have been set forth in this chapter. We cannot assent to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum if it is intended to imply that the starting point for all our reflection is consciousness of self but not at all consciousness of reality. One cannot strip away from his ideas all objective reference, all apprehension of an Other and yet say, significantly, that he still possesses at least his own ideas. He does not know them as his own ideas unless he is able to contrast them with what is real, with what is not merely his self or a modification of his self. We considered next some implications of the thesis of Berkeley that knowledge consists wholly in reading off the literally present contents of mind which are modifications of the knower's consciousness. To do this, is, we saw, to ignore the radical psychological distinction between "intentional acts" and presentations. The knowledge situation is never a

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single item, a one-dimensional fact, merely a sensation, perception, or idea which is but a mode of the knower's mind as the quality of hardness is a mode of the table upon which I am writing. There is, in the knowledge situation, a quality of distance and of tension, of an intention to mean something which is not a literal possession, in the sense in which a pain or a felt sensation is a presentation immediately before or within the mind. Ideas are not self-contained, they are not, in truth, isolated, nor are they merely "end-terms." They are linked to structures not themselves. They are the vehicles of meanings with which they are not identical. Thirdly, we observed a logical consequence of placing all contents of the mind upon one level, within one class, and viewing them all as ideas of the mind. This is the Lockian tradition. When allowed to work itself out, it obliterates any distinctions of value between the various possessions of the mind. It is a levelling motive. The distinction between true and false, which is a value distinction, disappears just in proportion as the complete meaning of each perception and idea comes to lie in the fact of its being a presentation, something before the mind. For false ideas as well as true ideas are before the mind. But naturalism also, and more profoundly, is the outcome of a similar process. All ideas and loyalties are observed to depend upon and to voice natural matter-of-fact processes. In the light of this common equality of everything within the life of the mind, how may we still hold that there is some real and inherent distinction between the true and the false, the good and the evil? Nevertheless, to obliterate these distinctions is suicidal. Some power of revealing the intrinsic structure of reality must belong to ideas. Most clearly does this come to light when we reflect upon the manifest contradiction which is implied in any naturalistic theory of the mind. These contradictions disclose to us that, after all, ideas are not exclusively the projection and the utterance of particular and contingent natural events. Ideas have the capacity of revealing the truth, because the mind is not isolated from objective significant structures. Ideas, by right, participate in reality. Ideas also are, to be sure, linked to the vital needs and activities of particular organisms and interests. Once more do we come upon our problem. How is it that ideas can, at once, carry on these two functions, point in these two directions?

This is but another way of asking how we may today fuse into one coherent idea system, one plan of life, both the heritage of Platonism and Christianity, and also the deep-lying requirements of the modern age. One confusion, at least, we may learn to avoid. Idealism contains too much of the tradition of Platonism and of Christianity to identify it with a theory of the self-containedness and isolation of ideas. Subjectivism and naturalism, in all of their various forms, these are the philosophies of ideas isolated from significant structures. Idealism is the philosophy of solidarity, of possession, of the mind's knowledge of, and participation in, Reality.

CHAPTER VII

IDEALISM AND THE AUTONOMY OF VALUES

THE question as to the existence of objective significant structures, of real values, in which the mind of man may participate, is our central problem. The naturalism and subjectivism of modern thought have expressed in the language of theory those formative and practical forces which have fashioned the characteristic institutions and habits of life in modern, west-European and American culture. Through the cumulative impact of these moving forces the direction of men's interests and attitudes has profoundly altered. The mind looks backward to needs, interests, and desires rather than forward to "The Idea of the Good." Ideas are servants of the will to live; science and knowledge exist in order to yield power, to be useful instruments in the satisfaction of human wants. Not contemplation and possession of Ideas, values, or significant structures for their own sake, but creative activity, control, the fruition of impulse and of instinct, express our interests and our world. The last chapter considered some reasons for being dissatisfied with any philosophical theories which reject the possibility of the mind's appropriation and knowledge of objective significant structures. We are henceforth committed to a philosophy which does provide for such a possibility and which is, for that reason if one chooses, utterly "realistic." We are, in the present chapter, to inquire further and more constructively into the meaning of the assertion that significant structures are objectively real. But we must also attempt to interpret this thesis in such a manner as to provide a rightful place for all of those important motives and attitudes which do characterize the modern age. We cannot and we would not go back to Platonism or to the

medieval idea systems, discrediting completely the modern ideals. Our task, both theoretical and practical, both that of the organization of ideas and the organization of life, is to knit together into one coherent and living structure the attitudes and the philosophies of possession and of activity, of participation in significant structures and the achievement of desire. I know of no other term in philosophy which may express more adequately the resulting synthesis than the term "idealism." This chapter will seek to set forth, then, the fundamental principles of constructive idealism.

It is the problem of values, once more, with which we begin. There are two regions in particular which offer an opportunity to observe the fact and significance of what shall here be spoken of as the autonomy of values. They are Ethics, and the problem of knowledge. In each of these regions certain values are at stake, and we shall observe throughout a common interest which some familiar and important concepts have in maintaining the autonomy of values. We shall also observe that we cannot pause with the autonomy of values, but are confronted at once with problems of reality and of mind. What is meant, then, by the "autonomy of values"? An autonomous value is one whose validity or whose worthfulness does not depend upon the mere existence of any fact or situation whatever. No matter what the real world may contain, irrespective of the fortune of events in space and time, certain ideals shall remain significant and valid. Whoever says this is viewing such ideals as if they stood entirely upon their own feet, so far at least as their value is concerned. They are autonomous ideals. Their worth is intrinsic, their own possession, and is not borrowed from any prior existing situation. Now there have been weighty doctrines and theories of Ethics in which the Good and the Right have in no way been thought of as autonomous. In such theories, the content and meaning of the Good and the rightfulness of that which ought to be done is the resultant of some actual fact. Thus, the Good and the Right have been thought of as dependent upon the matter-offact decrees and dictates of an actual sovereign, of God, or of the civil power. One would then be unable to know what is good or right, what he *ought* to do, without first being informed as to what is. Or, the prior reality which determines the worth of ideals and values

could be viewed simply as nature, or as the tendencies of the evolutionary process, or as the wishes of the majority. Mr. G. E. Moore, who has set forth with such thoroughness the various forms of ethical heteronomy, i.e., the refusal to regard the Good as autonomous, has spoken of the metaphysical and the naturalistic fallacies. The Stoic ethics is an instance of the metaphysical fallacy. Goodness, for the Stoic, lies in conformity and willing obedience to nature or the world-reason which dwells within Nature. One may seriously question, I believe, the complete absence of idealism, of the autonomy of the Good, in the Stoic doctrines. Something of the Platonic teaching entered into the texture of Stoicism. This would become quite clear if we should turn to the place which the autonomy of values and of the Good has within political thought and the influence of Stoicism there. The most obvious example of the naturalistic fallacy is to be found in certain teachings of evolutionary ethics, such, for instance, as define goodness in terms of the ability and the fact of survival in the struggle for existence. In both types of fallacy, if we may speak from the point of view which would regard them as fallacies, some existing reality is the determinant of the content of the Good, and of the worth of all our ideals and values. The belief that these are indeed fallacies, I share, and for reasons which shall presently be set forth. But first, I would call attention to another type of ethical theory which might seem to provide for the autonomy of the Good, but which will prove, upon analysis, to involve essentially the same type of fallacy. It is fairly obvious, namely, that there is no autonomy in defining my Good merely as obedience to the decrees of God, whatever they may be, or as conformity with the course of nature, or the laws of some great Leviathan, some absolutistic state. And this is obvious because of the evident possibility of conflict between all of these existing facts and forces and my own desires and interests. I may not desire to do what nature or God or the State has decreed. One is, then, easily led to suppose that if the Good were only defined as the object of my desires, such a Good would be wholly autonomous because it is freed from dependence upon outer fact. It appears, indeed, almost axiomatic that, in the words of Hobbes, "whatsoever is the object of any man's Desire, that it is which he for his part calleth Good, and the object of his aversion, Evil." The good

is the desired, and desire measures the content and the meaning of the Good. Or, if the Good is defined as the pleasurable, as that which yields satisfaction, we have a statement which may seem to provide for the autonomy of the Good. Yet reflection may easily uncover doubts and problems. Certainly in one important respect it makes little difference whether the good is defined as that which conforms to an external command, or whether it is defined as that which is the object of desire and which yields feelings of satisfaction. Both desire and pleasure and also the arbitrary decrees of an external sovereign are utterly matter of fact. They are whatever they happen to be; they are existential, particular and contingent. They might, perchance, be otherwise, and this, their contingency, infects the content and meaning of the Good, if the Good is to be thus defined. There can be nothing inherently compelling nor intrinsically valid in a good which borrows its content either from external arbitrary commands, or from psychological events. The same comment is to be made with reference to the definition proffered by the Moral Sense theory, the definition of the Good as the approved. Approval and blame, like desire and pleasure, are also particular psychological events. They are contingent and factual. A good, a value which is literally identical with such matter-of-fact items is not an autonomous value.

So far, it has been largely a matter of definition and negative definition at that. We are to understand by an objective good, an autonomous value, something which is coincident neither with any external matter-of-fact situation or decree, nor with psychological matter of fact, such as desire, pleasure, or feelings of approval. Before giving any reasons for holding that there are genuinely autonomous and objective values, it will not be out of place to indicate briefly something of the larger purport and background of the argument. The life of mind, the contents of our individual minds, point in two directions. Like our sense organs, our minds stand between ourselves and a real environment. Consciousness is the fruition and the instrument of bodily activities and structures, and consciousness also participates in reality. This objective and cognitive reference to and participation in reality characterizes not only our knowledge, but our willing and our loving, our feeling and our

valuing as well. Throughout this chapter we shall have in mind the criticism of the familiar and perhaps prevalent thesis that the value of anything depends entirely upon the fact that it is needed and desired by a living organism. We shall not assent to the statement that the basic situation in our value judgments is either *interest* or feeling. We shall urge that we discover values much as we discover truths, that the values do not depend upon the organization and structure of our matter-of-fact interests, but that they are objective. We wish, in a way, to assimilate our value judgments, the world of morality and of ethics, to our theoretical and our cognitive judgments. So far we shall be, if one chooses, perversely realistic and intellectualistic. Yet we shall also seek to find a place for the (at least) partial truths which the advocates of interest and of desire have so insistently urged upon us.

Let us, then, turn to some questions of Ethics and to the central ethical concept of the Good. And first we may refer to a thesis that is by no means novel, though it has been set forth in a striking way by a number of important recent writers. It is the thesis that one must inevitably, in one's reflection, reach a concept which is ultimate and indefinable in the sense that it endows all subsidiary concepts with their meaning, but that its own meaning is unborrowed and original. Such an ultimate idea is indefinable because we must constantly make use of it in defining derivative and analogous ideas. To "define" this last—or first—idea would thus involve the use of that selfsame idea. Now ever since the teachings of Plato, it has been a recurrent and profound doctrine that the good is such an ultimate and unique concept. This belief in the intrinsic content of the Good, in its unborrowed capacity to endow other concepts with their ethical meaning, is by no means the whole of the Platonic teaching. We shall before long see how this thesis is to be supplemented by another. That the meaning of the good is different from the meaning of the desired or of pleasure is really implied in the statement of the hedonist who desires to equate these concepts. For such a statement as this, that man's happiness and the satisfaction of his desires are man's

¹ Thus Perry: "Assuming that value is a function of what may broadly be termed "interest," etc., "Monist," vol. 27, p. 352. See also his article on "The Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., vol. 11, pp. 141 ff.

good, is certainly regarded even by the hedonist as a significant proposition. It is not intended to be tautologous nor to be a dictionary definition of a mere term. In the words of Russell, "when we are told that the good is the desired, we feel at once that we are being told something of philosophical importance, something which has ethical consequences, something which it is quite beyond the scope of a dictionary to tell us. The reason of this is that we already know what we mean by the good, and what we mean by the desired; and if these two meanings always applied to the same objects, that would not be a verbal definition, but an important truth."2 Of recent writers in Ethics, it is Sidgwick who has impressively revived this doctrine of the inherent wealth of meaning which the good possesses, and which is not simply the equivalent of other concepts drawn from our psychological feeling of pleasure, desire, and interest. And this thesis has been accepted and elaborated by Moore, Rashdall, and Russell. An essentially similar thesis forms the starting point of a monograph of the first importance by Scheler.3

But, suppose it is to be admitted that the good has some residue of meaning over and above the meaning which the desired, the approved, the pleasant, or any other term may possess, and that, in consequence, at least that residual core of meaning is indefinable and unanalyzable. Does this have any bearing upon the theory that the good is something objective, something real which the mind discovers and which the intelligence may apprehend? In the first place, it may be pointed out that the possibility, at least, of such an objective good or value, is thereby provided for. If the good were merely another name for the desired or for feelings of pleasure and satisfaction, then obviously the situation would be altogether one-sided. Desire and feeling, psychological and bodily processes occurring in the organism would alone generate value and the good. These would be but names for such vital or mental processes, and for whatever might exist as their projection or shadow. If, on the other hand, value and the good mean something other than the content of such psychological processes, the entire situation may be more complex. It

² B. Russell: "The Elements of Ethics," in "Philosophical Essays," p. 8.

³ Max Scheler: "Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Werthethik," in Husserl's "Jahrbuch für Philosophie," 1913.

may be a polar situation in which the good is objective, lodged in the environment, and at a distance from the feelings which are the immediate possessions of the organism. Is this, now, more than a possibility? For the beginning of an answer, we may turn to the empirical consideration of the manner in which values enter into our experience. There are, of course, many familiar situations in which an object seems to be valuable solely because someone desires it, strives for it, demands it. The worth of the object appears to be entirely a function, an index, of the intensity of the felt want. Thus we say that pleasure is a good, because men desire it, that economic goods are humanly valuable, because there is a demand and desire for them. But this situation certainly does not exhaust all the possibilities. There are values which we apprehend without desiring them or striving for them, and this type of situation is of the first importance in letting us see what the objectivity of certain values, at least, may mean. In the first place, it may be pointed out that even in the case of objects whose value seems to be a function of their being desired, there is no exact correspondence between the worth we impute to them, and the intensity with which we desire them. We may even cease to desire them and still apprehend them as good. Sidgwick has called attention to this obvious possibility. "A prudent man is accustomed to suppress, with more or less success, desires for what he regards as out of his power to attain by voluntary action—as fine weather, perfect health, great wealth or fame, etc., but any success he may have in diminishing the actual intensity of such desires has no effect in leading him to judge the objects desired less 'good.' " But, of course, such objects are, as a class and in some measure, desired by all men. Consider, then, a much more significant instance. One large class of values there is, whose relation to conscious desire and striving is certainly much less intimate. I refer to esthetic values. And there are here, at least, two remarks to make with reference to the relation between the beautiful and human desires and felt activities. The first is that esthetic values may announce themselves to our experience and may be welcomed and enjoyed as if they entered from without and not as the satisfaction and completion of a previous desire. "When a beautiful landscape

bursts upon us unexpectedly, the enjoyment of it is not diminished by the fact that we were not craving for it beforehand." In such a case we literally discover an objective value. But, one may urge here that men do as a fact normally desire beauty, and that is why the beautiful is good. This desire, so it may be said, exists as a constant demand of our nature even when we are not fully conscious of it. All of which may well be the case, but there is something here akin to a fallacy which will come to light when we turn to our second remark about esthetic values. It is that the central aspect of the esthetic experience is precisely the absence or temporary suspension of desire, of purposive striving, of interest. This has been frequently set forth in its classical form by Kant and by Schopenhauer, and we need not here dwell upon it. The psychological basis of this doctrine lies in a certain contrast and seeming incompatibility between contemplation and desire, clear insight and emotional activity. It is this tension which Spinoza seizes upon so profoundly in his doctrine of the manner in which man is to obtain freedom from the bondage of the emotions. It is another aspect of this same tension which Buddhism has used in its doctrine of the way to salvation from desire and the sorrows which inevitably accompany the vain striving of desire to find satisfaction. Now these motives and teachings are familiar ones. They are deep-seated and persistent in the history of ideas. Their evident purport is to stress a region of human experience which is other than that of desire and interest, different from the craving and demand rooted in bodily and mental tensions and activities. Yet this region, although so sharply contrasted with all desire, is one where certain values are believed to make their appearance. Such values are thought to be quite inaccessible as long as the striving and activity of desire dominate the field of consciousness. But there is a seeming difficulty and paradox here. Kant asserts that the esthetic judgment is one which is entirely lacking in "interest." One may then ask Kant whether there is any "interest" in the beauty which the esthetic judgment pronounces an object to possess. Or, still clearer, Schopenhauer certainly holds that in the esthetic contemplation of beauty, all desires are, for the time, in abeyance. One may then ask Schopenhauer whether, knowing the evil of all desire, and knowing

⁵ Rashdall: "The Theory of Good and Evil," vol. 1, p. 18.

the possibility of release from desire which contemplation yields, one will not desire to contemplate beauty, and desire not to have any desires. Just so, one may ask the Buddhist how he can desire to uproot all desires, if all desires are sources of sorrow. Does not the paradox reveal after all the truth of the insight that one cannot escape desire and activity, and that the value of that which seems so to be opposed to desire lies in the fact that it, too, is desired,—desired, it may be, by a craving of a different order? I do not think that this is the lesson of the paradox. For, it is agreed that, at the very least, there are two levels or grades of "desire" which are here in question. There is the desire for wealth and fame, let us say, and then there is the desire for the possession of that beauty which will suspend the desires for wealth and fame. But does not the difference between these two types of "desire" lie just in this, that in the one case the valued object is only or chiefly a projection of the felt desire, whereas in the other case the "desire" is aroused by a belief in the intrinsic and objective value of the object? Only some such account of the difference can justify, it seems to me, that profound and persistent tendency to observe a deep distinction, a radical tension, between the energies of desire and activity, and the contemplative insight and apprehension which yield the possession of some objective and intrinsic good.

Not only does the contemplation of the beautiful yield an apprehension and possession of a good which is not founded upon desire, but the same thing is to be pointed out in another region. I refer to the contrast between desire or striving, and love, and to the undoubted existence of an attitude of loving in which striving and desire are not present. There is a disinterested and contemplative aspect of loving which places it within another psychological category than that of desire. Devotion, loyalty, worship are, on the whole, non-pragmatic attitudes. They are experiences and attitudes in which the object of devotion is not viewed as any instrument to be used in the furtherance of life activities, or in the adjustment of the organism to its environment. In love, it is the environment, the person loved, the ideal object in which the attitude of affection and loyalty terminates, that constitutes, as it were, the center of gravity of the act of loving. The environment does not exist in order that

that desire may be satisfied and interest fulfilled. Once more, the situation is a polar one; there is a realm of objective values, a real order in which dwell the objects, significant structures, which are worthy of affection and of loyalty, and it is toward this objective focus that the energies of the lover's mind and interests are concentrated.⁶

Thus are we justified in stressing the objective status of values whose prior existence and whose nature make them worthy objects of recognition, knowledge, and love. Here is, indeed, a region and an experience not easily to be subsumed under the pragmatic rubric of adaptation, of behavior, of instrumental efficiency, and of the outgoing striving of an organism to maintain its existence against an environment which it seeks to master and to control. We shall not at this place develop the theme any further. The full measure of its significance comes to light only when we undertake to scrutinize and to appraise the true nature of our human social interests, the life of religion, and the central doctrines of idealism.

But the thesis that values are objective, that they are fit objects of discovery, of contemplation, and of worship and love comes into sharper relief if we compare it with another doctrine with which it is not seldom confused. That such terms as pleasure and satisfaction are abstract, and that there exist in reality various concrete pleasures, rather than a single blanket pleasure, is something of a commonplace of ethical criticism. It is possible to arrange pleasures in various series. One such series is deserving of notice here. Consider, then, a series of types of pleasure where one starts, let us say,

⁶ Cf. the following quotation from Laberthonnière: "Essais de Philosophie Religieuse," p. 68. "Mais l'amour, on ne le remarque pas assez, n'a rien de commun avec le désir. Par le désir on cherche à transformer ce qu'on désire en soi-même. Par l'amour on se transforme en ce qu'on aime. L'amour n'est pas une prise de possession, c'est le don de soi. . . . Ce qu'on désire on le traite comme une chose, on le considère comme un moyen; se qu'on aime on le traite comme un être, on le considère comme une fin." The essays of Pfänder: Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen, and of Scheler: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, in Husserl's "Jahrbuch für Philosophie" are particularly worthy of mention. Cf. the following from Pfänder: "Aber dieses Streben, dieses Moment des unbefriedigten Drängens kann allmählich verschwinden, und trotzdem kann dann die aktuelle Gesinnung der Liebe unvermindet vorhanden bleiben: Es gibt eben strebungslose, in ihrem Gegenstand befriedigt ruhende Liebe, Zuneigung und Freundlichkeit." p. 351.

with a very brief, momentary thrill of pleasure feeling. The animal order, no doubt, far lower than man, exhibits such fleeting moments of enjoyment. They may leave behind them little or nothing in the way of altered disposition or memory. Now, from this as a lower limit, one may ascend through types of pleasure which exhibit an increasing stability, permanence, and coherent solidity. "Happiness," no doubt, belongs further along in such a series than does "pleasure." Happiness certainly connotes greater stability and permanence than pleasure does; it signifies an enduring disposition or attitude rather than a momentary, felt experience. And there are, of course, varying degrees of permanence and of solidity in concrete instances of happiness and of satisfaction. Some are more enduring than others, some bring into play deeper or more ideal levels and interests of the self than do others. All of this is, of course, perfectly familiar and commonplace. But here is surely a problem. What, we may inquire, is the upper limit of this series? Is the series simply one in which nothing is involved save differences in the duration, in the depth, in the solidity of what is restricted wholly to the self? Is the series one in which the dominant theme is the overcoming of the isolation and particularity of impulse, through the emergence of selfconsciousness, and the idea of a self which is different from any mere sum of its feelings and its experiences? It is thus, for instance, that Green has so impressively set forth the relation and the contrast between the pleasure which constitutes the satisfaction of an impulse, and the well-being which is the satisfaction of the entire self. "The objects of a man's various desires," says Green, "form a system, connected by memory and anticipation, in which each is qualified by the rest; and just as the object of what we reckon a single desire derives its unity from the unity of the self-presenting consciousness in and for which alone it exists, so the system of a man's desires has its bond of union in the single subject, which always carries with it the consciousness of objects that have been and may be desired into the consciousness of the object which at present is being desired. . . . It is thus equally important to bear in mind that there is a real unity in all a man's desires, a common ground of them all, and that this real unity or common ground is simply the man's self, as conscious of itself and consciously seeking

in the satisfaction of desires the satisfaction of self." In this interpretation of the series in question, the upper limit is the complete realization of those desires and capacities which belong to the real and the eternal self, to that spiritual principle which is the source of all order, coherence, and stability. But, let it be noted, the ultimate good is here defined entirely in terms of the self and its activities. Throughout, "the common characteristic of the good is that it satisfies some desire." The position of any particular pleasure or satisfaction in the series depends solely upon the area and the coherence of the activities of the self which finds satisfaction. There is another interpretation of such a series which offers, at least, a possible hypothesis, and which is worth considering. It is the hypothesis that as one approaches the upper limit of this series of satisfactions, the self is more and more participating in an objective order, an environing reality which constitutes the good. To experience satisfactions which belong to the upper reaches of our series is to explore and to discover wider ranges of values which reside within that real, objective order. The series runs not merely from momentary thrill of pleasure to enduring satisfaction, but from happiness and satisfaction as immediate experiences of the self to the knowledge and possession of the good, to participation in the life and the interests of a real community. Here also does the self live in an environment; it is linked to reality and it participates in a world of reality. And here, too, is seen once more the necessity of recognizing the possibility of apprehending and possessing values, as an experience which is not simply an outgrowth of the realization of conation and desire.9

Did we accept this hypothesis, we could then interpret the life of goodness and morality as the recognition of the objective values which the real world contains. The good man is he who lives within

⁷ "Prolegomena to Ethics," pp. 150-151.

⁸ Ibid., p. 201.

⁹ Cf. the following sentence from Scheler, p. 498: "Gerade im ruhigen Fühlen und dem vollen* gefühlsmässigen Besitzen eines positiv wertvollen Gutes ist sogar der reinste Fall der 'Befriedigung' gegeben, d. h. da, wo alles 'Streben' schweight; auch muss nicht notwendig ein Streben vorhergegangen sein damit Befriedigung eintrete." Mention may also be made of Rashdall's, "Is Conscience an Emotion," especially the final chapter entitled Value or Satisfaction.

a larger world; he participates in wider ranges of reality, he has discovered and appropriated values which simply do not enter into the life and experience of those who are less "good." This is the Socratic thesis that virtue is insight, knowledge. No doubt there are varying degrees of the warmth and intimacy with which real values may be apprehended, and it is only when the mind's participation in the Good is intimate and vivid that the will is set in motion. Nevertheless the response of the will is to significant structures and to an objective good in which the mind does participate. Speaking of Iago and the idea that he is a man "of supreme intellect who is at the same time supremely wicked," Professor Bradley bids us "perceive how miserably close is his intellectual horizon; that such a thing as a thought beyond the reaches of his soul has never come near him; that he is prosaic through and through, deaf and blind to all but a tiny fragment of the meaning of things." 10

But we have still, I believe, to set forth the most convincing and the most significant reason for viewing the objects of our value judgments as, in a real sense, objective, and not merely as reflections and projections of our own desires and interests. And this consideration will also bring to light the actual function which feeling and conation do play in our recognition of values and in our value judgments. For there can, of course, be no doubt that feelings of satisfaction or of pleasure or of outgoing conations are always in evidence whenever we pronounce an object to be good. We have been urging that such an apprehension of worth and, in consequence, the good life itself, is cognitive in its innermost nature. We participate in objective, significant structures, when we discover and appropriate something which is really of value. Such an experience of recognizing and of participating in something objective may be akin to desire and striving or contemplation and love. But in any entrance of values into our experience, feeling of some sort is aroused. There is, then, this difference between our theoretical judgments and our value judgments. Both are, or may be, cognitive. But whereas in a theoretical judgment feelings need not be implicated, in our value judgments something in the way of feeling always is involved. It is the detailed analysis of the feelings and emotions

¹⁰ A. C. Bradley: "Shakespearean Tragedy," p. 236.

which are invariably present whenever we approve and disapprove, which constitutes the distinctive achievement of recent social psychology and of anthropology, of the work of McDougall and of Westermarck. It is pointed out that not only of our approvals and disapprovals but of all our activity as well, is some feeling, some emotion, the stimulus and the source. For feeling and emotion, when used in a large sense, are thought of as concomitants and functions of instinct. Instinctive behavior and a distinct complex of feelings and emotions are invariably linked together. These lie at the basis not only of our value judgments but of our entire practical behavior. "Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clock work whose main spring had been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will."11

We yield a hearty assent to the thesis that emotion and feeling, desire and interest, play an indispensable rôle in our value judgments. We shall, however, bring to bear upon this thesis the distinction which has already met our attention and which will here prove to be of decisive importance. It is the distinction between stimulus and object. And what we shall proceed to maintain is that feeling is both the necessary stimulus and the vehicle of our value judgments, but neither their object nor, in a certain sense, their source. In order to set forth the larger implications and background of this thesis, we may correlate it with another thesis, which is to be dealt with in the following chapter. We shall there maintain the view that, with reference to the relation between knowledge and behavior, the mind and the brain, our knowledge is not an instrument of our behavior, nor is it generated by behavior, but that there is nevertheless a functional correspondence between knowledge and behavior. Or, if we are to speak of mind and brain, we shall point out that here, too, processes occurring within the brain (a matter of bodily behavior) have a great deal to do with the contents of

¹¹ McDougall: "Social Psychology," p. 44.

our consciousness (a matter of knowledge). But it by no means follows that brain processes generate consciousness, or that bodily behavior is literally identical with what we have traditionally spoken of as consciousness. The mutual correlation between brain processes and states of consciousness, or between behavior and knowledge, is equally compatible with another hypothesis, the hypothesis, namely, that the brain is an organ of selection and not of creation (of consciousness), that there is no access to my mind save though my brain, and that what my brain is now doing and how my body is now behaving determine what is going on in my mind and what I am now attentive to and what I know. But these latter are determined only in the sense that they are selected, not in the sense that they are thus generated. Brain process and bodily behavior are the necessary vehicle through which the stimulus must pass, but they are not thereby the proper objects of the mind's knowledge or attention. Likewise, here, we shall agree that the only avenue through which the good may enter into our experience is the avenue of feeling and desire, but here also it by no means follows that feeling and desire create the idea of the good, nor does it follow that our value judgments have no true object other than the feeling which generates them or that which is the shadowy projection of our own desires.

A passage from Hume will furnish us here with our point of departure. "But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact (i.e., objective) whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Willful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature,

you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are

not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind."12

Is it not clear that this passage exhibits a failure to discriminate between the object of our moral disapproval, and the stimulus, i.e., the moving force, the emotion, which does excite the moral judgment? And is it not also clear that this is quite on a par with the similar confusion in our theoretical judgments, in the region of sense perception and our knowledge of reality, which leads there to immediacy and to subjective idealism? Let us briefly review the nature of that confusion, and observe the analogy between the two situations. I perceive yonder tree. Obviously the reason which leads me to make this judgment, and the inciting cause of my knowledge is the fact that I actually have in my conscious experience a complex of sensations and feelings of attention, etc., which in their totality the psychologist calls a perception. Or, if we chose to describe the inciting cause, the stimulus, of my knowledge that yonder is a tree, in physical and physiological terms, we point, of course, to the excitement of the retina by light waves and the propagation of that excitement along sensory nerves to the brain. But neither the conscious perception, nor the brain process, is the object of our knowledge, the thing perceived. They are, rather, the stimulus, the vehicle, of our knowledge. Yet it is unquestionably true that the persistent confusion between object and stimulus is, in the last analysis, the chief source of subjectivism. If it be asked by what right we insist upon distinguishing them, the answer, I conceive, might be somewhat as follows. There are certainly some instances of knowledge in which object and stimulus cannot possibly coincide. They cannot coincide whenever something inert, abstract, remote, or non-existent is the object of our knowledge. Whoever makes an assertion about a past event is speaking of something which simply cannot be the inciting cause, the stimulus of his assertion and his knowledge. A past event no longer exists, it has lost its efficaciousness and its capacity to act as a stimulus. A "pure" instrumentalist or behaviorist will care nothing for the past, because the past as

such can never be a stimulus to which the behavior of the organism must respond. It accords wholly with this when Dewey remarks that "to isolate the past, dwelling upon it for its own sake and giving it the eulogistic name of knowledge, is to substitute the reminiscence of old age for effective intelligence." But if the past is in no way "practically" efficacious, unable to act as a stimulus, no more so, it would appear, can the future be. At the present moment the future seems to be as non-existent as the past and of course whatever literally incites and calls into existence knowledge must itself exist. And the same must hold good of abstract and ideal objects, of assumptions, of non-physical relationships, of universals, unless indeed we are willing to ally ourselves unreservedly with the extreme tradition of nominalism and affirm that all such supposed objects of knowledge are mere names, mere "sounds of the voice." And yet, that all of these are mere names is itself something of an abstract, ideal and universal proposition which can hardly be as efficacious a stimulus to bodily behavior as, say, a blow upon the head. And certainly the non-existent, the class which contains no members, is an important object of our knowledge. Negative propositions, and indeed universal propositions, affirming as they do the non-existence of some portion of the universe of discourse, enter into every region of our knowledge. They are inescapable. To doubt and question them and to deny them is not possible save as we affirm and imply at least some universal and ideal relations which cannot possibly coalesce with items which are fit to serve as literal stimuli. The conclusion is inevitable, then, that there are at least some objects of knowledge which are not stimuli inciting in our minds the existence of that knowledge. This conclusion would, I think, lead one to wonder whether in the case of present physical objects which do act as a stimulus to our sense organs and our reflex arc structures, that aspect of the thing which is the stimulus is also the object of our knowledge. It is demonstrable, I believe, that the object of knowledge is always something more complex and more ideal than any mere here-and-now item which is the stimulus either of our behavior or of our knowledge. Plato's "Theaetetus,"

¹³ In "Creative Intelligence," p. 14.

Spinoza's "Ethics" and Hegel's "Phenomenology" furnish a sufficient demonstration of this thesis.

Let us come back now to our value judgments, our approvals and disapprovals, our desires and our strivings. There is that within our experience which is ultimately rooted in our instincts, something of the nature of feeling and emotion, which is indeed invariably present in all such practical attitudes. The Moral Sense theories of the eighteenth century, best represented by Hume, were utterly right in insisting as against the rigid intellectuals, upon this outstanding circumstance. The social and the anthropological, above all, the evolutionary aspect of the moral sense, of the emotional feelings of blame and praise, liking and disliking, desire and aversion, they could, of course, not adequately have seen. But having discovered this region of feeling, they err in supposing that it is the real object of our moral praise and blame, in inferring that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." They commit essentially the same fallacy as those who infer that the pleasure, the felt satisfaction, through which the object of desire, the good, announces itself to our experience, is itself the object of our interest and our desire. The Moral Sense writers had succeeded. for the most part, in breaking with the fallacy of psychological hedonism. They confused, however, the feeling of approval with the object of approval. They had not been schooled in the Platonic and idealistic-tradition which bids us see in the felt immediacies of experience, the vehicles and the illustrations of the true objects of our knowledge and our love, the realm of Ideas culminating in the Idea of the Good.

Our conclusion, then, is that the feelings of 'moral sense' are the representatives within experience of those moral qualities which constitute the objects of our ethical judgments. Such feelings are also the inciting stimuli of these judgments. These feelings have very much the same relations to the objective region of the good, that our perceptions, as conscious contents, have to the objects which they intend and mean. Such feelings, when they are the stimuli of our judgments, possess just that *act* character, that

quality of intending something other than themselves upon which an earlier chapter has laid stress. Feeling, as such, is not necessarily debarred from being cognitive in its nature; it too may and does, in certain of its reaches, participate in that which is real.

Thus far we have been concerned with setting forth some reasons for holding that values possess objectivity, and that they need not be shadowy projections of, or mere names for, feeling and desires. But, to halt the argument here would be to leave values suspended in a void. One comes away, I think, from the study of many writers who defend the undefinable and objective nature of the good, with a feeling that it is all abstract and remote. After all, the hedonists and the nominalists and the Moral Sense writers have had before them the actual stuff of experience as it is lived. Better that, one says, than a ghostly and shadowy good, a realm of values distinct from the felt immediacies of life. But is it a fair and an exhaustive alternative, to bid us choose between the definition of the good in terms of pleasure or of desire, and the realism of Russell and of Moore? I shall contend that it is not, and that there is still another possibility. That possibility I shall now outline briefly, leaving to our later chapters the task of filling it in and giving it thickness and concreteness. What we are now to set forth, together with its implications, constitutes as well the heart of idealism in the proper sense of that term. We shall here state two theses which supplement each other and which are, in principle, applicable to the entire range of the mind's recognition of values. We shall be dealing then not only with the values which accrue to goodness but to knowledge as well.

The first thesis is a statement of what lies at the basis of the views which we have been criticizing throughout, and especially in this chapter. Experience is indeed through and through pervaded by activity, by choice and discrimination, desire and striving. Experience is no mere presence in the mind of certain contents of consciousness; it everywhere exhibits conation and activity. We wish then to lay stress upon this aspect of our life and our experience which theories of voluntarism and instrumentalism seize upon in varying fashion and make central in their psychology, ethics, and

metaphysics. Let us at once observe how many provinces of our life there are which exhibit such activity and conation, the unwillingness merely to accept our world as a given data, but the desire to fashion it and control it to some purpose. Let us view these varying provinces as illustrations of the following thesis: The mind endlessly strives to reconstruct its world, so that its world may be greeted as, in some sense, a reflection of itself, an answer to its questions, an expression of its meanings and purposes. Only in an order which does thus respond to its own requirements is the mind willing to acquiesce.

First, then, there is democracy, not as a bare form of government, but as a spiritual impulse bidding man not to content himself with any political order imposed upon him, but actively to construct that order so that it does respond to his own nature. Only such an order is one fit for man to live in. But, secondly, may we not see in the very nature of our social experience and our recognition of our fellow men an illustration and a confirmation of this thesis? Our social environment is no bare complex of facts, of neutral entities thrust upon us willy-nilly, for our compulsory acceptance. Recognition, sympathy, mutual response and understanding, these are none of them terms which can apply merely to what we find, to what confronts us, with complete indifference as to its inner nature. We learn, indeed, the meaning of these terms in our social experience where soul greets soul and recognizes a genuine Other, sharing with himself common interests and a common nature.

And, thirdly, what of external nature? Are we willing to avow that really to know her is merely to classify our perceptual experiences and to describe the regularity of their sequences? If so, we completely shut ourselves off from two significant interests, and it is well that we should realize the possibility of such loss. We would, in the first place, cut ourselves off from all those deeper experiences of our race, expressed in its art and its poetry, its mythology and its religion, and which find in nature that which responds to some of the persistent needs of the human spirit, and which lets us view our relations to nature in essentially social terms. And we would, in the second place, remove from us the exact sciences which seek to discover in nature the embodiment and the illustration of law

and order, of reason and thought. For, be it noted, neither the hidden meaning which nature reveals to the poet's imagination and insight, nor the precise mathematical relationships which she reveals to the physicist are facts which confront us and which we literally find. We search for them, and finding them, we acquiesce and delight in them, we recognize them as real because, in the last analysis, they greet us as the embodiments of our own meanings, and with them and with the nature which is built up around them, we may and we do have fellowship.

Fourthly, there may be cited the wide range of facts and situations which arise from the basic principle that wherever there is a living structure, there is an interest which seeks to sustain itself over against its world. Introduce an organism into any world and at once the objects in that world are dichotomized. Some objects there are which belong to the animal's actual environment and which are reckoned with and responded to by the organism. All other objects simply do not enter into the real environment of the organism. And, too, out of the objects which are practically recognized and reckoned with, the organism is constantly discriminating some which are particularly important, as food, enemies, etc. These are commonplaces of biology and, since James at any rate, of psychology. For the mind selects and discriminates no less than does the bodily organism. And in its very selection, its attention, it makes over the raw material of sensations into the more or less coherent and familiar objects of perception. Again, of course, these are commonplaces of psychology. They deserve, however, to find a place here in the summary list of ways in which the active and transforming life of the mind manifests itself. It is but an extension of this basic biological fact that any living structure has, or better, is, an organized mass of interests which it strives to assert and to sustain, and it is only a development of this fact which leads to the theories which have been before us throughout our discussion. Impulse, instinct, and desire are but so many channels through which the interests and the life of organisms do maintain themselves. Why not, then, say that value everywhere is but the satisfaction which accrues to the organism in the maintenance of its interests and in

the successful pursuit of its desires? Our second thesis will complete

our reply to this question.

Meanwhile, and finally, there is that in the philosophy of Kant which I would cite here and place alongside of these various instances of the activity of the mind or the self. Kant is the first philosopher definitely to break with the "copy theory" of knowledge. What this signifies is that, for Kant, knowledge is something profoundly different from that which it was in the entire previous tradition of philosophy, going back to Plato and Aristotle. For Kant, the mind is no longer a mirror of reality; it is rather a region in which there occurs an endless activity, a process of reconstruction and arrangement in which certain data are *ordered* in accordance with certain norms or standards. The object of knowledge, for science and for practical life, is the rule or principle which determines *how* the manifold of sensation ought to be set in order.¹⁴

When you generalize this insight you will have nothing less than a philosophical statement of what the modern man, vastly more than the medieval or the Greek, has actually undertaken to do. He has been unwilling to accept his world as something given. He seeks everywhere to organize, control, and fashion it. This is autonomy, and this is democracy as well. This is why Kant is so preeminently the philosopher of the modern age. Because he happens not to use the language of biology, because he is dealing not with the behavior of the physical organism as it seeks to use its environment in the maintenance of its interests, but with the activity of the self, as it seeks to fashion its world, in knowledge, in history and society, in art and in religion,—all of this is no reason for counting him oldfashioned and reactionary or a mere bypath in the development of modern thought. I propose to call this entire motive, some of whose forms we have been so hastily viewing, the Kantian element in our experience. The thesis that the self seeks to order and to interpret its world so as to find therein that which responds to its own nature and interests, we shall call the Kantian thesis in the structure of idealism. It is this insight which is indeed hinted at, but falsified and blurred in the Berkeleyan doctrine that "to be real means to be

¹⁴ The briefest and most convincing statement of this interpretation of the significance of Kant's theory of knowledge is the Essay on Kant in Windelband's "Präludien."

perceived." But there is another insight which enters into the fabric of idealism. It is an insight which, in our life and our practice, our social structures and our interests, seems almost forgotten. I shall call it the Platonic insight and thesis. If the Kantian insight sums up a world of activity and of democracy, that of Plato connotes stability, possession, certainty. Let us here state the thesis simply as an hypothesis, and as an hypothesis which is to interpret and to render intelligible what we have just been describing, i.e., the mind's activity upon and reconstruction of the data presented by experience. This activity, whether stated in terms of democracy, or of the exact sciences, of individual and national expansion and selfconsciousness, of voluntarism and behaviorism, of release of desire and instinct or of the primacy of the will,-in whatever language it is set forth, it is the outstanding characteristic of the modern age when compared with the medieval world or with antiquity. Let us frankly accept it, but let us ask the question, what makes it possible, what shall interpret it, what shall make it intelligible? And, in asking this question, let us by all means keep in mind the very wide range of activity which is here in question. It is not only the behavior of the bodily organism, but the deeds of active selves and communities in history and in civilization which furnish us with our problem; most of the deposits left behind by the mind's activity are such as wholly to escape the observations of the biologist and the behaviorist. The hypothesis, then, is this: Unless the mind were really in possession of something final and real, unless the knowledge of that which might serve it as a norm and a reality belonged intrinsically to its own nature, nothing of that persistent activity of the mind and of selves which the life of reason exhibits, would, as a matter of fact and of history, exist. Were there no unoriginated knowledge, the possession of which is a function of intelligence itself, the "mind" would be solely the deposit and the echo of prior matter-of-fact processes; there would be no knowledge at all, and no autonomous values. And there would be no such striving of the mind to build up, to verify and to greet, in experience and in nature, an order which responds to its own life and its own interests. This, then, is our hypothesis. We have called it the Platonic insight, and it is certainly a half of the tradition of idealism, if this term is to be used with any historic justice.

We may conclude this chapter by presenting, in outline, a very formal argument which may indicate something of the meaning of this Platonic thesis, and which shall relate it to our question of the objectivity of values. An earlier chapter, in criticizing the Berkeleyan thesis, set forth a number of grounds for asserting that there is a difference between being immediately experienced and being known to be real. It follows that the mind which knows that something is real or, in other words, the mind which really knows, must possess some knowledge of reality, must know what "to be real" means, and that this knowledge cannot itself be derived from experience. Or, stating it in other words, experienced objects announce themselves to the mind. They need no introduction and no credentials in order to pass for experienced entities. Not so with real entities. They cannot simply announce themselves precisely because only some "I am here" of present experience can announce itself, and present experience simply is not the same as object known to be real. And once more, this judgment which has reality for its object, this acquaintance with the nature of reality, cannot by any possible device, be regarded as the fruit of experience. For just that experience must have been trusted as something real, or capable of yielding a knowledge of reality, and this in turn implies a prior knowledge of what "to be real" means. As an illustration of this situation I shall cite what Royce has called the Religious Paradox, or the Paradox of Revelation. It has, however, as he well insists, a very universal meaning for the life of reason and of knowledge everywhere. One of the early problems which theology had to face was that of the relation between knowledge given by revelation, and such other knowledge, if any, which the human mind possessed in its own right, or at least independently of any revelation. The problem is one which is analogous to the problem concerning the relation between knowledge conveyed by experience, and such other knowledge, if any, which the mind may possess in its own right, or at least independently of experience. Now in the case of revelation it became apparent to the clearest minded of the Christian theologians that revelation is not, by itself, sufficient to account for, or to justify such knowledge as was commonly ascribed to it. I do not refer to the fact that these theologians recognized that experience and reason, could, of themselves, furnish

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the mind with some truths, and hence admitted them alongside of revelation as sources of real knowledge. The problem lies deeper than that. It lies in the fact that merely having a revelation, as so much present experience, is not identical with the knowledge that that revelation is from God, and is therefore valid. Of any supposed revelation, I can always ask, by what marks do I recognize that this is a valid revelation, that it is genuinely from God? I must know what a valid revelation, i.e., one from God, would be like, before I can know that any actual experience really is a valid revelation, and that knowledge cannot possibly have been gained through revelation, because the same question would recur concerning its validity, and so on for each prior revelation. No, in the language of Professor Royce, the mind must first know God's autograph, before it can know that a revelation is valid, and that knowledge cannot have been gained through revelation. "Every acceptance of a revelation depends upon something that, in the individual's mind, must be prior to this acceptance."15 One sees here that the whole point lies in observing the difference between having a revelation, as so much content of consciousness in one's mind, and knowing that it is a true, a valid, revelation. Substitute in this illustration the word "experience," for the word "revelation," and you have precisely the situation which genuine idealism has seen and whose lesson it has sought to learn.

A precisely analogous statement is to be made in the region of Ethics, and in relation to the mind's knowledge of the good. In the world of conduct, that which corresponds to immediacy, to experience in the world of knowledge, is desire. Desire, felt activity, want, these are all experienced feelings. Is there any difference between that which is good, and that which is desired? Or, to call anything good, is not that simply a name for the experienced fact that I, either my apparent or my true self, desire something? Now idealism in Ethics, or what is often called the self-realization theory, has usually been supposed to say just this, to say with Hume, that actions are good because we approve of them, and we do not approve of them because they are good. Only, idealism has insisted that it must be the real, the standard self which does the approving. If such idealism had only said that it must be the good self which does the approving,

^{15 &}quot;The Sources of Religious Insight," p. 23.

it would have seen the circularity of its statement. The fact is, once more, there is a difference between psychological, experienced desire, and the recognition that the object of desire is good. And, unless the mind knows what "good" means, independently of desire, it cannot say that an experienced desire is or is not good, just as the mind cannot say that an experience is real unless it first knows what reality is, and just as no revelation can be a real revelation, unless the mind first knows the essential characteristics of a valid revelation.

This Platonic insight, then, claims for the life of Reason an ultimate and indisputable metaphysical possession. There is here, I am convinced, a veritable ontological argument for the mind's knowledge of reality which no criticism can dislodge. For criticism of arguments, like the criticism of experience as real or unreal, itself presupposes something on which it stands, some prior acquaintance with Reality. The Platonic principle thus expresses a sense of givenness, of living and knowing in a world not empty, not devoid of all but our own activity. There is a greeting of Reality in our knowledge and our living, our desiring and our striving, not any mere acquiescence in the data of experience. This Platonic insight is to be seized upon, made concrete, and put to work in our modern thought and life. For, in the end, we must learn that a reality defined wholly in terms of creative activity, in terms of the release of impulse and the satisfaction of desire, is empty and hollow. A world which is only the setting for our own activity, whether wayward and capricious as conceived by romanticism, or stern and heroic such as a Fichte demanded, is no real world. All significant activity presupposes a real world to seize upon, to interpret, to participate in and to make one's own. Yet, if we only retain such a Platonic motive, uncorrected by the cumulative experiences and needs of the modern world, how inadequately will we define that reality, the contemplation and knowledge of which is the inherent nature of intelligence. If we neglect our first thesis, we will do as the more reflective and profound realisms have done, define reality not in terms of experience, but in terms of universals, having being or validity, and wholly independent of our activity and our knowing. Such realisms have sprung up as an inevitable and salutary correction of the romanticisms, the pseudo-idealisms and the philosophies of sheer activity, which modern thought,

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especially in the last century, has witnessed. Our first thesis, the Kantian ingredient of idealism, tells us that neither reality nor experience is merely enjoyed and contemplated from a distance. It tells us that reason, that mind, is not an empty spectator of truths and entities, the locus in which things happen to get known together. It points out that experience is not merely a possession, but is an activity, a searching for self-completion and self-possession. It points out that if the world of history, of the partial achievement of knowledge, of justice, of social, moral, and religious ends,—that if this world is real and significant, it can only be because these various things fulfill the wants and express the interests of minds. Minds do not merely survey the on-goings of history; they make history, and in so doing they live their own lives.

Thus it is that each of these two principles is necessary. The real world is both that which we find and appropriate, which environs us and our activity, but the real world is *also*, not something whose nature it is just to be independent of our activity and our experience. It is continuous with our ways of knowing, it expresses meanings which we understand because they are ours. Not otherwise could our world possess meaning, or intelligibility, or reality. But this is all, as yet, utterly formal and abstract. It need not remain so, however, and our remaining chapters will be devoted to a study of certain regions in which the fusion of these two insights and doctrines is

definite and concrete.



CHAPTER VIII

KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOR, MIND AND BODY

HE view, briefly stated in the preceding chapter, that the mind does possess in its own right a knowledge of reality, that such participation in an objective, significant order is a function of its own nature, this view is not as strange as may at first appear. One reason why it may strike us as paradoxical is that we have accustomed ourselves to accept uncritically a certain assumption. Whenever we confront anything complex, anything which exists "high up" or far along in an evolutionary series, we tend to suppose that all of the properties and functions which attach to the complex structure as a whole must be themselves derivative, compounded of the properties and functions of more elementary units, and, in a sense, artificial and unreal. Thus it is that we say, since the sense of duty and obligation is something which does manifestly have a history, since it is built up on the basis of a more elementary susceptibility to pleasure and pain, that therefore all of its characteristics, over and above its pleasure-pain aspects, are problematic and derived. None of the distinctive qualities of conscience as such, so we suppose, can be unique, belonging to conscience itself rather than to the earlier and more elementary things which preceded conscience. It is as if one should say that since calculus must be preceded by algebra and analytic geometry or some more elementary mathematics, therefore calculus cannot possess any characteristics which belong uniquely to it and are not merely further prolongations and elaborations of the concepts and truths which belong to arithmetic. We might speak of the fallacy here in question as the fallacy of undue simplification. And this fallacy has one consequence to which attention may here be called.

Under the influence of this fallacy, we are constantly led to suppose that exercise of the characteristic functions of any entity is the problem to be explained, while a lapse from or a cessation of such normal functions is the expected thing and requires no explanation. An illustration from another field will make this clearer, and I take the illustration from a scientist who surely suffers from no bias in the direction of mysticism or idealism. We constantly tend to think and to speak as if the life of organisms were the mysterious thing, the thing requiring explanation, and as if the death of organisms were the natural and the expected thing. It is with reference to this prejudice that Loeb writes (and I quote the passage at some length): "The idea that the body cells are naturally immortal and die only if exposed to extreme injuries such as prolonged lack of oxygen or too high a temperature helps to make our problem more intelligible. The medical student, who for the first time realizes that life depends upon that one organ, the heart, doing its duty incessantly for the seventy years or so allotted to man, is amazed at the precariousness of our existence. It seems indeed uncanny that so delicate a mechanism should function so regularly for so many years. The mysticism connected with this and other phenomena of adaptation would tend to disappear if we could be certain that all cells are really immortal and that the fact which demands an explanation is not the continued activity but the cessation of activity in death. Thus we see that the idea of the immortality of the body cell, if it can be generalized, may be destined to become one of the main supports for a complete physico-chemical analysis of life phenomena since it makes the durability of organisms intelligible."1

Many questions arise as to the significance of the conception which is here set forth. Of interest to us here are the possibilities which it suggests when carried over from the conception of life to the conception of mind. Seen in this light, the problematic and mysterious thing is not that *knowledge* should exist, but that the mind should exhibit the limitations and restrictions which experience shows it to possess. Such a general conception of the life and function of consciousness receives an added significance when we come to realize that the life of the mind cannot be thought of simply as a prolongation of the life

¹ Loeb: "The Organism as a Whole," p. 32.

and interests of the body. For, when we bring home to our reflection and our imagination the undoubted truth that the brain is solely an instrument of action and of behavior, of the adaptation of response to stimulus, we see that, in the last analysis, but two alternatives confront us. Either "knowledge" is merely an incident in the processes of behavior and adaptation, or else the brain does not generate, in any real sense whatever, the life of mind and of knowledge. The brain and the bodily behavior which it controls will be (in the latter case) but a principle of selection and of limitation, not creating the fact that knowledge exists, but determining, in part, which, among all the real objects of knowledge, are the ones which shall at the moment come before the mind. Readers of Bergson will see the similarity between the thesis here set forth and the course of the argument in "Matière et Mémoire."

But the question persists, are we confident that the first of the two alternatives is really to be excluded? Is not knowledge, in the end, to be assimilated to behavior and to adaptation, so that all the interests of life which are really pertinent to our world and to our needs, are such as have to do with the control of our environment for the satisfaction of our desires? I propose in this chapter to consider this question by turning to some of life's major interests and seeing the part there played by behavior or adaptation on the one hand, and by knowledge, contemplation, or possession on the other. We shall observe certain limitations upon those attitudes and interests which

² Professor N. K. Smith has done a service in reminding us of the kinship between Bergson and Avenarius in holding that "the brain is in no sense the seat or organ of conscious life, that its function is purely motor and never cognitive." Nevertheless, there is for Avenarius a fundamental parallelism between the vital, organic series and the conscious series. And this parallelism tends to be stressed not only in respect to the structure of the two series, but in respect to their function as well. The result is that Avenarius approximates to the first of the two alternative views above mentioned. What you can say about the brain, that you can also say, substantially, about consciousness. One has only to give up the artificial and puzzling parallelism of Avenarius to reach the full-fledged realism and behaviorism of Mach and the others. Speaking further of Bergson, Professor Smith continues: "Bergson's problem isn't to account for consciousness. By right it is knowledge of true, independent reality, really it is limited, permeated with illusion, and largely personal. True knowledge consists in emancipation from the tyranny of practical needs." "Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy," *Philosophical Review*, 1908.

may be called pragmatic, and which the philosophies which are the outgrowth of biological concepts have so insistently stressed. There will pass before us in review a number of regions in our experience which simply cannot be interpreted in terms of stimulus and response, activity and control. This chapter will be just to this extent a critique of instrumentalism.

I shall cite first an aspect of our world which is utterly pervasive and which has ever impressed itself upon men's imaginations. I mean the tragic aspect of experience and of life. Now, wherever there is tragedy there is always one salient feature of the situation which we do well to reflect upon in trying to estimate the comprehensiveness and the adequacy of the pragmatic concepts. In any situation which is tragic there are forces at work over which man has no control whatever, and no possibility of any control. The spectator-and for that matter the participant also—is provided with no clew, no stimulus, which is able to initiate a response, a behavior series, able to relieve the situation and solve the problems. This is of course not the whole of the tragic situation, but it is one aspect of it. In the words of Bradley, "That men may start a course of events but can neither calculate nor control it, is a tragic fact." It is the inevitable yet uncontrollable consequences of men's free deeds, of their initiative and their behavior itself which is here in question.4 Now the tragic fact conceals what may appear to be a paradox. It presents us with suffering, with conflict, with baffling circumstances. In most, perhaps all, other instances where we find such things, they come to us as stimuli calling for some adaptive behavior. We seek to remove the difficulty, to heal the suffering, and to restore the untroubled functioning of life's interests once again. But this is precisely what cannot be done in the presence of tragedy. Here we are helpless; there is no transition from the stimulus to the particular response which will "adapt the organism to the requirements of its environment." Pragmatism has here nothing whatever to say. And yet—this is the para-

³ "Shakespearean Tragedy," p. 15.

⁴ Cf. Simmel: "Moralwissenschaft," vol. 2, p. 183. "Unserer Freiheit entfesselt Kräfte über die sie nicht mehr Herr ist, sie ruft Geister die sie nicht mehr los ist." T. H. Green also speaks of "the tragic conflict between the creative will of man and the hidden wisdom of the world." "Works," vol. 3, p. 278.

dox-we certainly do not, in the best and deepest moments of our experience, judge the tragic situation to be merely a baffling and unknown x, a world of forces which is quite beyond all apprehension and which is wholly without significance. We do not say, since all adaptive and useful behavior is here out of the question that therefore there is nothing to do save to turn our faces away in sheer desperation. This is what we ought to do if the significance which objects possess were merely a function of their ability to satisfy our needs, solve our particular problems, initiate a useful adaptation. It is far more true to say, again with Bradley, that "the representation of (tragedy) does not leave us crushed, rebellious or desperate." We find in the total tragic complex a source of meaning; we may even say that not willingly would we lose from our world just this wealth of meaning which inheres in the tragic situation. In the routine of experience as pictured by the instrumentalist and behaviorist, in the cycle leading from the problem yielding the stimulus to the response furnishing the solution of the problem, there is no place for tragedy. Here is a non-pragmatic interest and attitude, because it falls completely outside of those concepts in terms of which instrumentalism, following the lead of biology, does its thinking.

I turn abruptly to another field. The metaphysical problem of time, it has often been pointed out, exhibits certain analogies with certain problems arising from the analysis of typical attitudes within our experience. We observed something of this in the preceding chapter when we were pointing out how small is the range of possible stimuli to behavior when compared with the range of possible objects of knowledge. The past cannot interest us practically as, say, either the present or the future. Just as the past can never be a genuine stimulus because it is no longer "real," so it is not subject to any "control." It is irrevocable and unalterable. In this respect it is similar to the tragic fact, and like tragedy it quite escapes the accredited rubric and sanction of pragmatism. But it is not so much this aspect of the time order which I wish to stress here. It is rather the relation in which customarily and certainly under the influence of pragmatic habits of thought we view the relation between past, present, and future. Considered exclusively in its pragmatic and

instrumental significance, every object in the environment which is perceived and attended to is a signal for some appropriate response. It is but the beginning of a reflex arc. Knowledge and reflection are instruments of action and behavior. Now it is not at all strange that this relationship between stimulus and behavior should be carried over to the relationship between succeeding intervals of time, in such fashion that any moment or period of time may be said to be simply a signal and a preparation for some following moment of time. Of any such definite period of time, then, it will be said that its value lies not at all in itself, but wholly in that for which it is but a preparation and, as it were, a stimulus. Let us see the way in which this works out in certain familiar regions and concepts. It enters, for instance, into the meaning of the concept "progress." We tend to think of the past as inevitably preparing the way for the present, and so we suppose that the present is a solution of the problems and difficulties which the past contained, and that the future will solve our problems. Just so, the response which follows the stimulus is thought of as a solution of the problem offered by the situation implied by the stimulus. But the response proves, in its turn, to develop into another problem just as the present which follows upon the past is in turn followed by the future. There is no resting place and there is no intrinsic meaning or value possessed by any one period of time in its own right. And consequently there is something problematic and perhaps hollow about the very notion of progress. If each moment of history is merely a preparation for what follows then no moment of history has any intrinsic value. But in this case there is no progress; every moment of time is precisely on a level with every other moment, always leading on to a next moment and never coming into possession of any inherent and final value. All of this is obviously correlated with the most central characteristics of the modern industrial order in which the economic cycle does not terminate in the consumption of the goods which have been produced, but such consumption is, in its turn, merely a stimulus for further production. There is a pregnant saying of Ranke, the historian, which is often quoted, and which contains, I believe, the clew to the proper estimate and interpretation of this

whole motive. "Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott." In some fashion are we to view every age, every moment of time as possessing an inherent worth and significance of its own. Its entire meaning is not exhausted in its existence as a preparation for and a means to some future moment. This is, I think, one way of expressing the real sense of eternity and of setting forth the limitations which inhere in a time order conceived solely in terms of mere succession. Every fragment of time, every pulse of the flux of experience participates in eternity; it is in possession of some significant structure which is, in some determinate sense, final and inclusive. This insight has, too, practical implications for various human interests. It means in education, for instance, that the education of the child is not merely a process of training the child to live in the future. Childhood is not only a precursor and a means to the attainment of adult life. Childhood has its own interests; it too participates in inherent values. Education is not exclusively, perhaps not even primarily, a preparation for life; it is life. The interests of childhood have their own worth and their own justification apart from their being the stimuli whereby the more mature interests of the adult are prepared for in advance.

There is a third region which offers an excellent opportunity to try out the adequacy of the interests of use and of control. It is the region of our social life and our social interests, and this includes very much indeed. I shall touch only upon such matters as may best illustrate the contrast between the categories of behavior and of knowledge, action and thought, control and possession. And first, there is the very pervasive belief that the whole province of our social life and interests presents us primarily with situations which are first to be understood through a scientific analysis, and are then to be mastered and controlled. It is the ideal of Bacon, of the

⁵ The entire passage is worth quoting: "Eine solche gleichsam mediatisierte Generation würde an und für sich eine Bedeutung nicht haben; sie würde nur insofern etwas bedeuten als sie Stufe der nachfolgenden Generation wäre, and würde nicht im unmittelbaren Bezug zum Göttlichen stehen. Ich aber behaupte: Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott, und ihr Wert beruht gar nicht auf dem, was aus ihr hervorgeht, sondern in ihr Existenz selbst, in ihrem eigenen Selbst." "Ueber die Epochen der neueren Geschichte," z Vortrag.

Encyclopedists, of Comte and, reinforced by the teachings of nineteenth century biology, it is the ideal of contemporary instrumentalism. Knowledge is for the sake of power. Science—which means all precise and verifiable knowledge—shall yield to man an instrument for fashioning his life and his world, for controlling phenomena through an understanding of their causes. This essentially modern ideal of knowledge is, we have seen, the intellectual counterpart both of democracy and of the forces which have made the modern industrial order. The world exists to be mastered and used. But it has not been sufficiently observed, I think, how real and how deep are the relations existing between the "Enlightenment" utilitarianism of the eighteenth century and the "Esse est percipi" of Berkeley. Subjectivism is, in reality, but a variety of utilitarianism. Each of these does but utter a common motive and a common attitude. For, let anyone say of an object that he is interested in it only to the extent that he can control it, i.e., only to the extent, say, to which it contains nothing tragic and does not lie in the past, then he is viewing that object exclusively from the contribution which it makes to his own life. He is indeed ego-centric. The object is envisaged entirely as his own immediate possession. And what does it mean to say that the world is my idea, if not this? That which belongs to an object in itself, that which exceeds the limits of perception, has for us no practical significance. The imperceptible, the being of an object other than its percipi, is in this respect like the past. It cannot serve as a stimulus to behavior. Berkeley is undoubtedly very much under the influence of the pragmatic attitude. It shows itself, for instance, in his belief that the sole significance of mathematics lies in its being "subservient to practice" and in promoting "the benefit of life." "Hence we may see," he concludes, "how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation."6 It is only when one's interest terminates in some object itself, when it is indeed a real object and not merely a stimulus, it

^{6 &}quot;Principles of Human Knowledge," S 119 and 120. My attention was called to this connection between the utilitarian interest and the Berkeleyan doctrine by remarks of Mr. Clement C. J. Webb in his "Problems in the Relations of God and Man," p. 29, where specific reference is made to the above passages from Berkeley.

is only through a non-utilitarian and non-pragmatic interest that subjectivism and the ego-centric difficulty are overcome.

How is it, then, we ask, with the social order and with the life of our fellow men? Is the interest which we rightfully have in the knowledge of other minds, of all the varied wealth which the social order offers to us, of the world of history and of the past,—is this all to be subsumed under the pragmatic interest or does it contain at least certain reaches and aspects which can be understood only in the light of interests and attitudes which are non-pragmatic? Is the social order an object to be apprehended and appreciated because of its own inherent wealth of meaning, or is it a stimulus, significant because we need to reckon with it as a kind of thing which our environment contains? Let us state the question somewhat more concretely thus: The world of society and of human life is full of problems, conflicts and difficulties. The enormous success of modern science in winning control and mastery over the energies of the physical order leads irresistibly to the hope of extending this success to the world of human society. An adequate sociology, psychology, etc., will accomplish here what an adequate physics and mechanics have accomplished for industry and inventions, and what an adequate chemistry, physiology and pathology have accomplished for medicine. Nothing is needed in principle, save sciences which are wholly positive and empirical. It is this ideal and this hope which, first clearly formulated by Bacon, enters profoundly into the thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the labors of Locke and the Encyclopedists, and is continued in the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, and furnishes the dominant inspiration to contemporary instrumentalism. Is this hope well founded? No one will wisely set limits to man's control, through knowledge, over his social environment. Yet doubts insistently present themselves as to the adequacy of this idea. For, it must be asked, after all, whether our most pressing and our most tragic problems in the social and political life of men exist because we do not as yet possess the scientific, i.e., the causal knowledge which would enable us to solve these problems. Such is unquestionably the source of our failure thus far to control, say, certain diseases. We do not know, in their entirety, certain causal sequences. Until such

knowledge is gained, we are helpless. We possess, indeed, very little, if any, sure and certain knowledge of causal sequences in history and in any of the larger social processes, but is this lack, great though it be, responsible for the baffling social confusions amidst which we live? Would a positive science of society give us, in principle, the clew to the solution of our problems? I cannot believe that it would. The true source of our problems lies elsewhere, in a situation which has no counterpart in the physical order. A disease is baffling because we are ignorant of certain causal sequences; a social or political situation is baffling and problematic because it contains a conflict of wills, of interests and of loyalties. No amount of positive science, of knowledge of bare facts and of causal sequences will enable us to control a social situation, to heal the mortal conflicts and to bind up the wounds of the social body. This distinction and this general principle, which I believe to be of fundamental importance as a matter of methodology in dealing with all the practical problems touching the organization of life, need not here be further developed. What it points to is just the difficulty which inheres in any attempt to view the social order merely as material to be manipulated and controlled by means of an applied science resting upon a theoretical science.7

The consciousness of this difficulty lies at the basis of a distinction which students of society have found it necessary to make use of, the distinction, namely, between society and community, Gesell-schaft and Gemeinschaft. The distinction is an important one and bears directly upon this question as to how far our interest in our fellow men is fairly to be called a pragmatic interest, describable in terms of behavior, of stimulus, and response. There are, indeed, social relationships governed predominantly by interest and by the division of labor. Such are, above all, the economic relations and the logic of such a type of social organization is best set forth in the writings of the classical English economists. I associate myself with my fellow men—or am driven so to do—because I need their cooperation in the satisfaction of my desires. A society in which

⁷ The best statement of the view here combated known to me is that of Lévy-Bruhl: "La Morale et la Science des Moeurs," and Dewey's monograph on "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality."

each makes use of the labor of his fellow men, in which, namely, division of labor is practiced, will produce more, and will be further advanced in the industrial arts, than one in which division of labor is but slightly developed. But such a bond of social and economic organization need be based on nothing other than self-interest. My fellow men will be useful to me, if I in turn will be of use to them. Exchange, contract, division of labor are here the primary facts and interests. Now we must, in theory at any rate, contrast with this another type of bond which may unite me to my fellow men. I may be interested in my fellow men, not primarily because through exchange we can supply one another's wants, but because I discover that they and I really have something in common. I delight in sharing with him some mutual interest. He and I are linked together through membership in some more than individual life, in a true community. When I thus discover my fellow man as a member of a community, he becomes for me something other than a stimulus. My interest now terminates in him as an integral member of the community. I will not use him, but will enjoy him, sympathize with him, and love him. We come across again the profound difference, so often lost sight of, between the categories of desire and of love. Desire or interest is pragmatic and utilitarian. It asks, how can I use my world, what behavior of mine is most advantageous by way of response to such and such stimuli? Love is utterly nonpragmatic. It is "disinterested." It terminates in an object which is itself of inherent worth. It asks not, how can I use my world, but how may I appropriate all the wealth, the significant structures which my world contains, and how, perchance, may I contribute to the object of my devotion and love? Now we have, I take it, certain forms of community life which exhibit something of these nonpragmatic traits. Most elemental is, of course, the family. But, a bare mention of the family shows how complexly interrelated are, as a matter of fact, these two types of social structure and two attitudes which they exemplify. The family is, primitively, a biological and economic necessity. It is, like primitive barter, a device for supplying the elemental needs of protection, food, etc. And this economic aspect persists throughout. But a time undoubtedly arrives—and it must have arrived early, at least as early as religion

and law—when the family becomes not only a "society" but a "community," not only something to use, but something to possess and to participate in. And then again, very much later, with the rise of individualism, the economic and contractual side of marriage and of the family receives attention, in ways which are the source of problems which we have not yet learned adequately to solve.⁸

The reason, then, why we take an interest in the life of our fellow men is twofold. There is a biological and utilitarian interest, and there is also a contemplative and non-pragmatic interest. We desire their aid in the satisfaction of our wants, and we delight in the discovery of an Other with whom we may communicate. That there is about sympathy something which is not wholly resolvable into the mechanism of association, it is the merit of Shaftsbury, Hume, and Smith in the eighteenth century to have shown. But the uniqueness of sympathy, its distinction from behavior, which is socially useful and necessary, was called in question by the evolutionary theory and the work of Darwin in the nineteenth century. For there is the gregarious instinct which, among the higher animals and man, has certainly a biological utility. It possesses survival value in the struggle for existence. It is, then, natural enough to view sympathy merely as the mental accompaniment and reflex of instinctive gregarious behavior whose significance lies in its utility. Sympathy is thus the symptom and the outcome of the sociability, the living together of men, their cooperation and division of labor. But whatever may be the fact about the evolutionary and temporal series here involved, it is still possible and necessary to insist upon the qualitative ("phenomenological") distinction between useful social behavior and genuine sympathy. The former is all that "nature" cares about. As long as a group acts as a unit, coheres together with solidarity, nature has no concern with the way in which it feels in the conscious experience of the members of the group. But in that inner life a new dimension of values makes its appearance, the non-utilitarian value of sharing our ideas with an-

⁸ Although the contrast between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* receives special emphasis at the hands of the German philosophers, it is by no means confined to German philosophies of society. An excellent though brief résumé of the contrast is given by Richard: "La Sociologie Generale," pp. 164 ff.

other, of discovering and participating in the life of other minds. And, once we apprehend this distinction, we are entitled to say that such mutual understanding it is which makes social life, i.e., the historical life of communities possible, rather than that such sympathy is, as Darwin and Spencer supposed, the mere reflex of an already existing social order. I may quote a passage from Stout by way of emphasizing and confirming the psychological uniqueness of sympathy and its non-pragmatic nature. "Society," he says, "supplies the needs of the individual in a twofold manner. In the first place, each man depends upon the cooperation of others for the satisfaction of his practical needs, for the maintenance of his existence and of his material well-being. Without the aid of others he cannot mould and adapt his material environment to his own use. Perhaps the child's interest in the persons who surround him, and his desire to communicate with them, are at the outset mainly of this practical character. But at a very early stage in the development of the individual, the desire for sympathy and mutual understanding becomes itself a primary end. The mental life of man in society is as immediately dependent on interchange of ideas with his fellow men as it is on the use of his senses. The first strong development of pure curiosity arises in connection with social relations. It consists in the felt need to know what those around us are doing or thinking. The greater part of all ordinary conversation, both among the civilized and the uncivilized, illustrates this primary social impulse. Even the interest of human beings in nature, apart from their immediate practical needs, was at the outset an interest in personified natural objects. Another aspect of this desire for communion with our fellows, and of aversion for that mutilation of mental existence which social isolation involves, is found in what may be broadly termed the tendency to imitation,—the tendency to assimilate ourselves to the society in which we live, so that we may understand and sympathize with it, and it may understand and sympathize with us." McDougall likewise distinguishes between active and

^{9 &}quot;Analytic Psychology," vol. 2, p. 100. The most thoroughgoing psychological analysis of sympathy of which I know, entirely bearing out what I have spoken of as its non-pragmatic nature, is that of Scheler: "Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass."

passive sympathy. By active sympathy is meant "that tendency to seek to share our emotions and feelings with others." And although this "is rooted in primitive or passive sympathy and in the gregarious instinct," it is set forth as attaining a significance decidedly different from any which instinctive behavior can possess. "The person in whom this tendency is strong cannot bear to suffer his various affective experiences in isolation; his joys are no joys, his pains are doubly painful, so long as they are not shared by others; his anger or his moral indignation, his vengeful emotion, his pity, his elation, his admiration, if they are confined to his own bosom, cannot long endure without giving rise to a painful desire for sympathy." 10

Consider, once again, as an illustration of the mind's interest in apprehending and in participating in the life of a community, our attitude to the past and the meaning which history has for us. The life of every community is in time; the past is carried along into the present through custom, tradition, and piety. To enter fully into the life of any historical community is to apprehend the past. One discovers in the past a genuine Other just as much as one discovers in the minds of his fellow men common interests and sharable ideas. One may sympathize with the past then, just as one does with the minds which live in the present. Now, I submit that this interest in the life of the past and in the study of history is significant, that it is certainly different from a utilitarian interest in the past, a desire to use the experiences of the past in the solution of present difficulties, and that it may conceivably outweigh the 'scientific' and pragmatic value of history. Mr. Balfour has spoken of this as the 'aesthetic' value which history possesses. He means, I take it,

^{10 &}quot;Social Psychology," p. 200. Cf. also the following quotation from Hocking: "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 222. "The laws of the multiplication of human power by association have never been worked out; but no one has failed to measure in frequent experiences what incredible enhancement of the value of any experience may occur in a single touch of endorsement from without. Worth of all sorts begins to acquire another dimension as it enters a career of actual universality, such as the merest nod of assent from an Other may convey. Association is a principle which stands outside of and includes whatever may become content of individual experience; there is some possibility that in association a sufficient mastery of evil may be found."

the value which accrues to our sympathetic apprehension of more life and mind, which enlarges our world and in which we may take delight. I quote the paragraph. "That history has aesthetic value is evident. An age which is both scientific and utilitarian occasionally pretends to see in it no more than the raw material of a science called sociology, and a storehouse of precedents from which statesmen may draw maxims for the guidance of mankind. It may be all this, but it is certainly more. What has in the main caused history to be written, and when written to be eagerly read, is neither its scientific value nor its practical utility, but its aesthetic interest. Men love to contemplate the performances of their fellows, and whatever enables them to do so, whether we belittle it as gossip, or exalt it as history, will find admirers in abundance."11 It is only when seen in this light, as a domain of non-utilitarian interests, that justice can be done to that conception of history which is associated with the names of Rickert and Windelband. For this school of writers, history is always a matter of individual happenings, of unique men, deeds, and nations. The other sciences, physics, psychology, sociology, are concerned primarily not with the unique and the individual, but with the typical, with laws and universals, functional relationships. History is "idiographic"; these other sciences are "nomothetic." History seeks to envisage with insight and sympathy the individual. Its interest terminates in the individual, the other sciences are interested in individuals only as instances of types and laws. I mention here this far-reaching conception of history not in order to discuss it for its own sake, but to point out its real basis in our experience. We shall presently observe the important principle that it is only non-pragmatic interests and attitudes which terminate in individuals at all. To insist, then, that the objects of our historical interest are really individuals and not universal laws or types is at the same time to emphasize the non-behavior and non-pragmatic character of the mind's interest in other minds, in the past, and in the historical life of communities. Viewing this whole matter by and large, it presents us with an impressive clew as to what the life and the interests of the mind really are. What the brain is, at least what it is for, of that we may have little doubt.

^{11 &}quot;Theism and Humanism," p. 91.

We observe nature building up in the animal world more and more complexly inter-related systems of tropisms and reflex arcs. The significance of these structures, built up by nature and inherited by the individual, lies in their contribution to action and response, behavior and survival. Then what we are accustomed to call the life of mind emerges and what of *it?* Of course, it knits itself into the reflex and instinctive structures which are instruments of behavior and activity. But shall we say that the sole function of mind is instrumental and that the interests of behavior and of action remain forever supreme? Or, shall we discover in the life of reason a new interest, best illustrated in our social experience, in our apprehension and contemplation of the mind of an other and of the life of a community? It is in man's social experience and what grows out of it, that the mind's participation in objective significant structures takes on its most concrete form.

As a final illustration of the difference between the interests of control and of knowledge, I would refer to religion and more especially to the emergence of the distinction between magic and religion. Something of this has already come to our notice in speaking of the roots of the religious tradition. Here we may be reminded of the two criteria which are most commonly used to separate the province of magic from that of religion. Religion, it is said, is primarily and fundamentally a matter of men's social experience and their community interests, whereas magic is practiced by the individual for his own profit, or for the individual advantage of another. The priest is ever the spokesman for some community, family, city, state, or church. The medicine man carries on his arts in secret and as a solitary individual. The second difference between magic and religion is found in the different motives and attitudes which each fosters and nourishes. Magic is utilitarian and pragmatic. The magician is the earliest man deliberately to seek control over his world, to reconstruct his environment and the events it contains. so as to satisfy his own desires. He is the first instrumentalist. On the other hand, the moving force of religion is different. The primary interest of religion, as something distinct from magic, is in participating in, or in contemplating an energy, a life, a spiritual order which is not to be controlled but rather "enjoyed," lived, partici-

pated in, and which is—to use a distinction employed by Hocking fertile rather than useful. Religion belongs to the category of mutual understanding and of our social experience. This, of course, does not mean that it is easy to say what belongs to magic and what to religion in any concrete historical instance of religion. Some elements of magic have no doubt persisted in every historical religion and many cults which seek the shelter of religion are really but refined and subtle forms of magic. But, in principle and in outline, the cleavage is a clear one. Where religion is concerned, in the words of Marett quoted in our earlier chapter, "The will and personality in the worshippers are in need not so much of implements as of more will and personality. They get this from a spiritual kind of religion; which in one way or another always suggests a society, a communion, as at once the means and the end of vital betterment." These two criteria of the distinction between religion and magic, taken together, but emphasize once again the insight that the province of man's social experience simply cannot be subsumed under the concepts of behaviorism and instrumentalism.

We have been surveying in this chapter, in a cursory fashion, to be sure, certain provinces of our life and our interests for the purpose of bringing into clear relief how much more our experience and our world contain than that which may readily be interpreted in terms of behavior and control. Tragedy, the world of the past, indeed the entire time aspect of experience, our social experience, the apprehensions of other minds, participation in the life of a community, the world of history and the interests of religion are all non-pragmatic. Not behavior and control, but knowledge and possession are, in all these regions, the outstanding interests and attitudes. These show us what the life of the mind in truth is. Here is the life of reason. Idealism has been the theoretical spokesman and the interpreter of these interests, and religion, for the masses of men, has sheltered something of the enduring worth of this life of the mind.

But we have spoken as if thought and action, knowledge and behavior, the non-pragmatic interests of the mind, and the utilitarian interest in control were wholly antithetic to each other. Yet we know that such cannot quite be the case. The problem is really

that of the relation between mind and body, knowledge and behavior. To be a mind is to possess a knowledge of reality. These various concrete interests which we have been commenting upon are but concrete examples of what the mind's knowledge of reality means. It is in these several interests that the mind does claim to be, not an instrument of behavior, but a possessor of the real, a participant in significant structures. What in the last chapter we spoke of as the Platonic insight of idealism, takes on concreteness in these various interests, above all in man's social experience and in his religion. The thesis which seems to me to hold out most hope of doing justice both to behavior and control, and to the life of knowledge and possession is this. Every behavior interest is surrounded by a cognitive fringe. The awareness of some total situation is a matrix within which, at a focal point, the response of the organism to some particular stimulus occurs. It is this cognitive apprehension, this fringe, and not the behavior, the response to the stimulus, which is the source of all the meaning which attaches to an object attended and responded to. Let us now expand and illustrate this principle. I sit down at my desk to write. I see my pen, take it up, and commence to use it. At the moment it is my pen to which I adjust my behavior and which exists at or near the focus of my consciousness. But, while my hand is attending to my pen, both hand and pen fall within my field of vision which includes, too, very much else besides, my desk, books, my room, etc. Now the point of this very simple illustration is that a very much larger area comes within my conscious grasp than the specific objects to which my hand, or even my body as a whole is responding. My consciousness overlaps both my body and the environment which acts as a stimulus to the adaptive responses of the organism. The stimulus is embedded within a more inclusive and more total object. If one chooses to say, then, that I am "responding" to and "behaving" towards my entire, inclusive object, and not merely to the specific, focal stimuli, well and good. But let it then be understood that the manner of my response to my residual environment, my fringe, is not the same as the manner of my response to the stimulus. I literally behave towards, do something with my pen; I am aware of a total situation, an inclusive purpose, which makes it necessary

and meaningful that I should take up my pen. The stimulus responded to is a focal center within a larger area, which is apprehended and contemplated. How is this encircling fringe apprehended and what part does it play in our experience and our activity? For answer, we may turn to the chapters in Stout's "Analytic Psychology" entitled "The Apprehension of Form," and "Implicit Apprehension." To James, of course, belongs the credit of setting forth how pervasive and fundamental in the entire stream of consciousness is the focus-fringe situation. The analysis which Stout gives contains an abundance of suggestions as to the philosophical implications of this focus-fringe situation. We are concerned here with the relation between the apprehension of a whole, a total and inclusive situation, and our attention (response) to a specific constituent (stimulus) within that whole. The relation, then, of the awareness of whole and parts interests us. Now the first thing to observe is that, although the form of a whole cannot be apprehended without any awareness of the parts, yet "a whole with its characteristic unity may be apprehended without definitely distinguishing its several constituents from each other. It is certainly possible to think of a whole in its unity and distinctness without discerning all or even any of its component details."12 As, perhaps, the most striking and familiar illustration of this principle, Stout discusses the manner in which we apprehend the meaning of words. Such recognition of meaning occurs through an "imageless apprehension" of a distinct and characteristic totality. I am aware of the complexities and difficulties which attach to the problem of imageless thought. Nevertheless, Stout's description and analysis of the matter seems to me not to go beyond the verifiable features of the situation. The testimony is indeed unequivocal that "the flow of words is for the most part unattended by a parallel flow of mental imagery." We probably go too far, however, if we speak of all specific images as quite unnecessary and irrelevant. The apprehension of the whole, which is analogous to a surrounding fringe, has somewhere a focal point. It is to this focal center that the response and activity of accommodation, necessary for attention, are directed. The printed word is seen, is attended to; the activity of attending to it is the

^{12 &}quot;Analytic Psychology," vol. 1, pp. 76, 78.

bearer and the vehicle of the mind's apprehension of meaning. The specific stimulus probably does give rise to an image, but both stimulus and image are but partial, surrounded by the fringe of

meaning which is apprehended as a whole.

It is not difficult to adduce further instances of situations in which the presence of meaning arises from the implicit apprehension of a whole rather than from any specific response of the organism to a stimulus. Meaning is a matter not primarily of behavior, but of knowledge. I quote again from Stout. "When I look at a house, what is actually seen, together with what is mentally pictured, constitutes only a small part of the object as it is perceived. The actual sensations and the attendant mental imagery do not by their limitation limit the objective reference. This is possible only because an imageless representation of the whole is conjoined with the sensible appearance as its 'psychic fringe.' At the most, only the last two or three notes of a melody are perceived at its close, and yet the musically gifted are aware of it as a whole. Similarly, I may be keenly aware of the unity of a sonnet in respect of metrical form while I am reading the last lines, although the words of the preceding lines are no longer present to my mind. All perception of a series of changes as forming a whole, involves imageless apprehension. . . . In every train of thought, strictly so called, a single, central topic—a permanent object—is throughout kept in view. The orderly sequence of special apprehensions is due to the controlling influence of the persistent and central thought. . . . We have cognisance of this topic as a whole during the entire process; but its special parts or aspects are apprehended only piecemeal."13 Essentially the same statement applies to the life of purpose and conation. Every partial present purpose is surrounded by a more inclusive purpose. The desire for food is really the desire for health and strength and life, and from this larger fringe of interests there streams in upon the momentary partial interest its meaning and its justification. Again in our entire social life: the economic activities of men are embedded within a more comprehensive and concrete network of relations, legal, social and moral, though they may for the most part remain quite implicit, and we have often been

led to forget the fringe of these other motives and interests. What we have sought to make clear by these various examples then, is this. Something akin to the focus-fringe relationship in psychology, as set forth by James and others, also exists wherever there is any apprehension of meaning and an overt response to a specific stimulus. The organism's behavior in the presence of the stimulus does not comprise the entire situation as it really exists. A consciousness of meaning, an awareness of some total object surrounds every specific instance of behavior except, it may be, a pure tropism or instinct which is entirely a matter of biology. Behavior and meaning are never commensurate. They are related as stimulus and object. The categories of behaviorism and instrumentalism become less and less adequate as one moves from biology to psychology, from brain structures and reflex arcs to the life of mind and of consciousness. Throughout our experience these two, meaning and behavior, are in some fashion wedded together. We may say (with Stout) that "though mental process as it advances in complexity becomes less and less capable of adequate expression in terms of motor process, yet some motor process is always involved in it."

Consciousness is neither a picture gallery in flux, a succession of images, nor is it a series of behavior processes. It lives through its possession of wholes, through its apprehension of meanings, its participation in significant structures, its understanding of an Other. Conation itself is to be interpreted not merely as the attempt of an organism whose equilibrium is upset through the reception of a stimulus, to regain its equilibrium, not merely in terms of the satisfaction of a "vital series" (cf. Avenarius and all voluntarism) but also as a voyage of discovery, an exploration of self and of the world, an attainment of knowledge and a possession of reality. See, for a moment, what an interpretation of conation such as this would imply. Ask the question as to when, and under what circumstances the mind comes into contact with an environment, with reality. Hume answers, only at the very outset of its career, only in the process whereby the mind is furnished with "impressions." Impressions are the bearers of valid knowledge; they are a pledge of the continuity and contact of mind and world. But they constitute,

^{14 &}quot;Analytic Psychology," vol. 2, p. 103.

in addition, a stimulus to the elaboration of "ideas." And the further you go on the journey from "impressions" to "ideas," the further do you become separated from reality. Ideas are not cognitive at all. So much of the fabric of "custom and imagination" have entered into the substance of ideas, that they are separated by a long interval from impressions, and have ceased to participate in an objective order. They belong only to the mind as a witness to the manner in which the mind responds to the stimuli of impressions. One sees the analogy between Hume's thought on these matters and the way in which the conation, the conscious striving of any organism, is often pictured. It is assumed that the environment, through a stimulus which presents a problem to the organism, upsets its equilibrium and sets in motion a conation, a vital series, a striving which is pictured essentially as a process occurring within the organism. Mental striving tends to realize itself, to recover the equilibrium of the vital series. Now, in this way of viewing the matter we are, I think, in danger of falling into the same error in which Hume and all subjectivism fall. We are likely to forget that the mind is in contact with reality throughout, and not only at the initial moment of a conation series when a stimulus upsets the organism's equilibrium. The journey from stimulus to a final response is to be described not merely as something occurring entirely within the mind, or within the organism. Both processes constitute indeed a voyage of exploration and discovery. There is no conation without some continuous objective reference, some knowledge, some participation in reality, however unquiet it may be. There is a persistent confusion in psychology and in much of our thinking about the nature of consciousness, which is here to be mentioned. There lurk many ambiguities in the concept of mental activity, ambiguities which occasioned the well-known remark of Bradley that the very concept of mental activity was a scandal in metaphysics. The chief source of these perplexities lies in our failure to distinguish causal efficacy and the apprehension of meaning. In a sustained review of the work of Stout to which we have been referring, Royce has a telling criticism of just this confusion which Stout himself has not always escaped. We tend to confuse "meaning with abstract efficacy, good sense with causal power, rationality with capacity to accomplish the causal production

of deeds, and sustained significance with self-sustaining process."¹⁵ The radical difficulty with all extreme voluntarism and behaviorism lies just here. At bottom we suffer from a failure to free ourselves sufficiently from the dominance of biology and its categories.

One final matter as to the relation between thought and action remains to be mentioned. In the preceding chapter we made use of a hypothesis concerning the relation between stimulus and object so far as the status of values is involved. We there gave a ready assent to an intimate correlation between feeling or interest, and value, without regarding value merely as a projection or a creation of interest. In making use here of the focus-fringe situation and all that it implies, we are ready to say the same thing concerning the relation of behavior and meaning, body and mind. The brain does not generate the mind, the response of the organism to the stimulus is not identical with consciousness nor with the apprehension of meanings. And yet these two are intimately correlated with one another. How? I answer, the necessities of behavior and the brain processes which control that behavior select but do not generate the meanings which come before my mind. What I am now doing is the vehicle through which some whole, some significant structure becomes known to me. Just as the muscular accommodation of sense organs is unquestionably not identical with the meaning of that which is perceived, but only the channel through which an object is presented to my consciousness, so behavior as a whole determines my ideas only in the sense that it is the vehicle and not the creator of those meanings. In speaking of what he rightly calls "the most important part of consciousness," the essential thought activity, the apprehension of meanings and the "reference of consciousness to an object," McDougall speaks thus of the sensory and motor elements of consciousness here involved: "All the sensory feelings are but the medium which brings this thought-activity into play and determines its direction from moment to moment; they are but solicitations to thought or to thinking." Just so, the entire motor and behavior processes of the body with which the brain has

^{15 &}quot;Mind," 1897, p. 393.

^{16 &}quot;Psychology," p. 55.

to do, is the medium, the solicitation, the selection of the meanings which come before the mind at any moment.

For, we are never to lose sight of the fact that the brain is an instrument not of knowledge, but of muscular response and of behavior. It is but the connecting link between sense organs and muscles. Why there should be any consciousness at all over and above the brain and the behavior of the body may and does remain a mystery, at least in the sense that it is an ultimate fact about the nature of things. The two facts of which we may be wholly certain respecting this mystery are first, that knowledge, like every ultimate value, is autonomous: it reveals an objective significant structure, and to be a mind is precisely equivalent to possessing a knowledge of reality; and secondly, what, of all the mind's possessions, come at any moment into the explicit light of consciousness depends, in some degree at least, upon what the brain, i.e., the body is doing. The brain has to do only with some stimulus; a stimulus is a gathering place, a focal center for a fringe of meanings, whose organized totality is the true object of the mind and, in the last analysis, is reality itself.

reality itself.

We have throughout

We have throughout been discussing the contrast and the relation between man's interest in exploiting and controlling his world, and his interest in apprehending the wealth of meaning which reality offers him. There is one final thesis, in respect to these two attitudes, which I would here set forth. It is the thesis that only non-pragmatic attitudes and interests disclose individuals. Let anyone view his world solely in the light of the categories of behavior and control, then everything specific and individual is envisaged as one instance of a type, a law. An illustration will bring the matter before us at once. I find myself in a strange city, and in order to reach my destination I make inquiries of a uniformed individual whom I see standing on the street corner. It is an individual policeman whom I address, but I have an eye to nothing save his uniform which I take to be the sign of a class of men likely to have authoritative information about that which I need to know. I use my policeman in order effectively to adapt my behavior to my environment, in order to solve a practical problem. He is to me no individual object; he, or rather his uniform, is but a stimulus. On the other hand, in order

that I may discover something individual about the policeman I must cease to regard him simply as an instrument. My interest and attention must terminate in him as an end, and not pass through him as a means. I must seek to understand him, share his ideas

and feelings, sympathize with him.17

Now, the insight that only those interests and attitudes which are non-instrumental, i.e., love, sympathy, loyalty, appreciation, knowledge, terminate in individuals is all the more worth emphasizing, because so often is it supposed that the merit of pragmatism lies in its capacity to deal with what is specific and individual. The instrumentalists from Bacon to Dewey have spoken slightingly of traditional knowledge precisely because it seems to them something wholesale and absolute rather than a description of specific sequences such as will be useful in guiding our conduct. It is in order that the concrete, the specific, the individual, may be liberated that all Platonism is mistrusted and abhorred and replaced by instrumentalism. In Dewey's words, "democracy is an absurdity where faith in the individual as individual is impossible; and this faith is impossible when intelligence is regarded as a cosmic power, not an adjustment and application of individual tendencies."18 But, the historical sources of nineteenth century pragmatism suggest something different. What I mean is that the utilitarianism of Mill, the positivism of Comte and the pragmatism of our own day in this country are all offshoots of the same intellectual tradition. These are the inheritors of the Enlightenment ideals of the eighteenth century. Those ideals become, in the nineteenth century, more flexible, less mechanical and dogmatic, profoundly influenced by the newer social, historical, and biological interests, but withal the same. 19 Now it is a commonplace but nevertheless a truth that the rationalism of the eighteenth century was a philosophy and an attitude which did not succeed in caring very much for, or even in

18 "The Influence of Darwin upon Philosophy," etc., p. 59.

¹⁷ This illustration was suggested to me by the little book of Gudmundur Finn-bogason: "L'Intelligence Sympathique," pp. 5 ff. This book is an admirable psychological study of the contrast between the two interests we are discussing.

¹⁹ Cf. the following from Benn: "English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century," vol. 1, p. 295. "The Utilitarian School was the chief underground channel by which the rationalism of the eighteenth flowed into the nineteenth century."

discovering the individual. The eighteenth century was, indeed, individualistic and atomistic. But, as Simmel has pointed out, with characteristic cogency and profundity, the individual as he appeared to the mind of the eighteenth century, was utterly isolated from everything historical, positive, and contingent. It is only through such a release of the individual from everything "individual" that the universal humanity, the reason, within each person comes to be the all-important thing. All individuals are equal just because no individual is unique, is really an individual.20 This is, of course, why the eighteenth century did not possess, with a few notable exceptions, what the following century called the historical spirit. Its ideal of knowledge was, rather, that of the physical and the mechanical sciences. The Laplacean formula exemplifies its hope and its typical habits of thought. This surely need be urged no further. But what does not always receive its due notice is the relation between all of this and that other characteristic temper of the eighteenth century mind, its optimism, its belief in the perfectibility of the race, in universal progress, in the unlimited scope of man's control over his world, in short, in its utilitarianism. The relation is here close and deep-lying. As Windelband has put it, "the knowledge of universal laws has everywhere the practical value of making it possible for man to control his world, and deliberately to interfere in the processes of things."21 And the converse of this statement is also true. If you want above all to control your world, to exploit it, then your interest will terminate, not in individuals, but universals, laws, and types. And this is as true of contemporary instrumentalism as of an order utilitarianism. But this interest which we have in the intelligent control of our world and of the fortunes of our life, powerful and significant as it is, is subsidiary to the enduring interests of human life. If the very structure of our civilization threatens to give to these deep-seated and passionate ideals of the life of reason

²⁰ Simmel: "Kant," pp. 172 ff. Cf. especially the following sentence: "Diese Entleerung des blossen Ich von allem individuellen und tatsächlich gegebnen Inhalt ist die geeignete Grundlage für die Gleichheit aller Ichs, denn nur durch sie lässt sich der 'Allgemeine Mensch' herstellen; jede bestimmte Qualität würde unvermeidlich die Allgemeinheit aufheben," p. 173.

²¹ "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft," p. 19.

little opportunity to come to full fruition, the lesson is that our world must be reconstructed. So far is the teaching and the spirit of instrumentalism sound. We are not content with our world as we find it. We wish to control and to reconstruct many regions of our social, economic, and national life. But we wish to do this in order to set free the life of mind and of reason, the more complete participation of our ideas and our interests in objective, significant structures, a deeper enjoyment of the life of communities—of the Great Community that is to be. It is to something essentially individual that this deeper interest and attitude of the mind goes out. Our next chapter will concern itself with some of the problems about individuals, about self, and about selves.



CHAPTER IX

THE SELF AND THE COMMUNITY

HE concept of an objective, significant structure has met us more than once in the course of our discussion. It is in affirming the possibility of the mind's participation in and knowledge of such structures that we have thought the genius of idealism to lie. We have seen how the religious tradition takes its rise in some such attitude of possession, some experience and feeling of continuity between man and his world, rather than in a sheer process of animistic projection of ideas and of personality into nature. We have studied the way in which the participation of man in objective significant structures constitutes the essence of Platonism and of Christianity. We have observed the impact of certain forces within modern life upon this conception, an impact which, in many reaches of our experience, has resulted in an isolation of ideas, a dissolution of the mind's integrity and its possession of reality. We then turned to some of these questions for their own sake and, if our report of the facts is at all adequate and secure, we are justified once more in making use, both for our thinking and our practice, of the concept of significant objective structures in which the mind of man may and does participate. But this concept, as it has thus far come to light, is abstract, and we have purposely kept it abstract in order that its wide universality might be the more apparent. All of the basic problems of ethics and of knowledge and of social organization touch somewhere upon the Platonic concept of participation in an "Idea," in a structure which is at once meaningful and also real. We have postponed till now the question, as to what extent, if any, we are justified in filling out the concept of objective, significant structure with a meaning more concrete, how far we may draw upon the deeper reaches of our experience for suggestions and hypotheses as to what some, at least, of the

meaningful objective structures in which we participate, in truth are. Two such provinces of our experience there are where we must look and probe and see what they may have to tell us. These two provinces are not unrelated; they are our social experience, our recognition of selves and of communities, and religion. This chapter will be devoted to a study of the concept of self and other selves.

At the close of an earlier chapter we stated two theses which we called the Platonic and the Kantian principles. Both of these enter into the historical tradition of constructive idealism. The Platonic insight stands for the attitude and motive of possession, of participation in an objective order of real and meaningful structures. The Kantian insight is the spokesman for the mind's constant interest in making over its world, in organizing its life and its experience so that these shall embody meanings which are the self's own purposes and interests. These two motives carry along with them certain implications for the way in which the self shall be thought of and interpreted. The Platonic principle, when applied to the concept of the self, results in a definite type of theory which will, to be sure, have various forms but which, as a type, we shall speak of as a theory of appropriation. According to any such theory of appropriation, the really important things about a self are those of its possessions which it has appropriated from some real order of being. The center of gravity, so to speak, of any self is, according to such theories, vonder in those significant structures—whatever they may be—which the self knows, acknowledges, acquiesces in, but does not create. The task which is then imposed upon selves, the vocation of man, viewed in this light, is the task of appropriating that which is real, independently of himself. The Kantian principle seems quite the contrary. According to it, the most important things about a self are its own meanings, its own purposes, its own activities; that only which it can assimilate to its own life is it willing or able to acknowledge as real. Its center of gravity lies quite within itself. It is self-active and not recipient, measuring what it finds in terms of what it is seeking and doing, and not measuring itself in terms of such objective structures as it may acknowledge and appropriate. We shall call such theories as build upon this principle, theories of activity.

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It is with some of the questions suggested by the relation between appropriation from without and activity from within that we shall here be chiefly concerned. These two concepts, activity and appropriation, represent, we have said, but two large types of theory; within each type there are variations and subdivisions. One such important line of cleavage which cuts across each of these two large types may be mentioned here. The concept of activity, as we observed in the last chapter, may connote a crass and literal ability of the organism to initiate changes, to make differences in an environment otherwise neutral or mechanical. Such activity is causal efficacy. Or, the concept may relate to such matters as logical activity, i.e., the activity of the mind in developing a mathematical proposition, or the activity which is required to understand and to sympathize with the life of our fellow men. Or it may be thought of as the activity not of our empirical self, but of some deeper, noumenal self which is responsible for the meaningful organization of our experience. However set forth, all of these ways of understanding the concept of activity have to do with the apprehension and the development of meanings rather than with causal efficacy. We may say that the first concept of activity, just mentioned, falls in with the various theories of animism, interactionism, vitalism, of what James called "piecemeal supernaturalism." They represent, perhaps, the more common and familiar ways of understanding what the activity of a self must mean. We may designate the two sorts of activity here in question as psychological or causal, and logical or significant. While it is not easy to disentangle the two meanings of activity in many individual writers, yet no one familiar with the development of philosophy since Kant will question the importance of trying, in principle, to be clear in respect to the boundary between these two meanings.

The theories of appropriation are also subject to a line of cleavage with reference to the source from which the material for the building and the moulding of selves is derived. Such a source may be thought of as nature, as experience in its simpler and more primitive ranges, as sensations, or impressions. The body itself, with its behavior and its responses to its environment, may be viewed as the chief storehouse from which the mind or the self derives its sub-

stance. It is obvious that the theory of Hume, biological and behaviorist theories, and the relational theories of contemporary realism, would all come under this general type. These theories are naturalistic, because it is nature from which the self derives that which it is and has. On the other hand the source from which selves appropriate their substance may be thought of not as nature, but as "spirit," the region of man's social experience, the world of history, or some Platonic world of ideas, of norms, of significant structures, which possess an inherent and autonomous worth. There are, it will be evident, various possibilities here, as indeed in each of these four types of theory. These are, to be sure, but types; they stand for tendencies rather than for accomplished and specific individual theories. It is admitted that there are many further divisions and many intervening positions. Yet the central and the ultimate philosophical issues about the self are, I think, involved in the classification here suggested. The self is to be interpreted from within, in terms of autonomous self-activity, either causal or significant, or it is to be thought of as appropriating objective structures, either those of nature or of spirit. Any significant philosophical theory of the self will probably fall within such a classification as that here proposed, and I mention it only for that reason, and not because each of these four possible types of theory will be here analyzed in turn. We have, indeed, already had some things to say about some of the matters which are involved here. Our last chapter was a discussion of the two types of activity suggested by pragmatic control, and by knowledge. We have seen reasons for rejecting the view that the only activity which is worth considering is that of the intelligent manipulation of the environment in the interests of economical and efficient behavior. Our environment contains objects to be understood and to be loved, as well as stimuli to be responded to pragmatically. Again, in setting forth something of the relations between body and mind, we have rejected the view that the life of the mind is but a projection of the behavior of the body. It is just this insight which is forced upon us as we attempt to think through the difference between responding to a stimulus and understanding an object. The brain is concerned with the former and the mind with the latter interest. Any further inquiries and

reflections as to the relation between mind and brain must be based upon this as a starting point. And what this means is that, however intimate this relation be thought of, the mind cannot be wholly, nor even essentially, a name for certain structures or functions appropriated from the body, or from nature. By nature is meant the totality of physical structures and energies, including the bodies of living organisms, the environment which literally impinges upon the body, and the physical commerce and behavior which transpires at such points of contact. We shall see in this chapter further reasons for rejecting nature, thus understood, as the sole source from which selves appropriate their substance and their life. The larger questions of activity and appropriation are, then, before us.

We may begin by observing certain motives which have led men to define the self essentially in terms of activity. There is first the appeal to immediate, felt experience. Each person has, it is said, an immediate experience of his own self, as a center of conscious activity. Let the world of outer nature, of other selves, of external experience be dark and full of mystery, even let it be doubted and denied, yet my experience of my own inner self-activity and selfconsciousness still remains as the rock of certainty and assurance. The immediately experienced self need be no separate entity felt in isolation from all else, or something over and above all of our specific perceptions and experiences. It is as against such a view that the fire of Hume's famous criticism was directed. "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." But it may still be the case that the self is directly experienced, not apart from specific contents of consciousness, but as an indissoluble aspect of every content and act of consciousness.1 It is evident that any such emphasis as that which this view places upon the irreducible immediacy of the self is more compatible with

¹ A most comprehensive study of modern theories of the self in psychology is Oesterreich: "Phänomenologie des Ich." Cf. also the various writings of Professor Mary W. Calkins, specially "The Self in Scientific Psychology," American Journal of Psychology, October, 1915.

the activity theories than with the appropriation theories of the self. For, from Berkeley on, the most transparent and certain of the immediately experienced qualities of the self has been thought to be just its activity. Indeed, one may here appeal to an older theory than that of Berkeley, to primitive animism, in which power and causal efficacy, so obvious in the self, were read into all the processes of nature. And the influence of the tradition of animism probably tends to emphasize the literal, quasi-physical, and causal aspect of the self's activity and thus to ally the theory of immediacy with animism and interactionism.

A second motive which leads to a definition of the self in terms of empirical activity from within is as follows. Only that is real which makes a difference, whose action produces specific changes in a world which would be different without just that activity. This may well be called, one will agree, the pragmatic motive. Is the self real? If so, the self must be the source of deeds and activities which are inserted into an environment of local and specific places, which originate new series of changes, and which effect alterations in an otherwise selfless, neutral, or mechanical world. A self which does this, if it be more than a mere name, must be a center of energy acting from within, not any depository or medium for what is merely appropriated from without. There is likely to be a more or less explicit assumption here as to the contrast between the inert mechanical environment of the self, and the self's own spontaneous activity. The relation between the environment and the self, or between body and mind, is here conceived as an external one, such that the addition of a self-active mind to an otherwise material world alters that world only in spots, only in those places where life and mind can insert their peculiar activity into a world where, in general, life and mind are strangers. Vitalism and interactionism are content to leave most of reality in the full grip of mechanism.

Perhaps the most persistent motive which has led to a belief in the empirical activity of the self is the conviction that only thus can the claims of moral freedom and responsibility be fully met. Only if the self is active from within, the genuine initiator of deeds, can responsibility attach to the self. And this activity must be empirical, specific, the source of definite consequences observable

in time and space, if responsibility also is to be definite and specific. The appeal here is to the world of common moral sense, of moral agents, to what Bosanquet calls the "world of claim and counter claim." Indeed, it is not too much to say that this entire interpretation of the self in terms of empirical, psychological activity rests upon an appeal both to immediate experience and to common sense, to categories of thought and of life, which age-long habit and familiarity have fastened upon the race.

These three motives have one common implication which should be mentioned here. An individualism and radical separateness of selves is the usual, and certainly the logical accompaniment of stressing either the immediacy of felt activity, the efficacy of mind and of will, or the demands of freedom and responsibility. My experience of my own conscious activity is, in its immediacy, its "warmth and intimacy," something exclusively mine and unsharable. Also, the separateness of selves is reinforced by the biological bias of pragmatism and the picture, ever present to our eyes, of separate bodily organisms, each acting as a distinct unity, as a compact organization of interests and of behavior.

Let us look at some of the questions touching the meaning and the validity of these motives. The many pitfalls which surround the notion of immediate experience should at least put us on our guard when we are confronted by the thesis that every content of our conscious experience has a self aspect, in which its ownership by

a self is an integral and ultimate characteristic.

It is this thesis which we wish to examine rather than the view, opposed by Hume, that introspection reveals a unique and distinct entity known as the self. What is more obvious and more certain than that there is an immediate experience of one's self perceiving, attending, hoping, feeling, and acting? We shall not wish to quarrel with this statement after we have made sure that certain wrong meanings and implications have been excluded. And there is an important issue about the self, and, indeed, about the concept of consciousness itself, which is involved here. Is it not often supposed that the reason why one has an immediate and indubitable knowledge of one's self lies in the fact that one is one's self, that the object of one's knowledge is here coincident with the knower, so that there

is no possibility of duplicity or error in the perception and knowledge of one's self? The presupposition here, persistent throughout so much of modern philosophy, is that the total existence and reality of anything mental is exhausted by its being experienced. Whatever may be the case with existences other than one's own states of consciousness, of these at any rate it must be said that their esse is identical with their percipi. This is for Berkeley simply a truism. It is because he first defines material objects in terms of sensations and perceptions that he can affirm their esse to be literally identical with their percipi. An unperceived physical object, i.e., the interior of the earth, is not for common sense an absurdity; but an unperceived perception, an unfelt pain certainly is, to Berkeley and to common sense, a meaningless contradiction. The presupposition here in question is, then, that in the case of all mental existences, their whole reality is identical with their being experienced. They are wholly transparent and immediate; there is no distance or separation between the knower and the known, the perceiver and the thing perceived. One consequence of this assumption, it is very necessary to observe. If this be the case, then all possibility of error, of illusion, of incomplete and inadequate knowledge of the life of consciousness, is to be, in principle, excluded. How can there be any mistaking the nature of something mental, all of whose existences coincide with what is felt and known, with what is completely present and immediate? "For since all actions and sensations of the mind, says Hume, are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. Everything that enters the mind, being in reality as the perception, 'tis impossible anything shou'd to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken."2 And Hume is here but the spokesman for the entire Cartesian, "end-term" tradition. Contemporary neo-realism, which is so close to subjectivism in many ways, also here identifies its fortunes with this Humean assumption. Hume speaks not only for himself, but for the new realist when he says "there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object or perception, according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose, understanding

by both of them what any common man understands by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression, convey'd to him by his senses." Modern realism is also, like subjectivism, a philosophy of immediacy. The only difference is that whereas subjectivism regards the object as identical with the idea, realism views the idea as identical with the object. In each case the possibility of error and illusion seems quite remote because of the coincidence, the numerical identity, of the knower and the known. But leaving the neo-realists, let us inquire into this belief that, in the case of all mental existences, their esse is their percipi, and that, accordingly, all possibility of illusion and mistake in the knowledge of our contents of consciousness and of the self is to be excluded. This assumption must, I believe, be discarded, and in so doing, our interpretation of the self will be radically influenced. The belief, too, that the self is immediately experienced, will require a careful interpretation before it is allowed to stand.

Let us see whether, after all, it is absurd to suppose that in the case of mental existences and of the self, there is a difference between their esse and their percipi. Is the concept of a stable and permanent mental structure, a totality of which immediate experience reveals but a fragment,—is such a concept useful and is it legitimate? I believe that it is, and for the following reasons. First, we are obviously quite unable to neglect the discrepancy between an apparent, experienced self, and a real self. Who does not remember the exclamation of James in the chapter on the Self? "Everyone must have known some specimen of our mortal dust so intoxicated with the thought of his own person and the sound of his own voice as never to be able even to think the truth when his own autobiography was in question. Amiable, harmless, radiant J. V. Mayst thou ne'er wake to the difference between thy real and thy fondly-imagined Self." How, we ask, can any such difference be maintained unless more of the self be real than is momentarily experienced, unless indeed the self has a being other than its being experienced and felt? And do we not say, of our motives, that we thought we were acting from such and such motives but now we see that we were mistaken? Our real motives were quite different from those which we supposed

^{3 &}quot;Treatise," p. 202. Cf. with this the essay of James, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?"

them to be, i.e., from such as were experienced. If Hume could say of our perceptions that we must proceed upon the assumption that they "are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they are not perceived" (page 213)—to Hume a false though necessary assumption—how much more must we affirm of our motives and of our selves, that they have an existence over and above their being felt. Psychology is not able wholly to forego the concept of enduring mental structures and systems, however puzzled it may be about the compatibility of this assumption with the traditional Cartesian-Humean view. As an illustration of an enduring mental structure whose being is not exhausted by its being experienced, consider the concept of sentiment. A sentiment—as that term is used by such careful writers as Shand, Stout, and McDougall-is not the same thing as an emotion, and the difference is instructive. An emotion, like a sensation or a pain, falls much more easily within the Berkeleyan formula. If an unfelt toothache, i.e., the pain, is absurd, so is an unfelt fear or anger. There is something immediate, momentary, and intense about an emotion. Its existence coincides with its being experienced. But not so in the case of sentiments. A sentiment is a more permanent, a more enduring mental structure, it has more the characteristics of a system and a totality than has an emotion. And it has a reality which exceeds that of any momentary pulse of consciousness. "A sentiment, as we have defined it, cannot be actually felt at any one moment, as emotions can be felt. . . . They are complex mental dispositions, and may, as divers occasions arise, give birth to the whole gamut of the emotions."4 There are other differences between an emotion and a sentiment, but this alone interests us here. It shows us that the psychologist must fashion the concept of a mental existence whose reality is not coincident with its immediacy. A number of further illustrations of the same thing, drawn from psychology, may be noticed. Consider, for example, the difference between pleasure and happiness. It is

⁴ Stout: "Groundwork of Psychology," p. 223 ff. The most extended psychological analysis of sentiments (in English) is that of A. F. Shand: "The Foundations of Character." Reference should be made to the chapter on Sentiments in McDougall's "Social Psychology," and to the important essay of Pfänder: "Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen" (of which mention was earlier made) in Husserl's "Jahrbuch."

analogous with the difference between emotion and sentiment. Happiness has a duration, it has a dimension, as it were, which pleasure does not possess. Pleasure has less structure, less 'form' to it; it is momentary, as feeling and immediacy are momentary. Happiness connotes something more total; it is an enduring disposition, of course mental, but having an esse which extends beyond its percipi. Another instance, trespassing somewhat upon the subjectmatter of our next chapter, touches upon the difference between the category of 'experience' and that of 'attitude' in interpreting the psychology of religion. In comparison with an attitude, an experience is transient, vivid, warm with immediacy. It is just what it is experienced as being. Now the fact is sometimes overlooked that many religious persons never have any religious experiences, of the kind, for instance, to which James devoted the greater part of his discussion in "The Varieties of Religious Experience." But such persons may possess certain attitudes, which can only be adequately characterized as religious. They may not think of themselves as religious at all, any more than a happy child at play, or a person happily absorbed in his work thinks of himself as happy. An attitude, then, has a persistence, a structure, the form of a totality, which makes it like a sentiment, and which makes it differ from an immediate experience just as a sentiment differs from an emotion. Now such observations and reflections as these, and many others similar to them, can lead to but one conclusion touching the matter which here interests us. We simply cannot say that the very nature of anything mental, such as the self, precludes its possessing a reality over and above what is literally felt and experienced. The distinction between appearance and reality holds also within the province of contents of consciousness, within the life of the self. Observe, now, what bearing this has on the way in which we shall think of the self. There is a type of theory about the self, nowhere more attractively set forth than in James' "Psychology," which we may call a "transverse" theory. It conceives of the stream of consciousness, flowing along in time, as cut across transversely at the junctions, wherever we place them, of present and past. This is utterly crude, but it may answer the purpose. Each present self, through memory and knowledge, becomes the inheritor of the just

preceding self, and, consequently, of all the preceding selves, each one of which was at some time actually real. The only self which is real is one which is telescoped within the limits of the present moment. There is a "never lapsing ownership." Can we not suppose, says James, that the "thought, the present judging thought, instead of being in any way substantially or transcendentally identical with the former owner of the past self, merely inherited his 'title,' and thus stood as his legal representative now? . . . Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought, dies away and is replaced by another."5 And why, let us ask, are we driven to think of the self as a succession of momentary "specious presents," as perhaps a title which passes from one to the other? Does not the answer lie in the fact that we are really committed to the assumption we have been discussing, the assumption that the whole reality of anything mental must be crowded within the very brief and momentary span of what is, at any present moment, immediately experienced? And if, with those who seriously discuss mental attitudes and sentiments, we renounce this assumption, are we not entitled, yes, driven, to replace such a transverse theory by what we may call a "longitudinal" theory? By this awkward phrase we mean any theory of the self which is not bound by the very narrow limitations which mark the boundaries of the present moment; we mean a theory which ascribes to the self a perdurance and continuity along or through the intervals of time. Momentary experience, emotion, pleasure, are "transverse" categories; attitude, sentiment, happiness, are "longitudinal" categories. They stand for mental structures which endure through time, and whose reality vastly exceeds their being experienced. In passing, we may note that a distinction between transverse and longitudinal interpretations of society may also be observed. Sumner's "Folkways" interpretation is a transverse theory, like James' account of the self. The folkways of today inherit from the past and transmit to the future; they do not perdure. They constitute no stable social structure, such as an institution or a community which has some life of its own, bridging the gaps between successive generations and folkways.6

⁵ "Psychology," vol. 1, p. 339.

⁶ This contrast is set forth impressively in the monograph of Dilthey: "Der Aufbau

To say, now, that the self is something of a total, enduring structure is but to carry one step further the insight which results from the very necessary distinction between emotion and sentiment, experience and attitude. A self is, at least, an organized totality of sentiments and attitudes, which no experience of ours succeeds in exhausting. We may say more. We may again use the focus-fringe situation. Just as, in the last chapter, we observed that, in comparison with knowledge, behavior is always focal and local, so we may say here that what is immediately experienced is but a focal center in comparison with the totality which is apprehended implicitly. Such a background or fringe is that system with which we experience, rather than itself an object of experience. To look for the self as something experienced may indeed be similar to looking for one's spectacles while one is wearing them. This total structure, the self, is not pieced together hypothetically out of momentary fragments. It is rather the constant background, or fringe, which encompasses the present moment and links the present to the past.7 This concept of a stable mental structure, which we have brought to bear upon the problem of the self, has many points of contact with some familiar problems of metaphysics. I dwell for a moment upon one such. It is the problem of time itself. This quite empirical use of the concept of enduring mental structures, such as that of sentiments and attitudes, suggests what we might call the converse of the metaphysical doctrine that, in some sense, the temporal series is not the ultimate category under which reality is to be subsumed. In the empirical time series the coming of the present does annihilate the past. And the very type of this incessant flux seems to be the stream of consciousness itself. Yet we know that the "present moment" of the stream of thought is more than an ideal meeting place of past and future. It is a "saddle back" and not a "razor edge." der Geschichtlichen Welt in der Geisteswissenschaften," Berlin Academy Proceedings,

1010. ⁷ I cannot refrain from making reference once more to a really fruitful essay by

Max Scheler: Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis, in "Abhandlungen und Aufsätze," vol. 2. Cf. the following quotation: "Was mir so gegeben ist, erscheint dabei stets auf einem undeutlichen Hintergrund des ganzen ungeteilten 'Ich.' Das in der inneren Wahrnehmung erscheinende Ich ist also stets als Totalität gegenwärtig, auf der sich z. B. das Gegenwartsich nur als ein besonders helleuchtender Gipfel heraushebt." p. 118.

The time flux is, then, in principle, overcome in the experience of the present moment where past, present, and even future are grasped together in one conscious span. How much more is the time flux overcome through the building up of stable and enduring mental structures, sentiments, attitudes, selves, institutions and traditions in society. In these structures, immediate experience, the present moment, does not cover the entire reality, the total structure. Their esse is not equivalent to their percipi.

We return to our views of the self. We started out by observing the plausibility of those theories of the self which lay stress upon the immediate experience which each person has of himself as perceiving, attending, feeling, willing, etc., as, in brief, a center of conscious activity. Our conclusion so far is that the self may more adequately be conceived as a relatively stable and enduring total structure which persists 'longitudinally,' as it were, through the time series rather than a succession of 'transverse' momentary selves, each one passing on its title to its heir. But this has a direct bearing upon the issue between theories of activity and theories of appropriation. For, the more the self is conceived under the form of a total structure, the more is there for immediate experience to draw upon, to appropriate, and to possess. The immediately felt, outgoing energy and activity of the mind may not, in such a case, tell the whole story. The total self will be thought of, not as a memory image projected into the past from the present, but as a real structure. We shall have won the right to speak of a whole self. Moreover, it will be kept in mind that neither nature nor history builds up total structures, organisms, selves, or communities, in a vacuum, and in isolation. Some environment these structures all have, and their life is one of constant appropriation from that which the environment offers. We may remember all the reasons why the isolation of mind, why subjectivism is an untenable hypothesis. The mind's very knowledge of reality is a form of appropriation, a disavowal of sheer projection, of animism, of the fabrication of total structures which we know to be but fictions. It is the extension of the present moment, of the immediately experienced self, into the past which has so far come to our notice. There are organized mental structures psychologically continuous with the experienced

activity of the present, from which the self of the moment appropriates some of its content and its meanings. But there is now, so to speak, another dimension in which the present moment is to be extended, another type of structure from which the present moment draws some of its substance. In setting forth the nature of this other source from which selves appropriate their possessions, we may recall the general analysis of the concept of experience outlined in an earlier chapter, and what was there said about the deeper, Platonic motives which are to aid us in interpreting the life of the mind. Knowledge of reality, it was held, is never simply a reading off of the facts of experience. There are possessions of the mind which are logically prior to the data of experience, and of which experience may be said to furnish an illustration and a vehicle. This, which we spoke of as the Platonic principle in idealism, takes on a wealth of concrete meaning when we apply it to the concept of the self. For this Platonic insight applies also to the nature and the knowledge of the self. We do not deny that there are 'experiences' both of nature, and of the self. We do deny that they are our sole possessions. This may, perhaps, be made clearer by the following considerations. Were the self nothing more or other than what we actually experience, the self could not possess some of the things which, short of utter scepticism, we believe it actually to possess. A wholly empirical self could not possess those things, knowledge and goodness, the possession of which is our best treasure. Were the self composed of nothing but experience-stuff, were it wholly temporal, it could not furnish the seat for that which we mean by knowledge. The existence of valid knowledge is never merely a matter of biographical interest. Experiences, events, are all biographical items; they may be dated. My acquiring of the knowledge of calculus and my forgetting it may be dated, and these events might prove to be of interest in my biography, but to say that I really do know something is different from merely reporting a biographical item. It is to say that certain ideas, beliefs, which are a part of my stream of thought and which are to that extent events, also possess a certain value; it is to say that they are also true. And in being true, an idea participates in an order of things, i.e., in reality, which is something over and above its membership

in the series of thoughts and feelings which constitute my stream of consciousness or even the whole of my experience. What we may say, then, is that every true idea is the meeting point of two different series, of two dimensions or orders of being. A true idea belongs to the experiences of a self. It is owned by some stream of consciousness, as a belief, a judgment. As such, it is an event which may be dated and is, in so far, a biographical item. But in so far as it is a true idea, it belongs to another series, and we ought not to say that the fact of its belonging to that other series is simply a further matter of experience. For, false beliefs and erroneous judgments have their accredited place in the biographical experience series. Or, consider this same matter in the light of the following. There is a distinction which goes deep into the heart of both the Platonic and the Kantian philosophies, between that which is contingent, matter of fact, and that which is inherently necessary and significant. We can best catch the force of this distinction from one or two concrete illustrations. Why did the Deists in England, the leaders of eighteenth century thought in France (excepting Rousseau), why did the mind of the enlightenment, distrust everything which was "positive," i.e., historical, relative to a particular time and place? Why did it seek everywhere for that which is "natural" and universal, common to all men, and evident to the light of reason? Because this contrast between the mere matter of fact and the inherently necessary was vividly present to the imagination of this age. These men saw the limitations which everywhere hedge about what is only a particular, contingent fact, what is purely relative to some local here-and-now situation. There is ever an element of caprice, of chance, there is always the possibility of a thing having been or being other than it is, had only some accidental set of circumstances been altered. Of such matter-of-fact existences one will say, they happen to be thus and thus. But of rational and necessary realities and truths, one will say they must be as they are. The three angles of a triangle do not merely happen to equal two right angles; there is a quality of necessity and rationality about this relationship. It could not be otherwise. Of contingent fact we say something else. It happens that my watch is on the table. It might be otherwise; there is no inherent necessity about it. The belief that there

is an ultimate necessary principle behind all law, independent of the consent of man and of all historic, contingent fact, constitutes the belief in a Law of Nature, in the political and juristic sense. And this is the meaning of equity whose "claim to authority is grounded, not on the prerogative of any external person or body, not even on that of the magistrate who enunciates it, but on the special nature of its principles, to which it is alleged that all law ought to conform." Equity "pretends to a paramount sacredness" without any "concurrence of prince or parliamentary assembly."8 We meet here once more with autonomous values. They, alone, save us both from caprice and from absolutism, i.e., the subjection of men to the matter-of-fact will and power of a particular and local authority. We see the truth of Lord Acton's judgment that "it is the Stoics who emancipated mankind from its subjection to despotic rule, and whose enlightened and elevated views of life bridged the chasm that separates the ancient from the Christian state, and led the way to freedom." The Stoics did this through holding fast to just this distinction between the merely matter of fact, and that which is rational and normative. But the Stoics built upon an earlier philosophical tradition and insight, which we owe to the Greek thinkers, and above all to the genius of Plato. And so we come back to the Platonic ingredient in idealism, and our problem of the self. For it is Plato who undertakes, both in science and in political life, to overcome the limitations of the purely matter of fact and contingent by linking it to an inherently rational, significant structure. We, in the late modern world, are most familiar with and at home in this Platonic tradition, in the province of natural science, specially such sciences as make the largest use of mathematics. For it is a just remark which is made by Troeltsch when he says that the essence of modern science at the hands of its greatest founders, Kepler and Galileo, Descartes and Newton, is precisely the discovery of rational necessity in the factual processes of nature (die Aufweisung einer rationalen Notwendigkeit im Naturgeschehen).10

⁸ Maine: "Ancient Law," p. 28.

^{9 &}quot;Essays on Liberty," p. 24.

¹⁰ Empirismus und Platonismus in der Religions philosophie, "Schriften," vol. 2, p. 367. My earlier statement is virtually a translation of this from Troeltsch: "Aber

I say that it is in science that we best understand this Platonic insight, because the nineteenth century came so markedly under the influence of biological and historical tendencies and it is especially in politics and social matters that we are for the most part content with being the servants and the instruments of matter-offact forces. Even in the physical sciences, this Platonic insight was for awhile threatened through the influence of pragmatism, which is merely a deliberate rejection of everything Platonic, and hence of the foundations upon which the greatest successes of modern science were laid. What has this to do with the question about the self? The answer is that selves are the places where these two orders of being meet and join. There is nothing recondite about the saying of this unless squarely to face the central mystery about the life of selves be recondite. The situation is wholly aboveboard and stares us in the face. Every true idea that any self possesses belongs to two series. It is, once more, an item in that self's biography, and it also belongs to a structure whose autonomous rationality is self-contained. It is the difference between a cause and a reason. My belief in the Pythagorean proposition has, as a mental occurrence, a set of causes upon which it depends, certain preceding beliefs and sensations, or if you choose, certain physical events transpiring in my brain. But my belief is also based upon certain reasons. I can prove the proposition. My idea thus mediates between a very local, contingent, temporal aggregate of particles which I call my bodily organism, and an ideally significant and logical system of eternally true propositions. My idea, if it be true, "interprets" the one system to the other. And my self possesses, then, not only its particular, contingent experiences, its here-and-now character, but it also participates in these significant structures, these autonomous, Platonic ideas. It is the self's possession of these which confers validity upon any particular biographical event, whether idea or deed. We may say more than this. A self is characterized by the fusion, most intimate, of a contingent, matter-of-fact, causal series, and an inherently significant structure. That is just what we

er (Plato) will überall zugleich die Ueberwindung des bloss Tatsächlichen durch den Aufweis eines in ihm waltenden und sich entfaltenden rational—notwendigen Begriffselementes sein." p. 367.

mean by a self. The central fact about a self is the participation of something natural and organic, empirical and factual, in that which is really of value. Again in the language of Troeltsch, a self exists through the "Aufnahme absoluter Werte in das naturhafte Seelenleben." It is the claim which the self makes that its ideas shall not only be its ideas, but shall also be true, which furnishes the model for the procedure of the sciences which seek to overcome the merely factual through interpreting it in the light of a logical, mathematical system. Mechanics and physical science are in this sense anthropomorphic and human, but the self they pattern after is one in which, in principle, the limitations of the factual have already been overcome.

Let us summarize our results thus far. We have held that the self includes more than the literal feelings and experiences, which at any present moment are alive with the "warmth and intimacy" which belong to the present moment. The present self, our contents of consciousness whose esse is coincident with their percipi, must be filled out, if it is to include all that the self stands for. And it is to be filled out in two directions. First, the self must be thought of as including a relatively stable and permanent mental structure, comprising sentiments and attitudes which make up a totality and serve as a fringe for the more focal and particular present moment. This is, so to speak, a psychological extension of the present moment. Secondly, the self must be thought of as in possession of those significant structures, Platonic Ideas and norms which, when fused with the particular and matter-of-fact items of experience, generate knowledge and goodness. This is, we may say, an extension of the present moment not so much into further psychological and mental territory, as into the realm of significant structures, autonomously valid, the participation in which is the mark of the life of reason. A self which is more than a behaving organism is made by appropriating from and participating in such significant structures, and fusing them with the particular and contingent items of its experience and biography. We have been defending, then, what can be called a theory of appropriation. But what of the activity of selves;

¹¹ "Werke," vol. 2, p. 853.

how shall we make provision for those motives which cause so many writers to stress the unique activity of conscious selves?

By way of an answer to this question, we may first recall the necessity of distinguishing between causal efficacy and the apprehension and development of meaning. There is intelligent activity involved in successfully making a fire outdoors in the rain; there is activity involved in listening to music and apprehending its beauty and its meaning, or in conversing with a friend and developing common ideas and interests. But surely here are two different types of activity which, however intimately they may be related in many of the specific things we do, are, in principle, distinct. It is the distinction once more between adequately responding to a stimulus and apprehending an object, appropriating a meaning; it is the difference between the pragmatic and the non-pragmatic interests. With the necessity of being clear about this distinction we have already dealt at some length, and we need pursue it here no further. For we are here concerned with understanding the relation between the attitudes of appropriation and of activity, with seeing the place which a life of activity and freedom may have in a world where there are significant structures to be appropriated. Is the interest in possessing and in contemplating significant structures utterly static and conservative, or does it give scope for the individual, for freedom, for activity? Is it consonant with the impelling radicalism, more necessary now than ever, of reconstructing and building up our world anew? It will be seen that we are touching here once again upon the central question, the place which idealism may still claim in the modern age. In the remainder of this chapter but one aspect of this question will come before us, that which concerns especially the activities and the deeds of selves. What I shall try to make clear is the way in which both appropriation from without and activity from within meet and interpenetrate in the life of selves and individuals.

There is, first, a very familiar issue about the way in which historical events and achievements had best be interpreted, and the part taken by individuals in historical processes. There are historians who care nothing for institutions and there are those who care not at all about individuals. There are those who believe that every

significant historical change must have been somewhere initiated by an individual, and there are those who view the individual merely as one who seizes upon and utters forces which he finds already in existence and which he does not at all create. Place side by side these two statements. "The great religious movements which have stirred humanity to its depths and altered the beliefs of nations spring ultimately from the conscious and deliberate efforts of extraordinary minds, not from the blind unconscious operation of the multitude."12 And then this: "Humility and religion are neither the discovery nor the private possession of a few 'higher intelligences,' but are bound up with the native tendencies and with the social development of ordinary humanity."13 There is the principle, explicitly formulated by Baur, "alle geschichtliche Personen sind für uns blosse Namen," and there is the Great Man, the hero conception of Carlyle, and of William James who held that all historical and social changes are due "to the accumulated influences of individuals, of their examples, their initiatives, and their decisions."14

The issue between these two interpretations of history, familiar as it is, touches deeply other central problems. Thus, when one surveys any considerable portion of the world, one finds abundant evidences of change, of evolution, of something which we call lower becoming something which we are likely to call higher. The inorganic world forms the indispensable basis for the organic world; it in turn precedes the world of consciousness, and within the conscious order the instinctive and involuntary provide the foundations for the reflective and the voluntary. Now any process of development may be interpreted in one of two ways. Either that which is later and "higher" merely unfolds, utters, renders explicit and articulate that which is earlier and "lower," or it transforms and

¹² Frazer: "Adonis," p. 311.

¹³ Marett: "The Birth of Humility," p. 13.

¹⁴ Great Men and their Environment, in "The Will to Believe," etc., p. 218. I quote one more passage, again from a competent historian. "But we must look beyond mere individuals. In the great ages of the world individuals are but the instruments which are used by ideas and tendencies. If Paul had never become a Christian, the work he did would have been done by others; and no one felt this more strongly than the apostle himself." Percy Gardner: "The Growth of Christianity," p. 85.

really adds to the world through that which it contributes. In the former case, it appropriates the more elementary and the earlier, and is thus in reality but a prolongation of the "simpler" structures which precede. In the latter case it contributes something which it does not borrow; it is self-active and creative from within. Does consciousness but voice the body's interests, or does consciousness have some interests of its own? Is reason but instinct become aware of itself, or does it disclose new values and new motives? Does the community, for instance the state and the ordered institutions of historical man, but give utterance and protection to the natural interests and rights of the individual, or does it add to the wealth of his interests, transforming perhaps those concerns and motives which he has inherited from a "state of nature"? Does the present but appropriate and prolong the past, or does it add to the past, contributing something which it does in no way borrow? These are all analogous questions. They are pertinent to our inquiry as to the relative part played by appropriation and activity, knowledge and will, in the life of selves. Each of the two alternative answers to these questions appears to be strongest in pointing out the weakness of its opponent. Thus, one points out that the whole meaning of development, of history, of life quite drops out if the "higher" or later merely prolongs without reconstructing the "lower" or earlier. Were such the case, indeed, we simply would have no problem whatever on our hands. We face problems here because there are discontinuities, because there are selves, local centers of disturbance and change. But, on the other hand, one may urge no less decisively that unless the earlier and the "lower" contain the ground for the later and "higher," unless the life and the deeds of an individual do really knit themselves into and utter the forces really within the environment, then his own contributions will avail nothing, and will be vain and empty. The activities of such an individual will be rejected as an external gift, an intruding charity which is not wanted because it is no completion and fulfillment, no appropriation and utterance of what is really there.

There is only one solution of this dilemma which can, in the end, satisfy us. We must discover a situation in which the "higher" can not only build upon the "lower," appropriate and give voice to it,

thereby escaping emptiness and shallowness, but also be not merely the repetition and the prolongation of the lower. We want to discover an order in which there are both appropriation and activity. And such a situation, such a type of order, surely is to be found nowhere except in what is essentially a community, a social and a spiritual order. No purely mechanical order can meet this double requirement. There is, in a mechanical, time-space system, no novelty, no activity of anything individual; there is only continuity, thoroughgoing appropriation without alteration or leakage. That is precisely what the conservation of energy connotes. Also, a system characterized by "piecemeal supernaturalism" is no better off. Here is, at least in spots, sheer discontinuity; radical pluralism; activity, but no appropriation. But how different is a social structure, a world of selves. The very commonplaces of psychology are our witnesses to the way in which, in a world of selves, appropriation and activity are indissolubly linked together in a unique process, unique in the sense that such a fusion is exhibited only in a social structure. This is the bottom meaning of apperception, of attention, of the processes of imitation and learning, of knowing and of willing. Always is there appropriation, recognition of something not created and hence not at all subjective. And there is also invariably present some element of activity, individual emphasis, and unique interest. Let us state the matter in this way. A social world, a community life, is certainly not one in which Berkeley's formula would hold. The reality in the midst of which one is living is not identical with one's own perceptions and feelings. All is not solitary and individual. There is an objective significant structure which the individual is to acknowledge. The social order is not just my "idea." But it is equally true to say that no formula of sheer realism will exhibit the true nature of a social situation. My social environment is not wholly independent of my own recognition of it. You literally cease to be my fellow, if I refuse ever to recognize you as such. To be sure, your body is there in space, but that is all. A state, an authority, a sovereignty which is utterly realistic, whose very reality is not in some manner constituted by the voluntary recognition and allegiance which men yield it, is no real sovereign and no real state. Authority and political sovereignty have always, even in the most despotic

régime, some vestige of what Green has called "that impalpable congeries of the hopes and fears of a people, bound togther by common interests and sympathy."15 Neither realism nor subjectivism, neither sheer recognition of something completely independent, nor activity and creativity in a vacuum, will describe the truth about a social situation. We must say, simply, that both appropriation and activity are here fused together, both continuity and novelty, law and freedom. Here is, let us say, a third dimension in which the present moment and its activity need to be expanded and surrounded before we understand what the self is or implies. The present moment, we remember, participates in the past and in enduring mental structures, and this we called its psychological extension. And it participates in ideal meanings, regulative ideals, autonomous norms and values, and this we called its logical extension. And now what we say is that it participates in a social order, it appropriates a community life. The individual gets his significance and his solidity because his life expresses institutions, traditions, hopes and ideals transcending anything which springs only from within himself. Yet, the individual may be no mere repetition, and no slave of his community. He is to interpret it, to make it his own, to discover himself in its life. Thus may we see certainly one type of objective significant structure, a complex type, and one which is pervasive in all regions of our experience. How universal, how cosmic, may we expect and hope to find it? This raises the problem of religion, and to this subject we turn in the next chapter.

¹⁵ The Principles of Political Obligation, "Works," vol. 3, p. 404.

CHAPTER X

THE INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION

HAT religion is to be counted among the foremost of those significant interests and attitudes which are other than pragmatic and utilitarian will seem to many a doubtful saying. It is, however, this undoubted characteristic of religion which will constitute the theme of this chapter. Religion, in idea if not always in fact, has been the chief spokesman for the attitude of possession, of contemplation, of worship,—we may even say of knowledge, when these energies of the mind are taken at their fullest and their deepest. In the total economy of life's interests there is room for the apprehension of meanings, for participation in significant structures, for the knowledge of reality. And these all fulfill an office other than that of response to a stimulus, other than that of adaptation and behavior. To interpret the proper function of religion, and rightly to judge of its destiny is to understand, in something of its concrete significance, the import of these non-pragmatic interests. Moreover, that religion, in some fashion and in greater or less degree, is a matter of feeling will probably be admitted. In seeking, then, to understand the office of religion we shall find ourselves confronted by some of those vexed issues as to the relation between the intellect and such energies of the mind as imagination and appreciation, sympathy and love, in short, between idea and feeling. There are two situations in which this question as to the relation between idea and feeling arises, and a consideration of these two large situations will aid us in understanding the nature and the office of religion.

The first situation comes to light when we reflect upon the distinction between two different regions of experience, and two contrasting types of knowledge. In those ranges of our knowledge and our sciences which are called exact, such as mathematics or me-

chanics, we find it both easy and necessary to mark off the individual thinker, discoverer, investigator from the truths and theories which he discovers and propounds. All intellectual and scientific achievement is, indeed, in an important sense, individual. It is always some individual thinker who is responsible for every known truth, for every fruitful hypothesis which has emerged in the development of science and of philosophy. But, in that region of our knowledge which we are now calling to mind, the truths, theories and hypotheses, once discovered or invented, propounded and set forth in books, may be understood and tested without making any explicit reference to the individual thinker who first discovered them and sent them on their way. One need know and care little enough about the individual man Pythagoras, or the life and aspirations of the Pythagorean community in order to understand and to verify the Pythagorean proposition in geometry. Nor need one interest himself in the man Robert Boyle, nor in the culture of seventeenth century England, in order to grasp the meaning and verify the truth of Boyle's law in physics. Once born, once discovered, these truths and theories of mathematics and of science live, so to speak, a free life of their own. They sever themselves from all local attachment to the mind which first formulated them, and gave them birth. Such truths, we say, are objective and universal. That identical proposition in geometry which is ascribed to Pythagoras might have been, and very likely has been discovered frequently by various individuals and in varying circumstances of life and of culture. No one of these individual thinkers, then, puts anything of his unique, individual self into such a theorem. It passes as common currency in the intellectual market, freely changing hands, transmitted from countless teachers to countless pupils, but never bearing the marks of any individual mind or age through which it has passed. In respect to such wares, the individual is but a transparent vehicle for truths which might have been discovered and uttered by any other mind, at any other time and place, so far, at least, as any characteristic of the true proposition itself is concerned. Yet, we do well not to forget that all this mass of common intellectual currency does bear upon it some stamp, which attests its genuineness and its validity. Such a stamp issues from the scientific mind and

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tradition itself, from the nature of an autonomous intelligence which reserves the right to accept only such currency as conforms to its own standards and laws. Such is the permanent outcome and lesson of the Kantian analysis of the nature and basis of our knowledge. Because, then, nothing individual enters into the texture of scientific truths, it does not follow that nothing ideal, nothing derived from the autonomous realm of mind, enters therein. But it is not this Kantian insight which here demands our notice so much as the fact that science does, in vast regions of our knowledge, avow an exclusive interest in such truths as can be understood wholly apart from the individual selves who propounded them and who transmit them.

But this is not the sole region either of our interest or of our knowledge. There is another domain, in which it is less easy sharply to mark off the individual person and thinker from the results which issue from his thinking, and the products of his art. Here, so much of himself goes into his work that, in order to understand it, there is need to watch the manner in which it issues from the individual's own self. The personality of the originator, whether creator or thinker, becomes so mixed with his product that we cannot go far in comprehending that product without some appreciative insight into the individual self of the originator. All art I suppose to exhibit something of this trait, though in varying degrees, poetry more than music, and lyric poetry more than epic or dramatic poetry. And not only is a work of art permeated, to some extent, with the individual character of the artist, but it bears, as well, the marks of the individual age and culture in which it was produced. To read the "Divine Comedy" with intelligent understanding is not only to enter into the mind of the man Dante, but into the mind of the medieval age as well. Philosophy, if we choose to contrast it with science, shows us, unquestionably, thought-structures into which the individual thinker has put more of himself and of his age, more of all the varied energies of his life and his experience—feeling, passion, and imagination as well as idea and thought—than is the case with science. This explains why it is that the history of philosophy bears a more intimate relation to the problems of philosophy than the history of scientific ideas bears to the validity and the truth of those

ideas. There is more of the total and individual man and his age in the dialogues of Plato than in Newton's "Principia."

But if art and philosophy show us something of that region in which the thinker and his deeds are so intertwined that it is impossible to understand his ideas apart from the energies of the self which enter into them, religion may be said to explore farther and deeper reaches of that same region. I believe that many of the central and most characteristic traits of the religious attitude are to be understood only in the light of the situation we are now considering. We have already met with this situation in studying some of the relations between Platonism and Christianity. There we were interested both in the similarity and the differences in the Platonic contemplation of the Idea, and in the Christian loyalty to an individual and historical life and community. That religion is supremely concerned with individual selves, places, and events, that it lives through participation in the historic life of some vital tradition and community, must be patent to anyone who cares to understand the religious attitude. And also, correlated with this fact, is the additional characteristic of religion, that its interest is fundamentally non-pragmatic. Religion grows out of the discovery of and love for significant individual and historical structures, which live in time, even if they also participate in values which are more than temporal. Of such structures, a "beloved community" provides us with our most concrete instance. Religion, when purged of magic—as it may be in idea if not, alas, in fact—is something quite different from man's interest in utilizing and controlling his world, in responding effectively to stimuli. The interest of religion terminates not in behavior following upon a stimulus, but in the apprehension of meaning, the possession of an object, the knowledge of reality. To be sure, our age seldom interprets religion thus. Rather does it estimate religion in accordance with the presupposition that nothing can be significant for the modern man except that which contributes to his forward-looking interest in control, organization, and activity; in behavior and the anticipation of behavior. How deep and how persistent are the motives which have urged the modern mind to the tacit or avowed acknowledgment of this faith we have already seen. The influence of biology; the retreat of the intellect; democracy,

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boldly generalized; and, above all, the forces of modern economic rationalism have all tended to sweep the mind clear of any disposition to recognize non-pragmatic values. When confronted by such an idea system, the most that religion may claim is a zest for social activity, for "practical" concerns, an interest in promoting social reform. "Even prelates and missionaries," writes Mr. Santayana, "are hardly sincere or conscious of an honest function, save as they devote themselves to social work." Surely such "practical religion" represents but feebly the historical energy and function of religion; it witnesses rather to the success with which the biological and economic (capitalistic) interest of men in instrumental power and pragmatic mastery have all but eaten their way into the very citadel of that interest which historically has been the spokesman for possession and contemplation, for the love and worship of some significant structure, which alone makes any activity and any mastery worth while. And no wonder that religion, even "practical religion," languishes when expert and trained secular structures are at hand equipped and competent to organize the practical concerns of men. Religion will always bungle when it competes with the intelligent and the scientific control of life processes and their environment. For quite different purposes has it, since its early attempts to throw off magic, developed its most characteristic structures and its life. "Uti non frui bonis terrenis, frui non uti Deo." We may perhaps question the first clause, but surely not the second, and Augustine speaks with authority. One may not say that having taken this stand we are of necessity committed to all that is reactionary and conservative. Indeed, the contrary seems to me the natural implication. One may be and will be fearless and radical in thinking through the task of social reconstruction and social justice, precisely because one cherishes and participates in significant structures, which are the source of guidance and of loyalty.

Religion, then, stands for an interest in participating in, in knowing a significant structure, and one which is both individual and historical. But now we may recall what we said a moment ago about the way in which an individual being may express himself in deeds and products which may not be adequately apprehended independently of their source, but which are penetrated by meanings intel-

ligible only as we enter into the individual mind or minds which discovered them or brought them into being. And what I now wish to urge is this: There is a certain correlation between the nature of any structure which is to be apprehended and the nature of such energies as are involved in its apprehension. Especially, the more concrete is any structure, the more total and concrete must be the mind's activities if the mind is to succeed in knowing that structure. An idea, surrounded by feeling and kindled by imagination, is more complex and—one may surely say—more concrete than is idea standing alone. Accordingly, those truths which, once propounded, are intelligible without making any reference to their source in some individual mind and age, may be apprehended by idea alone. But it is otherwise with all such structures as embody within themselves genuinely individual meanings, purposes, and deeds. Wherever an individual self, community or age has really put something of itself into its deeds, and has mixed itself with its products, in such cases idea alone will not be adequate to participate in or to obtain a knowledge of the significant structure in question. What I am saying, then, is that there are circumstances in which feeling and imagination, sympathy and love are vehicles of knowledge. Without the functioning of these energies which are other than idea, certain significant structures could not be known and participated in. So far from feeling always and necessarily being subjective, wholly lacking in an object, we may say of it what our general idealistic thesis has said of the whole life of mind, that it is in communication with and in possession of the real. Error and illusion are to be recognized and provided for as one may, here as elsewhere. But error becomes a problem only because truth is the expected thing, and only if some truth is indubitably the possession of the mind. Not life but death, not memory but forgetfulness, not the mind's continuity with the real but its isolation and its futility, awaken wonder and demand explanation.1

¹ Cf. the following from Dilthey: "Die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir." . . . "Wir erklären durch rein intellectuelle Prozesse, aber wir verstehen durch das zusammenwirken aller Gemütskräfte in der Auffassung." Ideen uber eine beschriebende u. zergliedernde Psychologie. Berlin Akadamie, 1894, pp. 1314, 1342. Cf. also

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It may be admitted willingly that the term "feeling" is not adequate to denote the regions of our experience here in question. We have used it here simply as the most familiar of the terms which mark out some of those energies of the mind which are other than intellect and idea. But I would wish to guard against the implication that there is a clear-cut and decisive demarcation between reason and sympathetic imagination, idea and feeling. Indeed, one beneficial result of attempting to view the matter as we have been doing is the breaking down of the easy antithesis which controversies about intellectualism are too prone to build upon. For, there are varying distances between the life of concrete individual selves and communities, and the products or embodiments of their thinking. The greater the distance, the less will any such content be penetrated by the individual, and the less will 'feeling' be involved in its apprehension. Mathematics and the exact sciences are concerned with such truths as these; everything individual is here left behind and ideas alone function in the knowledge of such systems. But one may approach nearer to the deeds and life of individual structures, selves, communities, nations. As one does so, some element of feeling and will, something akin to love and sympathy must needs function with idea if such individual structures are to be known as they are. Such structures, as well as the energies which function in their apprehension, are more concrete, in the proper sense of that term. Here, feeling and idea, the individual and that which is the embodiment of his thought, are concreted together. There is no radical and qualitative opposition between feeling and idea. It is a matter of greater or less distance from some individual source, from some unique and determinate purpose and life. We may start nearest to the concrete individual and say with James that "feelings are the germ and starting point of cognition, thoughts the developed tree."2 Or we may start with that which is least individual and most universal, with mathematics and mechanics, and we might see how this is to be surrounded more and more by concrete and individual structures, requiring more and more the play of feeling and imagi-

the discussion of Webb in "Problems in the Relations of God and Man," p. 59, and Merz: "Religion and Science," pp. 60 ff.

² "Psychology," vol. 1, p. 222.

nation for their adequate apprehension. It is essentially thus that the idealistic critique of naturalism proceeds, as is exhibited for instance in Ward's "Naturalism and Agnosticism." Again, in this situation, we may be aided by the focus-fringe analogy. Idea is ever precise, explicit, fully attended to; feeling connotes that which is less articulate and formal, the vaguer background and fringe which surround the focal center of our attention. But no hard and fast barrier separates them, and both may be cognitive. Ideas, purged of feeling, may know such truths as have a content and meaning of which no individual purpose forms any part. Feeling and love, imagination and sympathetic appreciation may know the more total and complex structures, which cannot be torn away from their source in the life of some individual self or community.

The bearing of this upon the interpretation of religion will be clear enough. Religion is, psychologically, a matter of feeling rather than of idea. This need not mean that idea is lacking. This need imply no rejection of the autonomy and integrity of ideas. This does not mean that religion is wholly a matter of individual experience and subjective immediacy. The argument points indeed in quite an opposite direction. It opens the way for conceiving of religion both as an instance of those interests and attitudes which are cognitive, which possess and participate in real structures, and also as, on the whole, a matter of feeling and imagination. And it does so through no appeal to any abnormal or unusual experiences, but through observing the part actually played by mental energies other than sheer idea in the apprehension of individual structures and meanings. But to stress the fact that religion is primarily a matter of feeling, or something akin to feeling, has a further implication. For, feeling is linked, psychologically, with emotion and with instinct, with all that which is most primitive and potent among the constitutive and moving forces of life. And life itself, when reduced to its most fundamental terms, seems to be the maintenance of a particular interest as against an environment which does indeed tolerate, and which may, for a while, sustain the vital interest. But, any living body makes incessant demands upon its world; it is partial to and selective of such features of the environment as are pertinent to its own interests. And all such objects,

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selected because they are relevant to the vital interests at stake, are attended to with a glow of emotion, with feeling and with "interest." Now especially noteworthy, in this respect, is the feeling tone which accompanies the individual's attention to and participation in the life of his social group. That man's social experience does readily become suffused with emotions and feelings of a mystical and religious quality is not to be doubted. The loyalty of any individual to some social community which utterly commands his devotion and his life interests is piety and it is religion. We have dwelt upon this sufficiently in an earlier chapter.3 But just here, when we see the psychological continuity between religious devotion, full of emotional ardor and mystic piety, and those vital interests, represented by the primary instincts, which seize upon such portions of the environment as are pertinent to them, we face an issue of capital and central importance. The problem touches upon a divergence and conflict between fundamental assumptions, and it confronts us everywhere in our thinking. Reduced to its simplest terms, the radical issue in all our philosophy becomes this. We must say one of two things. Either our beliefs and our judgments, our preferences and our loyalties are not valid unless they conform to the requirements of some such function and energy of the mind as men have meant to denote by the term 'reason': this means that no instinctive proclivity, no natural interest is justified merely because of the fact that it happens to exist; only such life activities as may be justified by the standards of reason shall be allowed to stand. This is, of course, the Socratic conviction: a life which is not criticized is not one which is fit for a human being to live. Or, we shall say the other thing: having discovered, beneath the life of reason and idea the welter of instinct and of impulse, we shall say that reason is no judge which stands above life, but is merely the voice which gives utterance to a preexisting particular interest. Ideas and ideals will now be viewed as reflecting the preferences of organisms which must

³ For confirmatory details, one had best consult the writings of Durkheim and his school. Simmel has some pertinent remarks on this head in "Die Religion," pp. 28 ff. A noteworthy statement of this same conviction appears also in the recent book of Loisy, "La Religion" (1917), a fervid and eloquent interpretation of religion as the very essence of heroic devotion to one's beloved nation.

first act and live before they think and reason and know. We may best call this, I think, the Humean insight. For, it is in the philosophy of Hume that this discovery of instinct and of life is first set forth with full awareness of its importance and its implications. The necessities of life are here seen to lie deeper and to be more impelling and more creative than any idea; it is idle and foolish to ask of reason and intellect that they shall furnish the basis and the justification of life. Life needs no justification; we are not to say of reason that it is autonomous, the source of such ideals and values as it may be willing to recognize. The "shining of the Right by its own unborrowed radiance"—the phrase is Howison's—becomes meaningless. In Hume's philosophy is embedded practically the whole of instrumentalism and of modern biological naturalism, which affirms the primacy of instinct, and denies the autonomy of intellect. It is wholly in accordance with the spirit of Hume's thought for McDougall to write thus: "We may say, then that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity, . . . take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steamengine whose fires had been drawn."4

We have already dealt with some aspects of this difference between the Socratic and Humean assumptions as to the office of reason in discussing and in defending the autonomy of certain values. This we did while attempting to give full recognition to the undoubted importance which feeling and instinctive, natural interests have in our value consciousness. And we desire here to stress once more as emphatically as may be the way in which religion roots itself in impulse and in vital necessity, and the way in which it bodies forth certain of the fundamental and instinctive interests which a gregarious animal will exhibit. To see the force of this, let us enter into and accept the premises of a thoroughgoing biological and voluntaristic view of human nature and of the engrossing human concerns. We will be confronted on every hand by vital

⁴ "Social Psychology," p. 44. This is by no means to say that the whole of this book is Humean, in its discussion of the relation between instinct and reason.

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interests, each one of which has arisen because it was a way of meeting the life needs of some specific organism in the presence of some specific situation. The total and single interest of the organism to maintain its existence, its élan vital, is but refracted into the various specific interests which reflect the different circumstances and needs of life. "Religion focuses round the needs and circumstances of life. Religion is indeed but a representation, an emphasis of those needs and circumstances collectively and repeatedly felt." This—quoted from Miss Harrison's "Themis"—is the burden of much of the most penetrating psychological analyses of religion which we owe to the whole modern movement inspired by biology and by the social and historical sense of the nineteenth century. It may well be that religion draws upon all of the primary human instincts, that it echoes in massive, if vague, form the ultimate necessities of the human organism in the presence of the world which surrounds him and, in part at least, sustains him. Or, with greater confidence and more definiteness we may link religion to those fundamental impulses and emotions which are bound up with the life of man in communities, the sensitiveness of the individual to social stimuli, and his felt participation in the life of the group. But it does not make very much difference, for the present argument, which instinctive interest or which group of life activities is regarded as furnishing the psychological roots of religion. That it is linked to some basic and instinctive interests, just as love is, indeed just as life as a whole is, determines our problem. Now with respect to instinct and all that springs from instinct, certain things are to be noted. First, there is the characteristic so strikingly set forth by James in a passage from which I shall quote. Each instinct, it is pointed out, leads to emotions, preferences, and ways of behaviour which, to the organism, are utterly obvious and "matter of course." The particular way of responding to the particular stimulus which happens to be effective is wholly self-evident and transparent, requiring no justification whatever. Such an instinctive connection is, for the organism itself, something, says James, "absolute and selbstverständlich, an 'a priori synthesis' of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its own evidence. It takes, in short, what Berkeley calls a mind debauched by learning to carry the process

of making the natural seem strange, so far as to ask the why of any instinctive human act. . . . Thus we may be sure that, however mysterious some animals' instincts may appear to us, our instincts will appear no less mysterious to them. And we may conclude that, to the animal which obeys it, every impulse and every step of every instinct shines with its own sufficient light, and seems at the moment the only eternally right and proper thing to do." Further, as Mr. Trotter has pointed out with clearness, the folkways, the idea systems, the preferences and loyalties of any human group whatever come also to possess this same transparent and absolute quality. "The essential specific characteristic of the mind of the gregarious animal is this very capacity to confer upon herd opinion the psychical energy of instinct." There are, in such instinctive behavior, or in the feelings which cluster around the individual's loyalty to and participation in the group, all the earmarks of absolutism. There is ever implied, if not avowed, an innocent disclaimer of relativity, and of the possible justification of other folkways and other loyalties. Observe, now, the bearing of this upon the concerns of religion. It will be agreed that religion has to do primarily with feeling, or that it is the spokesman of certain instinctive responses of man to his world, for instance fear, or that, in the words of Durkheim, it is "the eminent form and, as it were, the concentrated expression of the collective life." There is no need to plead for the recognition of some feeling and some instinctive interest which enters into the life of religion. And so of all our preferences, our sentiments, our loyalties. Somewhere each of these is to be traced back to some matter-of-fact instinct. But there is surely something disquieting about this discovery and this reflection. The existence and the intensity of any feeling, of any devotion, and consequently of religion proves to be only an index of the effectiveness of certain stimuli, and the sensitiveness of the individual to

5 "Psychology," vol. 2, p. 387.

⁶ W. Trotter: "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War," p. 82. Cf. also Veblen: "The Nature of Peace," pp. 91 ff. "Such an article of institutional furniture (as national loyalty) is an outcome of usage, not of reflection or deliberate choice; and it has consequently a character of self-legitimation, so that it stands in the accredited scheme of things as intrinsically right and good, and not merely as a shrewdly chosen expedient ad interim."

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them. Such feeling furnishes no evidence whatever as to the intrinsic worth of the object of one's feelings and of one's devotion. Let any normal individual attend, say, any college; let him absorb such folkways and traditions as there obtain, and feelings of loyalty and devotion which are called college spirit arise within him. And this will occur wholly regardless of the real merit and excellence of the particular college he has chosen. His feelings will be a function of his sensitiveness to social stimuli; they do not at all measure the worth of the object to which they are, seemingly, directed. Now the basic problem about religion lies just here. Are there any rational loyalties? There are plenty of instinctive loyalties generated by instinct, and revealing merely the effectiveness of certain stimuli upon the individual's mind. But are the total feelings and loyalties which attend the enterprise of life as a whole, and which surely are the psychological roots of religion,—do they also reveal any object which is able not only to cause the feelings and the devotion, but really to justify them? Does a man's willingness to give his life for his country measure the effectiveness with which herd opinion and collective emotions impinge upon him, or does it measure also the inherent worthiness and dignity of the cause to which he devotes himself? Unless we are able to affirm, at least, the possibility of the latter, I can see nothing but despair and cynicism for us as we face the future. Here is a terrible shortcoming of all feeling, instinct, of every matter-of-fact interest, of every devotion which is merely the inevitable prolongation of forces and stimuli from below and not at all the revelation of an autonomous good. For, in spite of the apparent self-evidence and transparency of instinct of which James speaks, we know how specious and illusory it is. It is utterly irrational, mere matter of fact, contingent and particular. Nothing objective or universal, nothing possessing inherent worth is here disclosed. To leave the matter thus with realism and with naturalism, is equivalent to shutting out from our life every breath of freedom and of reasonableness, of objectivity and of reality. Now, paradoxical as it may sound, religion, however deeply it is rooted in the life of instinct and of feeling, witnesses to the urgent requirement that our loyalties be not only the utterance of our interests and our instincts, but also the disclosure of an objective order which is the

source and the criterion of the good. Religion, in its higher historical forms, expresses the conviction that there are rational loyalties and preferences. By "rational" I simply mean that the loyalty is not merely generated by a local and particular interest which is rooted in instinct, but that it is directed toward and is nourished by a Good which is autonomous. The worth of our striving and of our interests shall be measured by the intrinsic worth of that ideal which shines wholly in its own light. Its worth shall not be measured by our instincts and our interests. No one can reasonably doubt, it seems to me, that such has been and is, the deepest and most universal intent of the religious mind. Through the vehicle of countless metaphor and legend has religion expressed man's sense that he is in the presence of ideals, of significant structures possessing autonomous value, which are pertinent to his own life interests, yet are not merely the shadowy projections of his own wishes nor the fortuitous outcome of the precarious congeries of vital forces and instincts which we call the human body. Religion, it is true, does connote a kind of "absolutism," if you choose to use the term. The object of one's uttermost fealty is not wholly relative to the particular interests which happen, for the time being, to be grouped together in some organism, class or nation. This is, one may say, "absolutism," but so is any conviction that there are, for instance, beliefs which derive their validity from the side of the objective realities they envisage, rather than from the instinctive and feeling propensities with which they may be congenial. And without this conviction there is no knowledge, no science, and no life of reason whatever.

Here then are two needs which religion or something akin to religion, may fulfill. The needs are legitimate and persistent. Loyalty and devotion to any cause involve feeling and emotion rather than idea alone, because it is through these energies of the mind which have their roots in instinct and in impulse that individual and historical structures are apprehended and participated in. But there is another side of the balance sheet, and another urgent requirement. That which originates in feeling and instinct is bound, it would appear, to be partial and limited, an expression solely of a particular and exclusive interest, never of structures and values

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which are really objective. The very individuality of feeling, and of that which feeling may know, implies such partiality and concentration. But we seek, at the very least, to clothe these instinctive loyalties in the garb of rationality, to pretend that they are inspired by the merit inhering in the object rather than by any interest or instinct which may happen to be ours. This tendency to take cover under the language of reason, to act and speak as if the intrinsic value of some object generates and justifies our devotion rather than acknowledge that our matter-of-fact devotion, instinctive or conventional, makes the object worthful,—this impulse is deep-seated and far-reaching. It witnesses to the actual need that we should discover some way of life, some organizing discipline, which issues from the authentic validity of an objective structure which we do not make and then remake, but which we know and in whose life we may share. Such a need is nothing whatever but the extension to all our life and our loyalties, of that which we willingly accord to the interest of knowledge, of science, and, it may be, of philosophy. Once the possibility of any truth whatever be granted—and to avow anything else is obviously out of the question—the range of the mind's contents and energies which do have an objective reference, which participate in significant structures, is likely to expand. You will, only with difficulty, draw a line between the mind's recognition of truth and the mind's possession of other values.

But, having considered these two functions which fall to the office of religion, we are at once confronted with the query as to whether these two needs are not really in conflict with one another. Do they not veer off in opposite directions, as one follows them along? To urge that it is feeling, or something not-idea, something which lies close to the instinctive bias of impulse or of tradition, which enables us to participate in the life of communities and selves, this would seem to connote anti-intellectualism and mysticism. It stresses the wealth and concreteness of the attitudes of love and loyalty, and it would ascribe to such interests of the mind a genuinely cognitive function. But the other motive and need points elsewhere, in the direction of a Platonic intellectualism; it distrusts, certainly for all the purposes of knowledge and possession, everything which springs

from impulse and instinct, from the basic necessities of life and of action. Now, placing these two functions of religion thus side by side merely serves to bring to a focus what is, after all, the central issue and the deepest problem in all our philosophy. It is the relation, once more, between activity and possession, behavior and knowledge. For feeling and instinct, representing as they do the energies of life itself, must needs select, act, and seek in every way to further the interests of which they are the witness. To live is to utilize and to control the world in which one lives. But what of knowledge, of the arts of sympathetic apprehension, of love, and of worship? Are these but variations upon the one central theme of creative intelligence and mastery? Bring together, once more and in a single perspective, the historical forces and the human motives which press for recognition and for some synthesis of their conflicting claims. Greek philosophy, the genius of Christianity, and the social structure of medieval feudalism, each in a different way, contain the implications of a common idea. That was the idea of an order of reality, a significant structure, which it is given to man to apprehend, to conform to, and to participate in. His vocation lies in the more and more complete possession of that order; it is wholly prior to his nature, his wants, and his life. Men neither construct nor reconstruct this divine texture, these Forms, this order of society. Everything individual, human, natural, is defined in terms of these prior structures. It is from this root that both religion and idealism emerge. Here there is opportunity for contemplation and for worship, for knowledge and for participation in the life and purposes of God. This is the one outstanding and overshadowing motive in the idea systems which prevailed down to the emergence and the dominance of those forces which have made the modern world. There is abundant room for diversity and richness of type in the long and impressive history of this master motive. And there was always present in these various idea systems one persistent and one great danger. It was the danger that, since one started not from human needs and from human nature, but from significant structures, these should become empty forms, the embodiment of interests which were simply not pertinent

to the life of man.⁷ The time comes when this danger proves to be fatal. The natural energies of man, his human interests and impulses find release; they burst forth rebellious against the claim of any significant structures which are simply to be recognized and apprehended. No structure possesses meaning or value, save such as is the embodiment and the instrument of a prior interest. We are in the world of the Renaissance, of nationalism, and of individualism, a world exhibiting the release of desire and the discovery of instinct. Not possession but activity, not realism but nominalism, not idealism but naturalism, not traditionalism but economic rationalism, not absolutism but democracy define the moving forces of the new age.

When we allow ourselves steadily to discern this large situation, when we see how significant and compelling are the idea systems which spring from both the old and the new, I see but one direction in which to look for a reasonable and a verifiable hypothesis which will meet our requirements. View the full circle of the mind's interests and experiences, and you must say that the mind points, as it were, in two directions, back to instinct, impulse, and desire, and forward to a real world which is the locus of enduring significant structures whose apprehension and love make the enterprise of life the thing that it is. And it is not two separate and irrelevant regions with which we are dealing, no merely blind, insatiable

7 "Both Stoicism and Christianity disapproved of slavery; but both were too careful of the established order, and the real effect of their attitudes was to keep the old institution in existence. For to the Stoic the law of nature was somewhat aloof from the actual arrangements of society. Stoics might believe and even act as though a slave were a human being; but the established convention had also to be maintained. And the Christian idealist also believed all men equal in the eyes of God and treated slaves as brethren; but he too gave his influence to maintain the established institution, for the laws of the city of God were very far removed from any real contact with the order of the state. Thus began the greatest hindrance to political development, the divided allegiance, according to which men continue to maintain as citizens what they condemn as human beings. Caesar being given one sort of service and God another, the higher your enthusiasm the more you neglected the actual re-arrangement of human relations. The temporal was reduced to dust and ashes by taking from it all the spirit of life, and the spiritual was emptied of all content by being removed from immediate contact with the world." Burns: "Political Ideals," p. 89.

Rousseauistic impulse arising from below, and a mysterious check from above, issuing from reason. Let one keep in mind a palpable and elementary truth regarding the function of consciousness at that level where it appears most rudimentary and simple. In a very literal manner we have said that the function of sense organs points in two directions. Sense organs are pertinent to the needs and the life-activity of the organism; and they disclose significant aspects of the environment. Their meaning is both "internal" and "external." Sense organs are called into being by the vital necessities of the organism, and are thus pragmatic and instrumental; but they also reveal that which is external and real and their function here can be interpreted only in terms of "realism." But neither instrumentalism nor realism, taken by itself, can do justice to this twofold relationship. The very same sensation which is an event in the life history of the organism and is a portion of its behavior just as truly as is its breathing, is also a disclosure of the real, in contact with and participant in an objective order. And what is so manifest in the case of sensations holds true, in principle, of the entire life of the mind. Ideas, as well as sensations, are the instruments of life; they are events in the behavior of selves, but they are cognitive as well. Ideas stand in a "between" relation with reference to life's interests on the one side, and objective structures on the other side. They interpret the one to the other; they are the pledge of the solidarity and continuity of life and knowledge, activity and possession, instinct and reason. Pragmatism alone, and realism alone, fail to do justice to the entire nature and office of ideas. An idea may be pertinent both to the life interests which are concentrated within a body, a self, a community, and at the same time it may participate in reality.

Now religion may be viewed, I believe, as the spokesman of this entire situation in which the life of the mind points backward to the vital interests of selves and communities, and forward to imperishable and real structures, whose apprehension is the source of whatever truth and significance the enterprise of life and of reason may achieve. This is the office of religion in principle and in idea. Such an interpretation does justice to both of those elements within the historic life of religion which everywhere meet our attention. There

is in religion immediacy, feeling, the urge and the pressure of social experience and group loyalty. And there is, too, an ineradicable metaphysical motive, a conviction of the reality of that which seems most distant from the immediacy of feeling, a belief in that which belongs to another order and another world. The fusion of these two elements may have been and may still be crude and unimaginative in the historical religions. Nevertheless it is religion which has served as the witness and the pledge of this most deep-lying and pervasive characteristic of all our experience. Unless the mind does point backward to vital interests, and forward to real significant structures, then there is no truth for man which is relevant to his experience and to the requirements of his life.

What I urge is, in substance then, that religion concentrates in a single attitude and experience those two motives which have

seemed to so many to be utterly incompatible with one another, the motives of possession and activity, contemplation and control, idealism and democracy, the idea systems of Platonism and Christianity, and the moving ideals of the modern age. And I have wished to contend that, in principle, these two attitudes are not necessarily antagonistic, but that they mutually imply and reinforce each other, when we take them at their fullest and their best. This they may do if a sensation or an idea may be viewed as facing in two directions, interpreting to each other a vital interest and objective fact. It remains to consider, in greater detail, why we are entitled to hold that the basic attitudes of religion and of democracy, contemplation and activity are not incompatible with one another. The belief that they are irreconcilable is widespread. And since idealism, in its more radical and profound form, has ever been the spokesman for the religious attitude, the rejection of religion implies also the rejection of idealism. The following passage from Perry may be cited as a

moderate statement of the position here in question. ". . . Idealism is not at heart sympathetic with the modern democratic conception of civilization. Idealism is, it is true, an *idealizing* philosophy. But the ideal which this philosophy glorifies is not the gradual amelioration of life through the human conquest of nature; but rather the perfection that was from the beginning and is forever more. The

enlightened and solidified mankind may achieve, despite the real resistance and incompetence which retard it. The faith which is most characteristic of idealism, on the other hand, is the faith that all things work together for the glory of an eternal spiritual life, despite appearances."8 Holding to this conviction, one will either renounce interest in religion altogether, ignore it while emphasizing the necessity for intelligent control and mastery, or one will interpret religion—that is, such religion as is worthy of survival in the modern age—as a doctrine of meliorism, and as, in substance, identical with the interests of morality. As representing the former position, Dewey is a conspicuous instance. One may confidently say that, for the instrumentalism of Dewey, there simply are no problems of religion and of the religious attitude and mind which are pertinent to our world and its interests. Here is eloquent if silent testimony to the conviction that religion is a matter of contemplation and of worship, of the mind's apprehension and possession of something perfected and significant. As such, it is not for us. For the instrumentalist, life and mind are centers of adaptive response, surrounded by an environment to be mastered and used and not enjoyed and loved. James, on the other hand, did concern himself with some of the problems of religion. But, for him, the religion which is best suited to a pluralistic and democratic world is melioristic and identical with the moral attitude of activity and striving. Any attitude of possession or contemplation bespeaks quiescence and a world in which nothing more remains to be done. Our world calls for struggle and for strife in order that it may become better. Significance shall accrue to it through man's activity.

No one will be inclined to deny the compelling force of such considerations. They are, without doubt, valid as against certain forms which, in the past and in the present, the religious interests of men have assumed. Nor is it at all difficult to point out certain traits of the religious attitude which appear to show a marked contrast with the life and the interests of morality. For the religious attitude, so it has appeared to us throughout, is one of the apprehension of and the participation in something which is both real and also significant. Here is, we have urged, something non-pragmatic, not describ-

⁸ Perry: "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 188.

able in the categories of behavior, response to a stimulus, mastery and use. Idealism, in its true and Platonic sense, is the utterance of just this interest. But the moral order—how commonly has it been urged—is a world of selves, individually responsible, defined not in terms of the significant structures in which they participate, and which are, but in terms of their fealty to ideals which ought to exist. And whoever tries to study with any patience and sympathy the life of religion must agree that it is utterly impossible to sweep into the categories of moralism those traits of the religious attitude which are most central and characteristic; he will agree that religion possesses a certain autonomy of its own, that it is no mere reinforcement of morality—as Kant supposed—any more than it is a bare affirmation of certain supposed truths, and all of this should now be clear to us. The achievements of psychological, historical, and social studies can no longer leave us content with Kant's interpretation, say, of the significance of the concept of Grace, and the experience which has gone into its making. We know how much has gone into the making of any individual self, how much is literally given to him by nature and by his social experience; his life and his deeds are, we agree, a participation in and an enjoyment of some community larger than himself. But, it is also true, as a plain matter of historical fact, that this participation of the individual in structures and in energies which he does not create, instead of lessening his capacity for moral achievement and mastery, steadies it and enhances it. He who has not discerned the way in which possession and activity, contemplation and mastery, knowledge and will, may be and are fused together without contradiction, in the life of religion, is blind to its most central and persistent nature. To point out the antinomy between apprehension, the contemplation of a significant structure, and the purposive striving to construct something satisfying and significant, between idealism and democracy, is certainly not the final word. The world of selves and of communities is too rich and too complex to be dealt with in so summary and easy a fashion. And the deeper regions of those energies and interests which men rightly call religious are given over neither to sheer quiescence, nor to creative adventure, but to a type of experience and attitude formed by the mutual interaction and interdependence

of these two seemingly opposed interests. Nor is this situation one which is wholly peculiar to religion and absent altogether from other regions of experience and the life of the mind at large. Indeed, we may best hope to understand the solidarity of the attitudes of activity and possession in the life of religion if we first turn to some analogous situations elsewhere in which such a fusion may be discerned. The larger import of the argument here should not escape us. Religion and idealism are rooted in those attitudes and interests which are involved in the mind's apprehension and possession of significant structures. The formative forces of the modern world have fostered the attitudes of activity and control, democracy and individualism. Our argument thus far has been concerned with the task of showing that the motives and ideas which find expression in Platonism and in idealism have an undoubted validity in respect to the problems of truth and value, of mind and of the self. But are these idea systems consonant with the ideals and attitudes, the motives and experiences of democracy and of the modern age? At this time to defend idealism, and to avow an interest in the life of religion, is this to be utterly reactionary, to be blind to all that separates us from the past, and to betray those hopes and aspirations upon which the future depends? In seeking an answer to this question, let us observe the way in which some of the major interests and provinces of experience do exhibit an interaction and fusion of attitudes which are analogous with those of possession and activity, idealism and democracy, religion and morality. We shall be interested, then, in the way in which the mind's activity, in certain important regions at least, is not describable as a sheer adventure in the void, but is intelligible and significant because it implies some previous possession. The entire process is one which exhibits a mutual interaction or alternation between creative adventure and cognitive apprehension and contemplation. The enterprise as a whole is thus "circular" and dialectic; to ignore this and to attempt a description of consciousness with, say, the biological categories of behavior alone, is to ignore one of the deepest aspects of the entire life of mind.

Consider, then, by way of illustration, the relation between deduction and induction in the acquisition and ordering of our knowledge.

What we are fairly entitled here to say is this. No concrete process of knowledge getting is ever an instance either of pure "deduction" or of pure "induction." It is the possibility of pure induction which specially interests us here. For, it might appear as if induction were really an instance of sheer adventure, as if one were, at the outset, in possession only of fragments and that the process consisted wholly of the building up of these fragments into something like a total structure. But not till the whole is thus constructed, not till the theory is formulated and the law ascertained is there anything for the mind to possess save the fragments which are to be pieced together and reconstructed. Here would appear to be nothing but a process which goes from the parts to the whole, a process exhibit-ing "creative intelligence," an experimental attitude, a "world in the making," a spirit of forward-looking adventure. No place here for Platonic contemplation, for the mind's possession of and participation in a significant structure. Any such structure seems but the tentative outcome of experimental activity. But, if anything is certain about the growth of knowledge and about scientific method, it is that any such description as this is entirely too simple and onesided. There is, in the first place, the part played by hypothesis and postulate. Every observation of a fact implies a certain principle of selection whereby just this fact is attended to. That principle of selection may not come before the mind as an explicit hypothesis. It will have its roots deep within those interests which belong to the mind, which indeed constitute the mind. It is the presence of these selective interests which lead both to the mind's looking and to the asking of questions. And nature answers no questions till we ask her. Facts are, then, observed and attended to in the hope that they may fulfill some want, verify some hypothesis, answer some question. The process of going from fact to fact, the activity of induction and construction is embedded within a structure the apprehension and possession of which makes the quest and the activity meaningful. The creative process describes only that which is taking place at the "focus" of some total situation in which there is a "fringe" as well. The further out toward the fringe one goes from the focus, the more is the attitude of creative adventure replaced by the attitude of apprehension and sure possession. That

the process in its entirety is not simply one of experimentalism, where everything is tentative because everything waits upon the success or failure of our constructions, is made clear by another consideration. Besides the process of induction there is the inductive principle itself. It is the inductive principle alone that, as Russell puts it, "can justify any inference from what has been examined to what has not been examined," and moreover, "we can never use experience to prove the inductive principle without begging the question." The inductive principle is that whose possession makes the activity of induction itself significant and we must say not only that the constructive activity is surrounded by a more total structure which is an object of possession, but also that such an "wholeidea" (the term is Hocking's), such a significant system, becomes pertinent to our experience, becomes articulate and concrete only as it is used to make our active and constructive enterprises significant. The continuity and mutual solidarity of focus and fringe, will and knowledge, instinct and idea means just this. The total process and interest is neither pure or impassive contemplation, nor one of sheer adventure and activity. Those philosophers who have envisaged the deeper nature of this situation have spoken of it as a "dialectic," a conversation, a matter of mutual enrichment with reference to the mind's prior possessions and its temporal constructions. The deeply human and normal nature of such dialectic so often has escaped the critic. The dialectic of Plato and of Hegel may appear a mere matter of words and of verbal gymnastics. This is not wholly lacking in either. But the dialectic is primarily an utterance and an interpretation of the life of the mind, and of the deepest trait of our experience. A paragraph from Nettleship, setting forth the nature of the Platonic dialectic, is worth quoting in this connection. "The logical method of the 'Republic' is in accordance with the form of conversational discussion. Plato does not start by collecting all the facts he can, trying afterwards to infer a principle from them; the book is full of facts, but they are all arranged to illustrate principles which he has in mind from the beginning. Nor does he set out by stating a principle and then asking what consequences follow from it. Starting with a certain conception of what man is,

⁹ Russell: "The Problems of Philosophy," p. 106.

he builds up a picture of what human life might be, and in this he is guided throughout by principles which he does not enunciate till he has gone on some way. He begins the construction of his picture with admitted facts about human life, and he gradually adds further elements in human life; he at once appeals to and criticizes popular ideas, as he goes on, extracting the truth and rejecting the falsehood in them. Thus neither 'induction' nor 'deduction' is a term that applies to his method; it is a 'genetic' or 'constructive' method; the formation of his principle and the application of it are going on side by side."10 This mutual playing back and forth between a total structure and a specific item, enriching the former and interpreting the latter, significantly responding to the stimulus of a fact because one apprehends a total meaning as an object, this is a matter of psychology as well as of logic and scientific method. Any new fact which may be perceived, every fresh item of experience as it comes to us, is taken up and knit into some already existing structure, some apperception mass, interest, hypothesis, or "whole-idea." And this process of assimilation is a circular process, in which both preexisting mental structure and the new experience react upon each other. Each is the interpreter of the other. Here is both deduction and induction, possession of a significant structure and creative activity, contemplation and behavior. An analysis of any significant human experience provides us with the essential concepts wherewith to understand how it is that Platonism and democracy, religion and creative intelligence, so far from being mutually repellent, may reinforce and supplement each other. That these two mental attitudes and energies are implicated together in the life of consciousness as it is concretely lived is the clear import of the chapter on Reasoning in James' "Psychology," and it has been more definitely set forth since then by many others.11 Hocking has given an illuminating account of the intricate nexus which binds deduction and induction together into a single complex process. This process is one which he brings under the rubric of the "Principle of Alternation," and it is this principle which is chiefly to aid us in interpreting religion at large and that more concentrated expression of

¹⁰ Nettleship: "Lectures on the Republic of Plato," p. 10.

¹¹ Notably by Angell, "Psychology," pp. 242 ff.

religion which is mysticism. "Effortless appreciation" of something complete and significant, this is what worship and the love of God are, in their psychological meaning. Every conscious event, every particular response to a stimulus, every specific practicality *does*, in truth, lie embedded within some larger structure, some apperception mass, some "whole-idea." Induction, pragmatic behavior, intelligent control, empiricism, and nominalism do not tell the whole story. The interest of religion, worship if you choose, is, in Hocking's words, "nothing more than doing with the whole self, and consciously, that which in blinder and more fragmentary fashion, we are doing at every moment of our waking lives." "12

Thus, the relation between induction and deduction, when we see its import, connotes what may be the possible relation between all of the manifold interests which are engendered by democracy and modernity, and those attitudes and interests which earlier took shape in the form of religion and idealism. "Every induction is *induced* by a prior induction, ultimately by a *total induction*, or judgment about the whole of things,—none other than my whole-idea, derived from whatever knowledge of the whole and of God my experience has built up for me. Every induction is at the same time a deduction, then,—an 'It must be so,' parented, though from the background of consciousness, by an insight which in its origins is religious." ¹³

We may briefly note the presence of another situation analogous to that which we have been describing in the province of man's moral and political activity. It comes to light as a difficulty which inheres in the attempt to view the state, say, as the outcome of creative

¹² Hocking: "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 422.

¹³ Ibid., p. 477. Hocking has also touched upon the relation between deduction and induction in his paper on "The Holt-Freudian Ethics and the Ethics of Royce" in the Philosophical Review for May, 1916. Cf. also the following paragraph from Bradley: "Essays on Truth and Reality," p. 16. "The want of an object, and, still more, the search for an object, imply in a certain sense, the knowledge of that object. If a man supposed that he never could tell when possession is or is not gained, he surely never would pursue. In and by the pursuit he commits himself to the opposite assumption, and that assumption must rest on a possession which to some extent and in some sense is there." There are some observations, acute as usual, concerning the mutual reciprocity of induction and deduction, activity and possession made by Simmel: "Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie," pp. 20 ff.

activity on the part of free individuals who wish to possess only such structures as they themselves have constructed. The social contract theory issues from such an idea system. That theory gives expression to the radical democratic—and modern—attitude according to which all worthy structures, fit for human habitation and possession, must be the outcome of man's own creative activity. The established political order, the structure of the state will be viewed as the outcome of men's deeds whereby they freely contracted with one another and built up an order which previously did not exist. But there is here an anomaly and a difficulty. For, in a "state of nature," where no political and moral structures are as yet possessed, no laws are binding, and no contract which is made where there is no such possession has any meaning or any binding force. A contract is a promise, but a promise has meaning only for one who already exists within a moral order. He who makes a promise must participate, prior to the making of the promise, in a system of laws and obligations. That system cannot be the product of any activity of promise making. And so with a contract. Two individuals may now make a contract because they both exist within a system which is prior to their activity as makers of contracts. That system is not, in its entirety, the residue of men's activity and creativity. The activity goes on within a structure which makes the activity possible and significant. So much at least constitutes the indispensable minimum of what philosophers have, at times, declared to be the a priori nature of morality. It is a way-often a very formal way—of saying that creative intelligence and activity occur at a "focus" surrounded by a larger "fringe" which is possessed and whose apprehension, explicit or not, makes the constructive activity possible.14

14 There is an interesting passage in Shaftesbury bearing directly upon the argument. "Tis ridiculous to say there is any obligation on man to act sociably or honestly in a formed government, and not in that which is commonly called the state of nature. For, to speak in the fashionable language of our modern philosophy: 'Society being founded on a compact, the surrender made of every man's private unlimited right, into the hands of the majority, or such as the majority should appoint, was of free choice, and by a promise.' Now the promise itself was made in the state of nature; and that which could make a promise obligatory in the state of nature, must make all other acts of humanity as much our real duty and natural

We have been citing illustrations of the undoubted coexistence and mutual reinforcement of the two attitudes of creative activity and contemplative possession. Now the existence of this situation elsewhere, as a normal if profound characteristic of our human experience, prepares us to understand what is an indubitable if paradoxical characteristic of the life of religion. To the sober-minded critic, zealous to defend the requirements of the moral consciousness, the attitude of possession and contemplation has often appeared antagonistic to the attitude and the implications of morality. What place has any Platonic or religious apprehension of significant structures, already complete and worthy of man's contemplation, in a world which bids us toil and create, looking only to that which ought to be but now is not? In so far as religion stresses any other interest than that of moral activity, does it not imply and justify a "moral holiday" which, if taken seriously, means the death of morals? How familiar is this judgment, and how urgently is it stressed, nowhere with more compelling vigor than in the polemic of James. But the very position against which James hurls the attitudes of meliorism and activism is one which makes the same assumption made by James himself. The quiescence and indifferentism of the mystic and the absolutist arise from the conviction that the life of possession and contemplation excludes, perforce, all moral striving and all discriminating loyalties. This belief in the essential antagonism of knowledge and activity, thought and life, is the common property of both James and the "tender-minded," contemplative intellectualist whom he pursues with such zest and relish. No doubt the history of religion and of life provides ample evidence for such a belief. But need it be so, and is it, in fact, the final word? That it

part. Thus faith, justice, honesty, and virtue, must have been as early as the state of nature, or they could never have been at all. The civil union, or confederacy, could never make right or wrong, if they subsisted not before. He who was free to any villainy before his contract, will and ought to make as free with his contract when he thinks fit. The natural knave has the same reason to be a civil one, and may dispense with his politic capacity as oft as he sees occasion. 'Tis only his word stands in his way. A man is obliged to keep his word. Why? Because he has given his word to keep it. Is not this a notable account of the original of moral justice, and the rise of civil government and allegiance!" "Freedom of Wit and Humour," Part 3, Section 1.

may be otherwise, that activity is, in certain normal and familiar regions, embedded within a total structure which surrounds and sustains it, and which may be possessed all the while that the activity is going on, so much we have tried to make plain. And just this, we now urge, is the deepest lesson of the life of religion itself. It simply is not true to say that here exists an inevitable clash of attitudes. Who sees nothing but this is blind to all that is profound within the higher, historical religions. James, when he leaves his pragmatism and enters into an analysis of saintliness and goodness is by no means thus blinded. Either a unique blending of these two interests, or something akin to an alternation-vide Hocking-back and forth from possession to activity and then again to apprehension and worship, this is the normal occurrence in religion. Yet it is sufficiently profound to be called a mystery, and, with a recent writer we may say that "one of the chief mysteries in religion is, in fact, the mystery that moral zeal does coexist with, nay feeds upon, the conviction of that perfection of the world which makes us see in it a revelation of God."15 We content ourselves here with observing this as an indubitable fact, appearing over and over in the lives of countless individuals as well as in the manner in which religious idea systems have entered into the life of men. Mystery and paradox that such should be the case, if you choose, but equally so will be the coexistence of deduction and induction, of that apprehension of inclusive structures which makes creative activity and experimentation possible and significant. There are queries and problems enough here as to detail. At least the possibility is assured that all the manifold energies and ideals of the modern age, democracy, individualism, intelligent control, and creative intelligence might coexist with religion and idealism, with the sure possession of objective, significant structures. Let us admit that "what serious

¹⁵ Hoernle: "The Religious Aspect of Bertrand Russeli's Philosophy," Harvard Theological Review, vol. 9, p. 181. Cf. also the following from P. Gardner: "And it is one of the great practical paradoxes of life that the human personality which is most constantly in quiet and patient communion with the divine does not thereby become poor and colorless, does not sink into a mere vehicle of an external power, but develops more remarkably on its own lines, gradually growing nearer to the height of that side of divine power and wisdom with which it has affinity." "The Sub-conscious and the Super-conscious," Hibbert Journal, vol. 9, p. 489.

minded men most want to know is what modifications and abandonments of intellectual inheritance are required by the newer industrial, political and scientific movements. They want to know what these newer movements mean when translated into general ideas."16 The modern man wishes, then, a philosophy, an education, and a political order consonant with realistic science, machine industry and radical democracy. Nevertheless, the modern man seeks to make his own world, not passively and piously to accept and acquiesce in whatever he chances to find. He is dissatisfied with all that is merely given to him from without, with everything traditional and static, authoritative and supernatural. Well and good, but why accept, then, as the final standards and sources of our philosophy and our imagination, those particular forces and structures which have found lodgment in modern life? Why say, with Dewey, that our entire philosophy and eduction "must effect the transfiguration of the mechanics of modern life into sentiment and imagination," if, at the very center of modern life is the interest and demand that we accept nothing and make everything? No, these modern structures themselves need scrutiny and appraisement, in the light of ideals and values which are autonomous. And this entire modern ideal and attitude of activity, control, and democracy, just as every pulse of conscious activity and will, presupposes an outlying significant structure which may be possessed and apprehended. At the heart of our modern ideals, awaiting clarification and articulation, is something in addition to creative intelligence, something akin to participation in what Plato envisaged as the idea of the Good, and what Christianity apprehended as the universal historical community.

¹⁶ Dewey: "Creative Intelligence," p. 5.

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